“Endless War” with no rules after Khamenei’s assassination

The moment of truth has arrived. The voices of diplomacy are no longer heard, and the sounds of gunfire drown out all others. President Donald Trump is living in a state of euphoria after his success in assassinating Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and some of his commanders. Neighboring countries have found themselves in the eye of the storm in a war they tried desperately to prevent but failed. Netanyahu has managed to drag Washington into a major war.

At this moment, the Middle East is experiencing unprecedented anticipation, anxiety, and fear, as it faces a “massive explosion”—a devastating war between the United States, Israel, and Iran.

This is not the result of “precise calculations,” but rather “miscalculations,” especially on the part of Tehran. Informed Arab sources say that the most prominent miscalculation is the belief among the parties to the crisis that each understands the other’s way of thinking. Added to this, according to Arab sources, is the excessive self-confidence on both sides. Now, all that remains is widespread destruction and an unprecedented war that has reached the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Iraq, Erbil, and Jordan, and even Oman, the mediator between Iran and the United States, amid reports of an attempted missile launch towards Cyprus.

While Iran, Israel, and the United States are at the heart of the storm, and Donald Trump and Khamenei have achieved their “great battle,” and Khamenei’s life is over, it seems that Netanyahu is the biggest winner, having achieved his long-held malicious desire: the destruction of Iran and its nuclear and missile capabilities, and regime change. Will we witness the irony of fate that warns against the fulfillment of Netanyahu’s desires, or will this destruction open Pandora’s box, overflowing with all kinds of evils?

All indicators point towards an expansion of the conflagration and serious repercussions, whatever the outcome, including the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the risk of a tanker war, rising oil prices, and the outbreak of a global inflationary wave. However, it is likely that everyone is counting their losses, and the Gulf states do not appear to be immune but have become an arena for conflict. There is a serious review process beginning for partnerships and alliances, and growing talk about security transformations in the Middle East.

Change the rules of the game

Former Kuwaiti Information Minister Sami Al-Nisf warned that Iran’s attempts to extend the war to other countries in the region are not in its own interest and called for wisdom and flexibility to prevail.

He warned that we are at the beginning of a war, and targeting the leadership will change the rules of the game.

The former minister revealed that he had posted two tweets two weeks prior, at a time of regional optimism, in which he predicted an unconventional war between the United States and Iran, met with an equally unconventional Iranian response.

In an exclusive interview with Sputnik, Al-Nisf explained that he believes his warnings have come to pass, noting that Iranian retaliation has now extended to various Gulf states.

He added that in his second tweet, posted on the same date, he indicated that the worst-case scenario would be the targeting of leaders, clarifying that he meant the possibility of Israel or the United States targeting the Iranian leadership, specifically Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. This, he asserted, is precisely what has occurred.

He pointed out that this fear is based, in his view, on previous targeting operations against prominent figures in the region, emphasizing that these entities possess advanced intelligence and technological capabilities that enable them to reach their targets.

Critical Phase

Former Egyptian Ambassador Yasser Murad believes that since the crisis, he saw things heading towards war, and there is a pattern of Trump’s administration that has been repeated, which is related to getting rid of the head of the hostile regime, as happened with Venezuelan President Maduro and now with the assassination of Khamenei.

Murad says that with the assassination of Khamenei, the equation appears to have entered a more critical phase. There are no longer any red lines, in the traditional sense, for Washington and Tel Aviv. Targeting the head of the religious and political hierarchy opens the door to expanding the circle of targeting to include other levels of leadership that form the backbone of the regime. This makes the coming days a decisive test not only for the current regime but also for the future of the entire Iranian state, the unity of its decision-making center, and its ability to contain the repercussions of the strike.

From this perspective, it can be said that the aftermath of the assassination of the Iranian Supreme Leader will be fundamentally different from what came before. The event raises a wave of major questions about the implications of the operation, its messages, its limits, and its potential internal and external repercussions in a region already teetering on the brink of a widespread, multi-front conflagration.

