By Adem Kılıç, Political Scientist
Greece’s armament of islands located extremely close to the Turkish coast and its insistence on extending its territorial waters from 6 miles to 12 miles should be considered as two separate but complementary moves aimed at changing the existing status quo in the Aegean Sea.
The islands armed by Greece and its obligations
Article 13 of the Treaty of Lausanne imposes certain military restrictions on Greece concerning the islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Ikaria. While the establishment of naval bases and fortifications on these islands is prohibited, the nature and quantity of military forces are also restricted.
Therefore, the issue is not, as Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis recently said, whether Greece keeps troops on its own territory or not.
The issue is whether Greece complies with its international obligations, and beyond that, whether with this move it is pursuing an unlawful course in a way that would pose a threat to Türkiye’s national security.
“Pacta sunt servanda,” one of the fundamental principles of the law of international treaties, states that treaties in force bind their parties and that their implementation is unavoidable.
In other words; the fact that a state claims that its security environment has changed does not, by itself, eliminate the obligations it previously accepted.
With regard to the Dodecanese, Article 14 of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty directly establishes a demilitarized status.
In other words, it shows that Greece’s fundamental obligation here cannot go beyond preserving the legal status it accepted together with the transfer of the islands to itself.
Greece’s objection that “Türkiye is not a party to the Paris Treaty” does not eliminate the fact under which conditions the Dodecanese were transferred to Greece.
In other words, this objection by Greece also has no justified basis in terms of international law and the relevant agreements.
The 12-mile claim
Regarding 12 miles, it is of great importance to correctly understand Türkiye’s position.
Yes, Article 3 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea recognizes that states may extend their territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles. However, the right to 12 miles and maritime delimitation are not the same thing.
In states with opposite or adjacent coasts, the delimitation of territorial waters is addressed separately.
Article 15 of UNCLOS also requires the median line principle and, in certain circumstances, the consideration of special circumstances.
The fundamental element that differentiates the Aegean Sea is precisely this point.
The distance between the Turkish coast and the Greek islands is much shorter than 12 miles at many points. Therefore, Greece measuring 12 miles from all of its coasts does not merely mean expanding its own territorial waters, but also creates a result that could directly affect the use of Türkiye’s maritime areas.
Türkiye’s fundamental objection also arises here.
In summary, all these conditions do not mean that Greece can unilaterally use the special geography of the Aegean Sea and Türkiye’s legitimate maritime rights in a manner that disregards them.
The maritime effect of the islands is not unlimited
Another argument put forward by Greece is that islands can create maritime areas like the mainland under international law. Article 121 of UNCLOS generally grants islands rights with regard to territorial waters and other maritime jurisdiction areas.
But here too, the critical distinction is this. The sovereignty over an island and the effect that island will be given in maritime delimitation are not the same.
International courts assess the position of islands and their effect on delimitation separately in many maritime delimitation cases.
As an example; in the 2009 Romania-Ukraine Black Sea Maritime Boundary Case, the situation of Snake Island also constituted an important precedent in this respect.
Therefore, the approach that “if an island belongs to Greece, it automatically creates 12 miles and full maritime jurisdiction in all directions” is not exactly valid according to the law of international maritime delimitation.
Türkiye’s declaration in 1995, through a decision of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, that it would consider Greece’s extension of its territorial waters to 12 miles a cause for war also stands out as a strategic decision taken in light of all these facts.
Conclusion: The issue is not a few islands or a few miles
In summary; all these data reveal that the main struggle in the Aegean Sea is much greater than the debate over the arming of a few islands or the extension of territorial waters from 6 miles to 12 miles.
It is clearly seen that Greece’s main objective is to open the way toward the so-called “Megali Idea” goal it seeks in the region by increasing the military capacity of the islands and the nautical miles of its territorial waters.
Furthermore, the international provisions and precedent examples I have detailed above clearly demonstrate that Greece’s claims cannot stand above Türkiye’s legitimate rights under international law.
Therefore, the Lausanne and Paris arrangements in the Aegean Sea, the “pacta sunt servanda” principle of the law of treaties, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and international precedent court rulings such as the case of Snake Island clearly demonstrate Türkiye’s legitimacy.
For years, Greece has continuously tried to create a perception of victimhood in order to preserve its expansionist theses in the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean by using its European Union membership and US bases as a shield.
However, Greece is now facing the reality that it is no longer dealing with the old Türkiye and, in the words of President Erdoğan, “the European Union is no longer a priority for us,” and if it insists on its mistake, it may also have to face Türkiye’s military power.