By Mehmet Enes Beşer
While the new era of international geopolitics sees a lot of great power competition between China and the US, the former and the latter use very different frameworks. China focuses on inclusivity, development partnership, and the Global South cooperation strategy. The United States, on the contrary, emphasizes its ally-centric approach which involves traditional alliances and “like-minded states coalitions”. Both China and the US build and leverage the power of various regional and global institutions in support of their policies and interests. This paper examines the issue of Chinese-US great power competition in the context of institution creation in Southeast Asia.
Institutionally speaking, China is a country whose approach is based on the principles of multipolarity that include projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the BRICS Plus framework, and the Global Development Initiative (GDI). China’s expansion through institutions implies the development of such norms as non-interference, development cooperation, and political sovereignty—all principles which should theoretically appeal to all Global South nations. China is a country which helps Global South gain recognition through the help of financing and developing infrastructure.
While emphasizing its traditional model of treaty alliances, security pacts, and minilateralism, the United States seeks to create an alliance of “like-minded democracies” through forums and institutions such as AUKUS, the Quad, and expanding NATO dialogues with Asian allies. While the security and technological advantages of such alliances may be immense, such institutions also rely on the principle of values convergence and security priorities that may be exclusive for some ASEAN members.
ASEAN states choose to engage with both sides by joining institutions associated with either country in addition to keeping ASEAN-centric organizations central to its diplomatic efforts. While such institutions may seem to be impartial meeting places, they actually represent a tool of balancing for ASEAN. Through such institutions as EAS, ARF, and ADMM+, ASEAN keeps its centrality in order to prevent monopolization of the region by a particular power and guide the direction of competition accordingly.
Such an approach is the product of pragmatic politics in which countries seek to gain from their relationship with both parties. While welcoming China in its economic pursuits in Southeast Asia, the latter welcomes US assistance regarding security and diversification. Instead of viewing both as competitive, regional actors see them as complementary in pursuit of different dimensions of sovereignty and development.
In addition, the ASEAN balancing approach is proactive. Through the establishment of inclusive norms, ASEAN prevents bloc formation while also preserving lines of communication between enemies. By making decisions which do not include any dichotomous alternatives, ASEAN shows its desire to preserve the regional diplomatic order that is more focused on regional sovereignty rather than great power exceptionalism.
However, such balancing is becoming tighter as well. The increasing competition between the United States and China in spheres like technology, maritime, and ideology might affect institutional division as well. Southeast Asia risks being caught between minilateralism and finding itself left out or bullied into making impossible binary decisions or finding itself trapped in a sphere of influence of one country or another. In turn, both China and the US have interest in this situation not repeating. Washington needs to acknowledge the fact that even if the states do not share common values, they might still serve as allies. China, on the other hand, wants its Global South story to be supported through open institutions.
Conclusion
The competition between the Global South model and the US ally model touches upon fundamental issues of the international order: will it remain multipolar or turn into a system of blocs? For Southeast Asia, the solution lies in the malleability of regional institutions. By accommodating itself to both sides equally, ASEAN proves that great power competition does not require subjugation to either side.
Southeast Asia is far from being an object of great power rivalry; on the contrary, it is an active subject trying to set up the rules of great power game. Its approach based on ASEAN centrality and diplomatic diversity is an example of how middle and small powers can pursue their own strategies amid great power rivalry. Such balance may work or fail depending on ASEAN unity and acceptance of a win-win order by both the US and China.