How Does Trump “Hunt” the Big Leaders?

In less than a year, the United States waged three decisive military campaigns against both Iran and Venezuela, employing a security and military strategy aimed at “cutting off the head of the pyramid” to disrupt the adversary’s defenses. Each time, Washington succeeded in delivering a shocking first strike, removing the political leadership from the scene entirely, either through arrest, as happened in Caracas, or through direct targeted killings.

Military evidence stretching from Tehran to Venezuela points to a recurring pattern: within the first 24 hours of a confrontation, Washington achieves its primary objective of neutralizing the top leadership.

This early “hunt” throws the other side into a spiral of chaos, forcing it to focus on regrouping and arranging alternative leadership positions, rather than concentrating on military response mechanisms or dealing with the accumulating crises on the ground.

“Swift Targeting”

In the first war against Iran, known as the Twelve-Day War, Washington, along with Israel, managed to eliminate top military leaders and target elite nuclear scientists through a series of precise military operations in Tehran and other major Iranian cities and provinces.

In Venezuela, Washington didn’t need much time to “capture” President Nicolás Maduro from his presidential compound in Caracas in a swift military operation. The details of the night of Maduro’s capture on January 3rd remain largely unknown to the Venezuelan and international public.

As for Iran, Washington launched its extensive military operation against Iran in the early hours of February with the assassination of its Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. American warplanes targeted Khamenei’s residence and office in the Iranian capital, Tehran.

Late on the night of March 1, 2026, Iranian television announced the assassination of Khamenei, simultaneously declaring 40 days of mourning and a seven-day public holiday.

A US Strategic Perspective

While the operations targeting Maduro and Khamenei align with the current US military and strategic vision of regime change through the dual approach of “economic pressure and decapitation,” without resorting to protracted wars or deploying US ground troops, the effectiveness of US forces in delivering precise strikes against the heads of these regimes, and the ease with which they can bypass defense systems and intelligence and logistical fortifications, remains a matter of serious question. This is especially true given that opposing sides frequently promote a rhetoric of war readiness and emphasize the lessons learned from past US wars.

At this juncture, the apparent US effectiveness in targeting “big heads” appears to stem from six major factors.

Six Major Reasons

The first reason lies in absolute technological and cyber superiority. Washington relies in its initial attacks on a barrage of technological strikes that cripple the enemy’s air defenses, rendering them an “open book” to its advanced fighter jets.

Before Maduro’s arrest, the S-300 air defense systems were disabled, and before Khamenei’s assassination, the Bavar systems were neutralized, allowing F-35 and F-22 stealth fighters to fly at medium altitudes and study Iranian and Venezuelan geography with near-microscopic precision.

The second reason is real-time satellite reconnaissance. Washington employs a sophisticated network of Pentagon satellites in all its wars. These satellites have provided precise intelligence on the movements of Iranian and Venezuelan leaders, down to the second, and have supplied geographic data on changes in the terrain near nuclear facilities, facilitating the targeting of the regime’s top figures.

US President Donald Trump commented on this, saying, “Khamenei could not escape our intelligence agencies and highly sophisticated tracking systems.”

The third reason lies in the silent infiltrations and defections within the leadership structure. These provided highly accurate information about Maduro’s location on the night of January 3, 2026. In Iran, it seems that years of economic pressure have resulted in sleeper cells within sensitive positions in Tehran, enabling the US to determine the timing of Khamenei’s and other military leaders’ presence—some sources even mention the assassination of top military commanders—at specific locations at the time of the attack in the early hours of February 28.

The fourth factor is the massive US aircraft carriers and ships anchored off the coasts of Venezuela and Iran. These powerful vessels not only carry Tomahawk missiles but also possess advanced electronic warfare capabilities that have been able to jam communications between political and military command centers on one hand, and military bases and units in Iran and Venezuela on the other.

