By Mehmet Enes Beşer
The Horn of Africa was far from the headlines. However, it is now located on the junction of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean, and the Middle East. Here, the routes for navigation and energy flow, military bases, political and economic influence of port countries, and building statehood all converge. For Türkiye, Somalia is no longer an exotic African country. This state became one of the few where Ankara managed to gain its strategic presence through developmental, military, and other means. For China, the Horn of Africa is connected with the issues of shipping routes’ safety, territorial integrity, China’s plans to build its economy and influence in Africa, and resistance to setting new precedents of separatism. That is how Türkiye and China converged despite their different political traditions.
Their convergence took a step ahead after the recognition of Somaliland by Israel in December 2025. Such recognition, seen by Somalia, China, Türkiye, and other countries as a violation of territorial integrity, provoked an active response from these states. Türkiye condemned such an action on the part of Israel and promised its continued support to Somalia’s territorial integrity, while China also refused any further division of this state.
These countries are now fighting not just with each other but with a principle underlying the future order on the junction of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. According to the first option, the existence of fragile states can provide an excellent opportunity for external powers to use the geopolitical space of these states if they are strategically located, externally useful, and politically available. The alternative suggests starting from the survival of states recognized by the international community – especially in the case of regions damaged by civil war, terrorism, famine, piracy, and external interventions. Türkiye and China adhere to this strategy while Israel follows the opposite one, which shows the nature of their conflict.
The reason why Somalia’s territorial integrity is crucial lies in the fact that this state suffered from various troubles but has already returned to the international political arena as well as established its relations with external players. Thus, the 2024 treaty on economic and military cooperation between Somalia and Türkiye is just one step in the history of Ankara’s growing involvement in Somali state-building and stabilization of the region through this method. The military base in the capital of Somalia, humanitarian aid, business, and energy agreements can be explained through a long-term approach towards Somalia as an independent state possessing the coastline that must be secured and economically developed.
The position of China is different as Beijing does not have the same historical relation to Somalia as its strategic ally. However, the recognition of separatist Somaliland can hardly please China due to various reasons. First of all, its relations with Taiwan, which is also separated from the territory of China, cannot go along with Somaliland’s relations with the same country. Moreover, China sees such a recognition through a broader prism as the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea are crucial for China’s international trade. Any splitting of Somalia, port contests, new proxy battles, and military bases cannot remain unnoticed by China.
These circumstances provide grounds for the joint actions of Türkiye and China in solving the problem of Somaliland’s recognition in international relations. Türkiye is capable of supporting Somalia’s territorial integrity because of its credibility, while China is able to bring financial resources for building infrastructures in Somalia and using its diplomatic potential in international organizations like the UN Security Council. Together, these two states can send an unequivocal message to Somalia’s opponents: the future belongs to the country itself and not to its fragments.
In January 2024, Somalia received additional proof of the correctness of this conclusion when the Ethiopia-Somaliland memorandum of understanding was signed by both parties. As a significant landlocked state with certain ethnic and economic problems, Ethiopia requires sea access. At the same time, trading recognition of Somaliland for strategic geography can result in a direct conflict with Somalia. Thus, the mediation between Somalia and Ethiopia conducted by Türkiye demonstrated Ankara’s awareness of the current problem. The objective of Türkiye must be not to block Ethiopia’s sea access but to make this process legal.
Recognition of Somaliland by Israel is consistent with a broader strategy of Tel Aviv, according to which this fragment of Somalia can give Israel additional positions, access to the Bab el-Mandeb, a location close to Yemen, Red Sea routes, and a friendlier atmosphere compared to Arab and African states. Against the background of increasing tensions in the Red Sea due to Houthi attacks, this option seems obvious. Still, some geopolitical decisions may turn out to be harmful for the state in which they are implemented. A foothold, which seems convenient in theory, can lead to a deeper fragmentation, stimulate the rise of national feelings, create counter-allegiances, and turn this fragment of Somalia into a battlefield of the Middle Eastern confrontation.
For Türkiye, such events represent not just another threat. This country’s policy in Somalia has always relied on the state-building principle since Ankara invested in Somalia in the period when this state could have been considered a failed state. By supporting its military sector, economy, infrastructure, and federal government, Ankara promoted the strengthening of Somalia as the country of its interests. Therefore, the recognition of Somaliland by other states and transformation of this fragment into strategic footholds for them will result in the failure of this strategy. Hence, a common understanding between Ankara and Beijing in this matter is necessary.
However, this understanding does not mean that Türkiye and China should join forces as allies or create another Axis against the rest of the world. There is no need to develop a common policy towards other states of Africa and the Middle East. The purpose is to cooperate in areas where their interests overlap. This is the case of Somalia. Both of them do not need to recognize the secession, guarantee maritime routes, limit strategic planning of Western and Israeli actors, and support African institutions and the Somali federal government in defending territorial integrity.
Thus, the first stage of such cooperation must include diplomatic measures implying continuous support of Somalia in international forums as well as opposition to recognition of Somaliland. This strategy does not involve ignoring the problems of this region’s stability and its population. On the contrary, it requires distinguishing between two things: rejecting the secession of this area of Somalia and denying the legitimacy of its population’s problems. The inhabitants of Somaliland indeed possess their institutions and feel their security and economic needs. Nevertheless, all these factors must be taken into account within the framework of constitutional and federal processes in Somalia, not outside recognition.
Maritime security represents the next point for the joint activity of Türkiye and China in Somalia. Due to its long coastline, Somalia can attract pirates, smugglers, fishers, and terrorists. The recent reports on increased piracy indicate the fact that such instability occurs when there are weak state mechanisms for managing the coastal zone and lack of attention of the international community. In this case, Turkish military efforts and China’s interests in securing shipping routes can contribute to Somalia’s development in the field. Increased security of ports, radars, and anti-piracy efforts can benefit the whole of Somalia, not only Türkiye and China but also the entire international business.
Another area of activity of China and Türkiye in Somalia must be economic development, which is crucial for stabilizing the statehood in this country since it provides statehood with various economic benefits like ports, transport, energy supplies, fisheries, and telecommunications. Besides, there are many aspects in the sphere of vocational training. Türkiye possesses the necessary construction and service resources as well as experience in the military industry, medicine, and education, while China has the ability to finance large-scale infrastructure works in various industries.
Finally, it is crucial to avoid a conflict with Somalia’s neighbors as it is evident that the separation of its fragment may trigger similar consequences in other parts of Africa. Therefore, it is necessary to avoid the formation of a new strategy of splitting states, according to which powerful states can establish control over regions with weaker economies through sponsoring of local separatists. Thus, Africa already suffers from old problems with its borders and does not need additional ones.
As a result, there are two visions of stabilization in the Horn of Africa: splitting states into smaller and more useful fragments or stabilizing statehood. The latter implies numerous mistakes that must be overcome. Türkiye understands this very well because its activities in Somalia depend directly on the presence of this state, and China also perceives this problem because separatist recognition and shipping instability may harm its interests in Africa. Thus, unlike China and Türkiye, Israel seems to be ready for gambling, which may transform the Gulf of Aden into yet another line of confrontation.
Therefore, these states should act before such development takes place. They should protect territorial integrity of Somalia, promote its growth, maintain peaceful relations with Hargeisa without recognizing its independence, and suggest alternative ways to get to the sea to Ethiopia.