The consolidation of the Russia-China strategic axis cannot but penetrate into Vietnam’s strategic sphere, including with respect to the South China Sea. But it needs not be threatening.
The consolidation of the Russia-China strategic axis cannot but penetrate into Vietnam’s strategic sphere, including with respect to the South China Sea. But it needs not be threatening.
By Mehmet Enes Beşer
As Russia-China strategic alignment becomes increasingly solidified with yet further heightening passion—based on converging geopolitical interests crossing and heightening economic interdependence—the world of Southeast Asia has watched with keen interest. Among them, however, Vietnam will be the hardest hit by the impact of the solidified axis. While other nations in the region have enjoyed friendly relations with either Moscow or Beijing but never both at the same time, Hanoi has enjoyed friendly relations with both Beijing and Moscow. Having already had its own disputed sea border with China in its own past, however, Vietnam would also only naturally worry that the closer Sino-Russian relations would destabilize Russia’s policy of equidistant and thus further promote Chinese interests in the South China Sea. But prudence can be anticipated, but alarmism cannot. The Russia-China relationship as complex as it will never pose a threat to the strategic independence of Vietnam or its own in the near term.
The anxiety in Vietnam results from a realistic calculation. Its biggest strategic opponent is China, most notably the South China Sea, where expansive claims by China specifically threaten Vietnam’s sovereignty and right to the resources. In contrast, Russia has been its stable and secure defense ally. Much of the weaponry of the Vietnamese military—including air power and naval vessels—is of Russian provenance. Besides, Russian petroleum corporations are currently engaged in the waters claimed by Vietnam, earning not only economic worth but also strategic validation for Vietnam’s sovereign rights.
There, the threat is simple: If Russia becomes too indebted to China—geographically isolated from the West and more indebted to Beijing—then Moscow will cut back its military-technical assistance to Vietnam, or even close Russian trade in disputed seas. That would embolden China to raise the stakes of even greater pressure on Vietnam and shift the strategic balance of the South China Sea.
But the fears must be overstated. Traditionally profound Russian foreign policy has branched out long before, on geopolitical grounds. While Moscow was heightening ties with China through Western sanctions and the war with Ukraine, it was still trying to woo other potential Asian friends, such as Vietnam and India. It doesn’t want to come second to China in an Asian China-directed Asia—nor completely lose its former friends in full incorporation within the American planning mechanism.
And also, the Russo-Chinese axis as arrogant in phraseology, too, has boundaries. Moscow goes out of its way not to endorse Beijing’s whole claim on the South China Sea. Russia is not itself a littoral claimant like China and applied peaceful settlement for use under international law, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)–one notch short of the Vietnamese and not the Chinese standpoint.
Russian interests also lie in Southeast Asia. ASEAN is a dynamic region of multipolar play where Moscow believes it can make its voice heard without China dominating the stage or being edged aside by the West. Losing Vietnam, one of its best Southeast Asian buddies, would be inimical to its desire. Vietnam provides Russia with arms sales, energy cooperation, and a secure base in Southeast Asia’s sea hub. Even under pressure generated by Beijing, Moscow has much to lose by destabilizing this union.
From the perspective of Hanoi, what to do is reboot and not panic. Vietnam also needs to strengthen its strategic relationships across the board—maintaining its defense ties close to Russia, elevating defense cooperation with India, Japan, and Australia, and maximizing its comprehensive partnership with the United States. It should also accelerate defense modernization efforts as well as diversification of military procurement to break its dependence on any single partner.
Politically, Vietnam has the space to maneuver: principle of neutrality, non-alignment, and ASEAN regional leadership. As a promoter of rule-based practice, crossing the duality of great powers, and safeguarding UNCLOS, Vietnam can still achieve space for maneuver, even in a more polarized regional order.
Conclusion
The consolidation of the Russia-China strategic axis cannot but penetrate into Vietnam’s strategic sphere, including with respect to the South China Sea. But it needs not be threatening. Russia’s historic balancing interests, its interest in maintaining Vietnam as a friendly and credible partner, and diplomatic resolve in Hanoi imply that the strategic balance will not be easily shifted.
Vietnam must be cautious—but hopeful—in its ability to guide itself forward in this new world. Its strongest weapon is not its location geographically on the globe or its growing economic power, but its unyielding pragmatism in international relations. In a time of enemy poles and dynamic changing allegiances, that pragmatism is its best shield.