Western objectives for Syria and regional countries’ mistakes

By Yunus Soner

Terrorist forces in Syria started a new offensive against the cities of Aleppo and Hama. The White House commented on the offensive:

“The Assad regime’s ongoing refusal to engage in the political process outlined in UNSCR 2254, and its reliance on Russia and Iran, created the conditions now unfolding, including the collapse of Assad regime lines in northwest Syria.”

The UN Security Council resolution 2254 is the main political demand presented by Western powers in Syria. Its concrete demand is as follows:

“Syrian-led political process that is facilitated by the United Nations and, within a target of six months, establishes credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance and sets a schedule and process for drafting a new constitution, and further expresses its support for free and fair elections, pursuant to the new constitution, to be held within 18 months and administered under supervision of the United Nations”.

Following a nation-wide ceasefire, without changing de facto occupations by terror groups or external powers, the UN resolution foresees three steps:

1. The establishment of a transitional government that is “credible” (to the West), “inclusive” (including anti-government forces, armed and non-armed), “non-sectarian” (open to Islamists). This point follows the playbook of other US-orchestrated regime changes, where in a transition a “government of national unity” is proposed, including elements of current government as well as insurgent groups.
2. “Drafting a new constitution”: This step aims to legalize de facto achievement of foreign intervention and to cement them in the capital and the state structure. It establishes a constitution that enshrines different sectarian groups, divides political positions among them, supports political parties to organize along sectarian lines. It also introduces regional autonomy that turns de facto occupation into de jure local governance.
3. New elections according to this constitution that provide the country with a new government that reflects this “inclusiveness”.

The main idea follows the examples of Lebanon and Iraq, after its occupation by US powers. This goes for the Arab population. The Kurdish population is exempted from sectarian divide and united ethnically.

Seeds for the de jure federalization have already been set: The Kurdish autonomy in the East of the Euphrates even received US education in local governance. Turkish supported groups have established an exile government as well as local governing bodies. Heyet Tahrir Sham that occupies the Idlib government has established a so-called “Salvation Government” that runs local governance.

Strategic goal and tactical support

The Iraqi example provides an idea: The US occupation divided the Arab population along sectarian lines, rejecting its ethnical unity. This objective was supported by rewriting history, causing inter-sectarian conflict and establishing the according political forces. The Kurdish population meanwhile was treated as a unity and received a unitarian local governance.

The US presence in Syria shows the same: US forces are stationed to protect the Kurdish autonomous region, US weapons are delivered to what is considered its future security force, US propaganda legitimizes its existence.

The other two main forces, Turkish-supported armed groups and Islamists in Idlib, are placed as secondary, supportive units whose main function is to pressure the Assad Government into the political process outlined above. Once this process is started, they will serve the objective of creating intra-Arab conflict to enable the Kurdish region’s survival.

Effects of the recent offensive

The recent offensive of Heyet Tahrir Sham from Idlib and Turkish-supported Syrian National Army in the north has not changed the political framework within which the US operates in Syria. The White House quote above ends repeating the call for a “political process” within the UNSC 2254.

As this process is supposed to legitimize de facto occupations, both groups mentioned advancing groups are expected to lay claims on recently gained territory.

Simultaneously, the so-called Syrian National Coalition, a body of anti-government forces based in Istanbul, Türkiye, repeated the White House demand:

It’s Chairman Hadi el Bahra said according to Turkish press that “the resolution 2254 is the only applicable political solution in Syria. We have the right to apply all measures necessary to achieve a political solution in its framework. We will liberate all lands and reclaim the rights of all elements and sects of the Syrian people”.

Others from the Syrian Transitional Government, also based in Türkiye, demanded they should govern the city of Aleppo.

Conclusion: at the tactical level of supplies, economy, military tactics, the gains of the anti-government forces may change equations. But their call for the so-called political solution once again shows that the offensive has limited effect on the strategic level.

Mistakes of regional powers

The UN resolution mentioned above was signed, among others by Russia and Türkiye too. Thus, both countries signed a document that outlines, in pretty hidden formulations, a road map to Syria’s division.

The actor most aware of that fact is the Syrian government itself. Coming from a Pan-Arabist tradition, being one of the leaders of Arab nationalism, the Assad government knows well that any signature under that document will start the country’s Balkanization. Hence, in all the negotiating rounds in Geneva and elsewhere, they resisted constructive cooperation in this process.

And even after the recent offensive, President Assad stated that “force is the only language that terrorists understand”, indicating his continuing resistance to such negotiations.

Regional powers also have committed the mistake in not understanding the strategic and tactical goals of the United States in Syria: The Islamist groups, beginning with ISIS and later continuing with its off-spring Heyet Tahrir Sham, have presented themselves as the aggressive, radical elements, thus drawing attention.

The Kurdish groups and above all the YPG, the PKK’s Syrian arm, showed a stance party cooperating with the Syrian government, party staying neutral. And above all, outside of sectarian division.

This has caused the impression they might be a neutral force or even an ally in the conflict. This impression was also result of the short-comings on the battlefield and limitations in supplies, supported by the fact that Syrian outreach to Kurdish zones was permanently stopped by US military intervention.   

But the fact remains: To end the conflict, regional powers need not to deal with the adversaries’ tactical moves but to defeat its strategic goal.

In that context, it is worth noting that the Astana Process was established to advance a political framework mainly designed by Western powers.

Türkiye’s position

Türkiye has a border of 900 kilometers with Syria. It has a strong military capacity, important regional political weight, it is, in difference to for instance Lebanon or Iraq, domestically stable. Hence, a word is necessary on the Erdogan government’s position.

President Erdoğan has since years been supporting the above-described UN resolution. Even during the recent rapprochement with the Syrian government, where Erdoğan “reached out his hand”, Ankara presented these demands.

Türkiye has pursued various military operations into Syrian territory, leading to continuous military presence, the creation of local governance structures and economic and social integration into Turkish mainland.  

In the recent Turkish-Syrian contacts, Damascus demanded the withdrawal of Turkish soldiers or a road map for that. Ankara refused such a step before the conclusion of the mentioned political process.

Ankara approves of the political process within the UN framework, including regional autonomy in various parts of Syria. The Turkish government has also not voiced opposition against a Kurdish regional autonomy.

But there is a strong disagreement between Ankara and Washington as who is the govern that entity. While Washington bets on the PKK, Ankara proposes that groups connected to Barzani in Iraq should be the dominant forces.

This disagreement is not simple, it is one of the reasons, though not the only one, for Türkiye’s military operations on Syrian soil.

It is noteworthy that these days, the Erdoğan government also started the debate on a new, “inclusive” government in Türkiye.

Conclusion

These days, news outlets are again presenting maps of Syria in different colors, with different forces occupying different parts. One of the functions of these maps is to create the perception that the country is, unreversible, divided.

From Turkish history, we know such colored maps. At the end of World War I, most parts of Anatolia were occupied by foreign powers, painting “their” territory in colors.

The resistance of the Assad Government to Syria’s division, despite years of foreign supported war, economic embargo, diplomatic cornering and induced emigration provides hope that at the end, Western plans will be defeated, and the unity of the Syrian Arab Republic reestablished.

Such a victory would provide hope from the Palestinian cause to the objective of West Asian regional integration against Balkanization.