In addition to this, Its military significance lies in reducing “warning time.” A missile, drone, or fighter jet launched from a submarine close to the coast can reach its target before the adversary can activate the “command evacuation” protocol.

The fifth factor is knowledge of the geographical distribution of Iranian radars. Washington realized that they are primarily concentrated along the Iraqi and Afghan land borders and are not widely deployed along the coast. This enabled them to launch strikes from “dead angles,” bypassing land-based radars from the sea.

The final factor is Washington’s use of political and rhetorical ambiguity to create the illusion that war is unlikely and that peace and negotiations are favored, while the Pentagon is simultaneously finalizing plans for a decisive military victory. The conciliatory rhetoric of Trump and his political team creates the illusion of calm and stability, generating a sense of military and intelligence complacency on the part of the adversary, which Washington exploits to launch the first strike.

“The 2026 War: No Security, No Deterrence

Since the end of the 2025 war and shortly after the signing of the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, Israeli rhetoric has escalated, inciting another strike on Iran to finish what the first strike started and eliminate all instruments of hostility to the Israeli expansionist settlement project from the Middle East.

This time, the rhetoric was American and Israeli, and it came after decisive military phases that significantly weakened Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, while leaving the surrounding Arab states hostage to Israeli expansionist ambitions. As a result of the heightened rhetoric and its targeting of the Iranian regime and based on Arab experience—particularly that of the Gulf states—in the chaos resulting from external attempts to change regimes, Arab countries rushed to the United States to try to soften the rhetoric or diplomatically manage its consequences.

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman were among the countries that called on the American administration to negotiate with the Iranians, and even pressured Iran to spare the region a war with dire consequences. Meanwhile, the Zionist lobby had already set its course weeks earlier. Several.

According to researcher Shaimaa Abdel Nabi, this Gulf trend, exceptional in the Gulf’s own nature, reflects a newfound understanding of Israel’s unchecked nature and the difficulty of predicting the aftermath of a war on Iran. This war, according to Israel, is intended to bring an ally to the entity, which, on the other hand, would act as a pincer movement around the necks of Arab states, alongside the UAE, Somaliland, and South Sudan.

This also confirms a shift in regional Gulf security strategies, a redefinition of the source of the threat, and a need to strengthen the concept of security and intelligence coordination among its members. It also necessitates accelerating joint defense projects, integrating early warning systems, protecting energy infrastructure and air defense systems, and even changing security concepts emerging from mediation, particularly in Qatar and Oman, following the American failure to deliver on the June 2025 strike and the Israeli failure to deliver on the September 2025 strike.

Gulf Security

Gulf security has come to rely on three pillars: the national security of each state, collective security within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and international partnerships and alliances. This last pillar is the weakest, and therefore it has been strengthened through mediation and peaceful solutions as a collective Gulf action aimed at preempting and preventing wars.

In reality, this approach has not succeeded, nor could it have, because Israel desired and actively pursued a war with Iran, disregarding any negative repercussions for the Arabian Gulf. Israel acts solely in its own self-interest, finding strength in the weakness of all parties. As long as the United States remains geographically distant from the conflict, the military backer will be able to pull Israel out of the fire while the Arab region is engulfed in it.

Thus, the Arab region was dragged into another war. Following a series of Iranian threats, this time escalating in anticipation, as seen in the Iranian strike on Al Udeid Air Base, Iran retaliated by striking 14 American bases in the Arab region.

For the first time in its history, the Gulf was targeted simultaneously: Al-Dhafra in Qatar, Al-Salem in Kuwait, the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, the US base in Iraq, as well as Erbil and Jordan. Explosions were heard in several Gulf cities, and airspace in the region was closed.

