There is no doubt that oil and gas supplies are at the heart of the game of nations that has been going on for years of creative chaos and the “New Middle East” project.
There is no doubt that oil and gas supplies are at the heart of the game of nations that has been going on for years of creative chaos and the “New Middle East” project.
By Mohammed Sabreen, Cairo / Egypt
“The player in the “Game of Nations” is forced by the nature of his surroundings to move in the game that sometimes has nothing to do with winning. The permanent goal of the players in the Game of Nations is to continue the game because stopping it means inevitable war.” With these words, the powerful Egyptian intelligence man and mysterious member of the July 23 Revolution Command Council, Zakaria Mohieddin, summarized the many incomprehensible political contradictions.
For his part, Miles Copeland explained in his famous book “The Game of Nations”, which he published in London in 1969, events that took place in the Middle East during the Nasserite period that were incomprehensible at the time, but one of the most important things he clarified was American interference in the affairs of the region. He says, “While the United States publicly refuses to interfere in the affairs of a particular country, it is in fact finding innovative ways to intervene in secret.” At the present moment, the conflict seems to be over energy sources, especially gas reserves and “gas pipeline” projects. Part of the reasons for what happened in the Russian-Ukrainian war, Syria, the Gaza war, and the war against Lebanon were motivated by the conflict over gas supplies. The discovery of large quantities of gas in the eastern Mediterranean basin over the past ten years has sparked ambitions to link the region’s energy markets; the Eastern Mediterranean Basin issue has taken on an international dimension, after international powers intervened for geopolitical reasons, not economic considerations, as the Eastern Mediterranean Basin has natural gas resources that do not exceed 2% of global reserves. In return, it has pushed the conflicting countries to the negotiating table. However, it has turned out that these high hopes were exaggerated. However, there are narrower goals that can still be achieved.
Big dreams
Amidst a wave of optimism, the countries of the region have moved towards concluding agreements for cooperation among themselves in the field of transporting and marketing natural gas, as follows:
1- Regional export agreements: Some countries in the region have begun signing agreements to export natural gas to markets close to them, such as Israel, which has concluded agreements to export raw gas to both Jordan and Egypt in order to meet the needs of their local markets, or for the purpose of re-exporting to European markets, taking advantage of the advanced infrastructure facilities in neighboring countries.
2- Regional pipelines: In line with the previous point, many proposals have emerged to launch regional pipelines to transport gas and market it to foreign markets, such as a pipeline between Israel and Türkiye, and another between Lebanon and Cyprus, in addition to the East Mediterranean (EastMed) pipeline, the construction agreement of which was signed in January 2020 and which will extend between Israel, Cyprus, Greece, and Israel, reaching Italy.
3- East Mediterranean Gas Forum: In January 2019, a group of countries in the region and Europe (Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority) established a regional bloc called the (East Mediterranean Gas Forum) headquartered in Cairo with the aim of launching a common market for natural gas and enhancing the joint use of infrastructure, knowing that the forum enjoys the support of multiple European parties.
What’s new?
More than a decade of gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean have raised hopes that “gas diplomacy” could radically reshape relations between countries in the basin—and even with countries further afield. The establishment of a regional gas forum has contributed to this line of thinking. But the prospects for gas diplomacy face significant limitations.
Why does it matter? The region is rife with armed conflicts and political disputes, including those involving Israel and Palestine; Israel and Lebanon; Cyprus; Türkiye and Greece; and others. The false promise of significant gas exports to Europe has intensified competition, while gas diplomacy has failed to address the underlying causes of the conflicts.
What should be done? With the collapse of EU plans to build a pipeline carrying gas from the region, it is time to rethink expectations about gas diplomacy. Eastern Mediterranean governments should focus on regional markets and regional cooperation. Actors seeking to resolve conflicts should focus on political dynamics and give gas diplomacy a secondary role.
