The West’s ‘Belarus Plan’ in the Ukraine War

On 7–9 July, Ankara will host the NATO Summit.

In the run-up to the summit, UWI author, historian and political scientist Associate Professor Mehmet Perinçek assessed Türkiye’s multi-layered developments.

On 6 June, a Turkish fishing vessel was sunk after being attacked off the coast of Sevastopol in Crimea. One Turkish citizen lost his life in the attack. What is happening in the Black Sea? Where does Ankara stand in Ukraine?

While senior Turkish officials have on the one hand been making statements underlining NATO’s importance, on the other there is an increasing emphasis within the country on a potential Türkiye–Russia–China–Iran alliance, referred to as “TRÇİ”.

In a broadcast answering questions from Türkiye Ulusal Kanal, Mehmet Perinçek assessed these issues while also looking at the broader context of NATO, Europe, Russia, China and Iran.

Messages to Türkiye in the Black Sea

On 6 June, what does the attack on a Turkish vessel off Sevastopol in Crimea mean for Türkiye?

Recent developments in the Black Sea have gained further importance because the war has intensified. By intensification I mean not only Russia being targeted, but also the messages sent to Türkiye.

These messages are not actually new. Since the beginning of the war, various sabotage attempts against TurkStream and Blue Stream have been carried out by Ukraine. Attacks and sabotage attempts targeting the underwater, onshore and terrestrial parts of these facilities. Various intelligence reports were obtained, some of these attempts were prevented. Additionally, in recent period there have been attacks on vessels sailing in Türkiye’s territorial waters. Most recently, as you said, a Turkish vessel was attacked, and a Turkish citizen lost his life.

Therefore, security in the Black Sea is not merely an issue between Russia and Ukraine; it has effectively become an issue between the Atlantic front and Eurasia. We already know that the US has long sought to enter the Black Sea and to circumvent the Montreux Convention.

The recent attacks can be interpreted as messages aimed at encouraging Türkiye to align its policies with Ukraine and the Atlantic bloc. These messages are indirect either: after the latest attack, the commander of Ukraine’s drone units explicitly stated that ships approaching Russian ports would be targeted.

Silence of Ankara

While all this is happening, and despite these events directly affecting Türkiye’s energy security and maritime navigation safety, we have seen no response from Ankara. Türkiye’s recent alignment with NATO and the Atlantic, and its participation in Trump’s projects, is preventing it from speaking out on these issues.

In parallel with this, we are seeing an increase in Türkiye’s assistance to Ukraine and in arms supplies, as well as the expansion of cooperation across different fields. In fact, even at a time when Turkish vessels were being struck in territorial waters, Zelenskyy was invited to Ankara. While circles within the government and parts of the press were expecting that this visit would be used to “put Zelenskyy in his place,” what occurred was just the opposite: Türkiye’s Foreign Minister, in a deputy role to Zelenskyy, visited Syria and engaged in discussions on joint energy projects.

Russia’s concern

Russia is quite concerned about these developments. We know that Russian counterparts at various levels in Türkiye have been making regular requests on these issues, saying, “You should also react to this.” This is also being conveyed to us in our discussions with Russian officials here. It must be said that if Türkiye fails to take a clear position and fails to protect its own interests, Turkish–Russian relations could suffer serious damage.

End of NATO’s lifespan

There is a NATO summit in Ankara on 7–8 July. How do you assess NATO’s current state?

Looking at the medium to long-term perspective, we can see that NATO has essentially reached the end of its lifespan. There are several reasons for this.

First, it must be said that the Atlantic bloc as a whole is in relative decline, economically, militarily and politically. This is acknowledged even by Western officials and Atlantic institutions themselves. In contrast, Eurasian powers are both consolidating and rising.

Second, there are internal problems within the US. At a time when it faces difficulties in maintaining global hegemony, it is experiencing major structural problems in its economy and politics. We are witnessing fractures at the top of the political system, within ruling classes, between states, and between society and the state.

Third, we also see deepening and increasingly irreparable contradictions between the US and the European Union. All of this is reflected in issues such as Greenland, Iran, NATO’s commitments, and the Ukraine question.