This time, the strikes were extensive, targeting direct objectives, and the level of escalation was high, raising the possibility of a regional war that could transform the Arabian Gulf into a potential battleground. The security of the Gulf has been fundamentally altered, and the concept of a “safe zone” has been dismantled, becoming instead a region prone to rapid escalation in any conflict between Iran, the United States, and Israel.

Furthermore, the US bases that once protected the Gulf states have become dangerous time bombs, threatening their security, sovereignty, and the safety of their inhabitants, especially given Iran’s proven reliance on missiles and drones, which has demonstrated the difficulty of completely countering them.

Accordingly, there are three scenarios surrounding the security of the Gulf – although the war is in its early stages and it is too early to speculate – First: the Gulf states rush into an air and missile arms race specific to each country to defend itself, and second: reducing its relations with the United States and reducing military bases, in parallel with broader relations with China and Russia, and warmth with Iran, which protects it from being targeted in the future – experience has proven that warmth is one thing and being targeted is another – and finally, reviving the idea of ​​collective Gulf security, the complete Gulf security that considers Iran a part of it, and that is currently imaginary.

Security Transformations in the Middle East

The Middle East is witnessing widespread debate and numerous questions about the features of a new phase that may emerge in the region following  this war amid the talk of a six-party alliance comprising Israel, India, Greece, and Cyprus, along with other African and Asian countries not named by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He stated that he would work to develop this alliance during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Tel Aviv on Wednesday.

However, observers noted his statement that Israel is working to establish a broad network of alliances around or within the Middle East to confront “radical axes, whether Shiite or Sunni.”

It is clear that Netanyahu’s statements and Israel’s moves toward India, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Ethiopia, and Somaliland represent a fundamental shift in the geopolitical landscape of the region and its surroundings. This shift ends what we have been accustomed to for the past four decades and opens a new chapter of strategic conflicts. Meanwhile, the current moment is witnessing a heated conflict with Iran, and an attempt to eliminate the capabilities of Iran and its allies in the region, whether through a large-scale war waged by America and Israel, or through a negotiated solution.

It is clear that the region is undergoing a difficult transitional phase that is nearing its end, giving way to a new phase and a new paradigm. The influential states are preparing to confront its challenges, and perhaps even its wars.

These states realize that they are facing numerous security transformations, most notably the shift in the balance of power in the region, the disintegration of deterrence systems, and the need to address significant developments. Among the most prominent questions are: Are the features of the post-Iran era beginning to take shape? Is there a need to form a new axis to replace the Iranian axis in confronting Israel and the alliance Netanyahu speaks of? Will India, with its vital interests with the Arab states and its legacy of non-alignment, become embroiled in an alliance against Arab interests?

Perhaps the most important development is the growing Arab awareness that the Israeli threat has become clear, direct, and a threat to their national security. Given these new convictions, the region is moving towards different arrangements to create a kind of balance, characterized by more flexible and strategic alliances and a balanced deterrent force, with a focus on political and security coordination, as seen in the Pakistani-Saudi joint defense agreement, the revival of Egyptian visions for the formation of new regional security forces, and the exploration of mechanisms to enhance Gulf defense cooperation. This was followed by a convergence of Egyptian and Turkish security visions for the first time in 13 years, resulting in the joint naval exercises “Sea of ​​Friendship” from September 22-26, 2015, and security coordination in the southern region.

These developments carry several implications, most notably: the embodiment of the classic military principle of “power plus power,” through the alliance between Egypt, the largest military power in the Arab region, the Middle East, and Africa, and Turkey, one of the most important military powers in the region and a member of NATO. This alliance aims to prevent any external party from exploiting the security vacuum in the region, thereby redrawing the map of influence in a way that avoids Israel’s traditional dominance and serves the collective security and strategic interests of regional states. This is one of the most delicate gambles, and it remains under scrutiny and evaluation in the current and coming phases.