Frustrated hopes for change
The gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean have transformed the region’s energy market and economic relations, raising hopes for geopolitical change as well. The United States has launched what it calls “gas diplomacy,” looking to use the region’s new energy wealth to bring its warring countries to the negotiating table. Israel and Egypt, the main beneficiaries of the new discoveries, have established a regional gas forum. The European Union has launched a study into a pipeline that could carry Israeli and possibly Cypriot gas to Europe, a project that seemed timely after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine cut off access to Russian gas. But the pipeline project appears to have stalled due to commercial and environmental concerns. In this and other respects, the high hopes pinned on the gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean have proven overblown. All actors should now focus on the more modest goal of fostering a comprehensive approach to resource exploitation to promote regional integration and stability—and continue moving toward renewable energy sources. In the wake of major discoveries more than a decade ago—the Tamar and Leviathan fields near Israel, the Aphrodite field off the coast of Cyprus, and the Zohr field near Egypt—American and European diplomats were optimistic that new gas reserves would spark greater regional economic cooperation and bring stability by changing political realities in a strategic part of the world. The United States led a “gas diplomacy” of separate gas agreements between Israel and Jordan, Israel and Egypt, and Israel and Lebanon. It also hoped that economically motivated actions on gas exports could spur regional players to make breakthroughs toward resolving the conflict on non-energy issues. But even the gas deals that were expected to crown gas diplomacy are less significant than they might appear at first glance. The agreements between Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt and Jordan, on the other, added a positive dimension to bilateral cooperation, but Israel had long since signed peace agreements with those countries. Israel’s agreement with Lebanon—with which it is still technically at war—is arguably more significant, as it led to a border demarcation agreement between the two countries. But gas deals with Egypt and Jordan have done little to warm what could be described as a “cold peace,” and the Israel-Lebanon border agreement shows no real sign of overcoming decades of hostility.
Time for a rethink
It is time for a rethink of gas diplomacy, reflecting three key elements:
First, commercial realities dictate that EU countries will look elsewhere to meet most of their energy needs in the short term. Instead of seeking to export to Europe or Asia, gas-rich countries in the Eastern Mediterranean would do well to turn to more accessible markets in the region itself. A concerted effort to meet the region’s energy needs from the East Mediterranean’s undersea reserves could be good for local economies and offer benefits in terms of broader economic integration, provided it is done in a comprehensive manner.
Second, moving towards this goal will require key states that are either present or active in the region to work more closely with those that have tried to stay away from it in energy transactions. Perhaps most notably, the EMGF should aim to expand its membership – and gradually, if necessary, include Türkiye. Only in this way can the forum truly become a force for integration and stability, rather than re-creating and exacerbating the fault lines that already exist in the region.
Finally, even if significant progress is made toward regional economic integration, external actors with an interest in regional stability should not assume that resource wealth can be the driver of efforts to end political and territorial disputes. These disputes will still need to focus on political dynamics. In short, part of any successful gas diplomacy strategy will be to understand its limitations and ensure that it is accompanied by a political agenda for resolving the region’s conflicts.
The Gaza gas story
Meanwhile, the Gaza Marine field, discovered by British Gas off the coast of Gaza in 1999-2000, a decade before Israel’s big-ticket discovery of the Tamar and Leviathan fields, remains untapped by Israeli restrictions, and thus offers no benefit to the people of Gaza who suffer the consequences of a crippling Israeli blockade.
The assumption that greater cooperation on gas exploitation and export could pave the way for closer relations between the states, and thus greater regional stability, helped generate some excitement when the East Mediterranean Gas Forum was established in January 2020. Founded by Egypt and Israel with the support of the European Union and the United States, the forum has over time also included the Republic of Cyprus, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Greece, Italy, and France. Forum members expect it to serve as a platform for economic cooperation and greater regional integration. But even after the forum’s launch, the prospects of it becoming a mechanism for expanding regional cooperation on energy issues remain slim. The main obstacle is the absence from the forum of major regional players on gas-related issues, for a variety of reasons, including Türkiye, Lebanon, the de facto Turkish Cypriot authorities that control the area in northern Cyprus, and Hamas, the Palestinian faction that used to rule the Gaza Strip but, under Israeli occupation, does not control the gas field off the coast of Gaza. Türkiye’s exclusion in particular has, in some cases, exacerbated tensions between the forum’s members and those with competing claims to gas reserves in the Mediterranean. Instead of being a neutral entity that manages a regional resource in a way that can help countries overcome their political differences, the forum has become a strategic partnership of countries with shared energy interests.
