By Adem Kılıç, Political Scientist
As I have written repeatedly in these columns, the eight months of the US-Iran war have clearly demonstrated that military superiority on paper alone is not sufficient to achieve the desired objectives.
However, this reality, along with US President Donald Trump’s announcement that he would not launch new attacks against Iran before the November midterm elections, does not mean that the war has completely ended or that the military option, even if not on an all-out scale, has been entirely taken off the table.
The Pentagon’s continued operational preparations, the deployment of additional naval and air power to the region, and the US effort to turn economic pressure into a long-term strategy indicate that the crisis will continue for a much longer period through different means.
On the other hand, at this stage, the problem facing the US administration is not merely limiting Iran’s military capabilities.
The inability to ensure security in the Strait of Hormuz, uncertainty in energy markets, the possibility of attacks against Saudi Arabia expanding, and the pressure on American ammunition stocks are narrowing the US room for maneuver.
Moreover, the failure of the eight-month war against Iran to produce the results initially anticipated raises the question of whether the US can escape its strategic impasse through a new wave of attacks. For an America heading towards an election, this also carries the potential to trigger a major crisis.
Undoubtedly, domestic politics plays a significant role behind this assessment.
Rising energy prices in the US, the growing prominence of fuel costs on the American electorate’s agenda, and uncertainty over when the war will end are directly affecting the Trump administration.
Indeed, the energy export agreement reached despite the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine also reveals the kind of impasse Trump is facing.
Precisely at this point of deadlock, even if expanding military operations can be presented as a show of strength in the short term, the possibility of the conflict entering a new vicious cycle could make the Trump administration’s claim of being “successful” subject to even greater scrutiny ahead of the elections.
The Houthi equation and rising costs
On the other hand, the Houthis’ attacks in recent days, particularly the strikes against Riyadh International Airport in Saudi Arabia, and the risks posed by Houthi threats to Bab el-Mandeb and overland oil shipments following the Strait of Hormuz crisis have become the starting point of a new period of chaos for the Trump administration.
Given that Saudi Arabia, supposedly under the US security umbrella, occupies a critical position not only in terms of energy production and exports but also in regional transportation and logistics networks, these developments carry the potential to further intensify the global crisis.
Indeed, disruptions to air traffic in Riyadh, the closure of airspace, and the impact on Bab el-Mandeb and overland shipments following the Strait of Hormuz crisis, together with threats to oil facilities, are directly transferring the cost of the conflict to the global economy.
Therefore, in such an environment, the consequences of a renewed US attack on Iran would not be limited to Iran’s military facilities. The situation contains all the conditions that could push the region to a point where it can no longer avoid a multi-front war.
This is because Saudi Arabia’s energy infrastructure, ports in the Gulf, commercial vessels, and international air transport are all parts of the same security chain. The complete disruption of this chain as a result of a war spreading across the region would further aggravate the global consequences of the crisis.
Conclusion: New attacks could deepen the US impasse
Yes, the Trump administration’s announcement that it would refrain from new attacks before the midterm elections does not mean that the Iran issue has been closed.
Reports indicating that the Pentagon is continuing its preparations, the deployment of additional military capabilities to the region, and the treatment of economic pressure as a long-term strategy demonstrate that the US wants to keep its options open.
However, as the past eight months have also demonstrated, the existence of these options does not mean that the US can achieve the objectives it set before the war.
The pressure on US ammunition stocks, the logistical costs of prolonged operations, the near absence of the possibility of a ground war, expanding security risks in the Gulf, and the importance of the closure of Bab el-Mandeb following the Strait of Hormuz crisis for the global economy are among the factors constraining US decision-making.
For this reason, the key factor determining the future of the Iran crisis will not be the possibility of the US launching another attack, but how long it can sustain the military blockade and economic pressure while limiting their global repercussions.
In short, instead of bringing the US quest for success to a conclusion, a new wave of attacks could further deepen America’s strategic impasse, not only in the region but now on the global stage as well.