On another front, there is an important factor related to Washington’s vision for the region and its future. It is noteworthy that US President Donald Trump clearly stated in the new US National Security Strategy that his country rejects the hegemony of any single power in the Middle East. In his renowned book “The Next Decade,” American writer and strategist George Friedman argues that the Middle East is not an arena for spreading values ​​or rebuilding states, but rather a central region in the global balance of power. According to his perspective, the American objective is not to end conflicts, but to prevent the emergence of a dominant regional power, particularly Iran, capable of controlling the Gulf and influencing energy flows through the Arabian Gulf.

Therefore, Friedman favors managing competition among regional powers, minimizing direct intervention, and employing deterrence and indirect support for allies. This approach aims to maintain a state of unstable equilibrium in the region, safeguarding Washington’s strategic interests without requiring extensive, long-term military engagement.

In his view, the United States does not seek to end conflicts, but rather to manage them so that no single party can decisively win. The goal is to prevent the emergence of a single regional power capable of controlling the Gulf or decisively influencing energy flows, given that whoever controls the Gulf region possesses global leverage.

Consequently, any excessive rise in Iranian influence, or even a broad regional rapprochement outside the American framework, constitutes a strategic threat. Interestingly, Friedman argues that while Israel is a crucial strategic ally of the United States, it is not the central focus of American policy in the Middle East, but rather part of a broader balancing act.

In his view, Washington supports Israel to ensure its military superiority and deter its adversaries, but the deeper objective is not simply to defend Israel itself, but to prevent any regional power, particularly Iran, from altering the balance of power. He believes the United States must sometimes restrain Israeli actions if they threaten to ignite a wider regional war that would disrupt the overall equilibrium, because the strategic priority is not decisive victory, but rather maintaining a balance of power that prevents total dominance and safeguards American interests in the region.

It remains to be seen whether regional states, especially Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Qatar, and Algeria, will move more actively to coordinate their efforts, despite the numerous challenges facing the region’s political and security arrangements, particularly after the events of October 7, 2013, and the growing likelihood of stalled resolutions in the bloody conflicts. However, Netanyahu’s threats, the fragmentation of the nation-state, and the realization that national security is at stake, have provided a rare “window of opportunity,” pushing the bet and action towards building a “security alliance.”

If Arab parties and Middle Eastern powers agree on the priority of “security timing.”

Arab and regional sources believe there are signs of a new climate in the region, most notably: a more acceptable balance between traditional and emerging powers on all vital regional issues; an emphasis on the diplomatic priorities of influential states, particularly Egypt, in resolving all outstanding peace settlements in crisis-stricken countries; military preparedness as a deterrent mechanism should the situation on the ground in the region escalate; attempts to contain Arab disputes; the end of intra-Gulf polarization; Qatar’s return to the Arab fold; improved communication channels; and expanded dialogue, especially with the resumption of Saudi-Iranian relations and the mending of the Arab-Turkish rift. There is also a growing Arab trend toward building balanced relations with emerging regional powers, and Iran is no longer considered the most serious threat in light of the “Greater Israel” threat.

Betting on time is no longer viable

Generally speaking, in recent hours, media outlets have reported consultations in Saudi Arabia regarding the “right to respond,” Qatari-Saudi contacts, and condemnations from Jordan, Egypt, and Kuwait of the “Iranian aggression.” However, any independent Gulf military action remains unlikely, given these countries’ own fears of a wider and more prolonged war, and its impact on their energy, tourism, and investment economies.

Moreover, any Gulf action is constrained by American firepower and, consequently, by Israeli interests. The Gulf, which has relied on the West (Britain and America) for its existence for many years, cannot afford to risk throwing itself into the fire in a moment of recklessness.

Today, the Arab region stands on a knife’s edge, awaiting the outcome of the Israeli-Iranian war. This waiting game seems to be a recurring pattern, but the region’s security can no longer afford to “bet on time” to weaken both Israel and Iran. There is a real danger that the flames of war will engulf everyone, and to prevent this, Arab and Gulf security must be addressed differently.