The Turkish-Cypriot conflict
Some experts believe that Türkiye is the main driver of the conflict over gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin. Ankara claims that the Turkish Cypriots have sovereign rights in the exclusive economic zone of the island of Cyprus, and that it is responsible for preserving it, while in fact Ankara wants to control the island’s gas resources and strengthen its position as a regional energy hub, which has faced strong European and American objections.
In light of the above, Ankara has moved to confront European and American support for gas cooperation projects in the region by rapprochement with the Iranian-Russian axis and sending ships to drill and explore for energy resources in Türkiye’s exclusive economic zone in recent months.
In addition, Ankara concluded an agreement to demarcate the maritime borders with the Libyan Government of National Accord at the end of last December, which would block the implementation of the “MedEast” pipeline, as the new demarcation included some Greek islands in Türkiye’s exclusive economic zone through which the pipeline will pass, and therefore the pipeline cannot be implemented without obtaining Türkiye’s approval.
Hopes that the gas discoveries could help forge deeper ties between the region and European governments eager to diversify their energy supplies — especially after their relations with Russia soured to the point of collapse over the war in Ukraine — have also been dashed. The problem is both supply and demand. On the supply side, the eastern Mediterranean has limited export potential; existing gas reserves are barely enough to cover domestic needs in the region’s countries, while the infrastructure is inadequate to export the small volumes that remain. High gas prices could make a pipeline from Israel and Cyprus to Greece, or a much shorter one from Israel to Türkiye, commercially viable, but such projects take years to complete, reducing incentives for potential investors. On the demand side, a growing consensus around the need to cut emissions by moving away from fossil fuels is reducing Europe’s long-term appetite for gas, which is at odds with long-term investments in gas infrastructure, particularly pipelines. The EU’s proposal to build a pipeline from Israel and Cyprus to Greece and the rest of Europe has faltered largely for this reason.
A pipeline between four Arab countries and Türkiye
A noteworthy possibility, following the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, is the revival of the $10 billion, 1,500-kilometer Qatar-Türkiye gas pipeline project, which had previously been suspended due to Assad’s resistance and the outbreak of war in Syria.
The collapse of this regime represents a pivotal moment for the Middle East, reshaping the regional geopolitical landscape and energy strategies.
This development has created a major power vacuum, diminished the influence of Assad’s two main allies, Iran and Russia, and paved the way for new alliances, regional cooperation, and infrastructure initiatives, especially in the energy sector.
It was initially proposed to transport natural gas from Qatar’s South Pars/North Dome gas field via Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria to Türkiye and European markets. This pipeline could diversify Europe’s energy supplies, reduce its dependence on Russian gas, and enhance Türkiye’s role as a vital energy hub. However, the Doha-Ankara gas pipeline project faces significant obstacles, as ongoing unrest in Syria, rivalry between regional powers, and Doha’s current focus on expanding its LNG production capacity pose significant challenges.
Qatar’s strategy
Qatar’s strategy for its gas and LNG exports focuses on expanding capacity and diversifying markets. The country plans to boost its LNG production capacity from 77 million tons per year to 142 million tons per year by 2030, through three major projects:
The Northeast Field, which will add 32 million tons per year by 2026-2027; the North South Field, which will add 16 million tons per year by 2027-2028; and the North West Field, which will add 16 million tons per year by 2029-2030.
The expansion complements Doha’s efforts to diversify markets, particularly by strengthening its position in Asian markets, which currently account for more than 70% of exports, and increasing its focus on European markets, which received 19% of Qatar’s LNG exports in 2023.
The Gulf state aims to secure long-term contracts with countries such as Germany, France and Italy to maintain market stability. In addition, it benefits from its low production costs and strategic geographical location to remain competitive in the global market.
The country is expanding its LNG shipping fleet, with plans to add more than 100 new state-of-the-art vessels by 2024 to boost its export capabilities.
The Post-Assad pipeline
The fall of the Assad regime has provided a glimmer of hope for the Qatar-Türkiye gas pipeline project, which could go ahead after Assad halted it. If the project materializes, it offers attractive potential for both the region and Europe, including diversifying Europe’s energy supplies and strengthening Türkiye’s role as an energy hub. However, this potential presents a host of challenges, as ongoing political turmoil in Syria, competing regional interests, and the EU’s shift toward renewable energy sources could complicate negotiations and jeopardize the project’s long-term viability.
Obstacles to implementation
The collapse of the Assad regime has reopened discussions about the Qatar-Türkiye gas pipeline project. But it faces a number of significant challenges related to security, politics, economics, and international relations.
Despite its potential benefits, the combination of Qatar’s focus on expanding LNG production, regional instability, and changing market conditions makes the pipeline an ambitious but elusive prospect. The main challenge is that gas previously earmarked for this project is now being allocated to Qatar’s LNG expansion projects.
Currently, there is no market demand for such a project, and significant security concerns, coupled with a lack of financial resources, pose additional major obstacles. In addition, the current geopolitical landscape—characterized by intense competition over regional energy resources and ongoing political instability in the Middle East—complicates any potential cooperation.
The failure to reach a unified position among key regional players, such as Qatar, Türkiye, and other energy consumers, means that the pipeline remains an ambitious but unlikely project. To move forward, regional priorities will need to be fundamentally realigned, and efforts coordinated to address security concerns and financing challenges.
“Until these issues are resolved, the Qatar-Türkiye pipeline remains a distant prospect and an unfeasible project,” says Dr. Omod Shokry, an energy strategist and senior visiting fellow at George Mason University.
Erdogan will not get his award
On the other hand, the Russian writer Gevorg Mirzayan explained in the Russian “Vzglyad” the reasons why it is impossible to build a Qatari gas pipeline through Syria. Although the Russian writer acknowledges that the seizure of the lion’s share of Syria by the Islamists controlled by Ankara now allows Recep Erdogan to start realizing his geopolitical ambitions, including building a gas pipeline from Qatar, via Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Türkiye, to Europe.
However, the writer believes that Erdogan will not receive a pipeline gift, for the following reasons:
First, after the overthrow of Assad and the possibility of the Lebanonization of Syria (i.e. the war of all against all), there is no single force that will guarantee the safety of the construction of the pipeline, and most importantly, its operation. With such risks, no one will invest billions of dollars in the construction of the pipeline.
Second, there is not enough free gas. Qatar is now exporting its liquefied gas by tankers to East Asia at special prices. Sending gas via pipeline (i.e. much cheaper) to Europe means depriving Qatar of part of its LNG exports.
Third, new transit risks, not only from Syria, but also from Saudi Arabia, the largest transit country in terms of the length of the pipeline. Saudi-Qatari relations deteriorated in the first decade of the 21st century. This means that it is impossible to build a pipeline of strategic importance to Qatar via Saudi Arabia.
In addition, the Americans will also oppose this. Washington exports LNG to Europe. That is why the Americans do not need anyone to compete with them. Qatar will listen to this request; the role of the United States is much greater than that of Türkiye.
Finally, the construction of the pipeline requires not only security of transit and sufficient quantities of gas, but also a guarantee of the sale of these quantities. And now, during the decline of industrialization in the Old World, the future of its consumption is unclear. Unlike the East Asian market, for example.
The game of nations again
It is clear in the end that the game of nations is playing out strongly, Russian gas has been pushed away from Europe, in favor of American LNG. Now, attempts are being made to contain Türkiye by Washington and Israel. There is no doubt that oil and gas supplies are at the heart of the game of nations that has been going on for years of creative chaos and the “New Middle East” project. Amidst this chaos and contradictory events, the process of the struggle over gas may reveal to us part of the game of nations.