Taken together, all of this suggests that NATO has no real future. There may be attempts of “cosmetic fixes” at the Ankara summit, but we will soon see those repairs peeling away. It will not be easy to reconcile Trump with Europe. We will also see the consequences of internal competition within Europe in the period ahead.

From a military perspective as well, NATO is facing multiple failures. Iran’s success has made this clear. In Ukraine, their failure is evident. Recently, Germany and France failed at their joint multi-billion-euro fighter jet project.

NATO or “TRÇİ”?

Under these conditions, when we turn to Türkiye’s position, we unfortunately see that Ankara has recently been pursuing policies aligned with NATO, which itself constitutes a source of threat.

On the one hand, we have momentum towards the “TRÇİ” alliance. On the other hand, presidential advisers continue to issue statements that praise NATO, while portraying Russia and China almost as adversaries. We have Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan holding various meetings in Moscow, while elsewhere NATO is being lauded who names Russia as its primary threat.

It must also be noted that the political forces advocating the TRÇİ alliance represent a rising trend, and that this will ultimately become Türkiye’s official strategic orientation, along with a government more compatible with it. Just as NATO is losing ground globally, being drowned in the waters of the Strait of Hormuz, so too in Türkiye, pro-NATO, pro-Trump and pro-EU policy will eventually lose their influence.

A divided Europe

Looking at NATO’s European wing, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated that “Russia will attack Europe by 2030.” At the G7 leaders’ summit, however, Germany made a different statement, indicating openness to negotiations. Does this point to an internal split?

Europe is divided not only between governments, but also within countries themselves. In Germany, the country’s leading party today, the AfD, opposes the war in Ukraine and advocates maintaining good relations with Russia and China. The AfD’s co-leader, Tino Chrupalla, has argued that Germany should become independent from NATO by 2028 and that NATO forces should be expelled from the country. Germany’s BSW and France’s Rassemblement National have similar positions. In the UK, there are forces such as Reform UK. Yes, there are divisions between leaders such as Merz, Starmer, and Macron at the governmental level, but even sharper contradictions exist between ruling and opposition parties. And these opposition parties are increasingly gaining the capacity to come to power.

Yes, Europe is engaged in highly provocative initiatives and is doing everything it can to prevent Ukraine from capitulating, but at the same time it is going through a period in which its own political leaderships are under threat. Statements like the ones you mentioned coming out of Germany are because leaders such as Merz perceiving a risk of losing power. The AfD’s stance on Russia is also forcing Merz to make statements that are close to those of the AfD. So we can say that the days of the warmongers in Europe are numbered.

“Russia has been a party to the war in Iran”

A memorandum of understanding has been signed between Iran and the US. In your view, what impact has Russia had on this war?

Russia has been a party to this war. This has been acknowledged by figures such as President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov since the beginning of the war. In various respects, Russia has supported Iran. The American side has repeatedly accused Moscow of providing Iran with intelligence and technological assistance.

Iran’s success has also been Russia’s success. Had Iran collapsed, the encirclement of Russia would have advanced much further. Russia would have had to contend not only with Ukraine, but also with pressure coming from the Caspian direction.

The strikes Iran has delivered against the Atlantic bloc have, in turn, strengthened Russia’s position in multiple areas. In that sense, Iran’s victory can be seen as shared by Russia and China.

A “shared victory”

This “shared victory” carries important lessons for Türkiye. It shows how national defense and security can be structured. Countries that rely on NATO, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain, have repeatedly expressed disappointment throughout the war, saying in essence: “We trusted the US, and that trust proved misplaced.” Iran, by aligning with China and Russia, managed to withstand a major military power such as US–Israel. Here, we can clearly observe the potential of the TRÇİ alliance.

Zelenskyy seeks to escalate the war

With the signing of the memorandum in Iran, the attention of all major powers has shifted to Ukraine. In this context, we are witnessing an intensification of the war. Violence is escalating not only along the front lines, but also in attacks behind the front (strikes during the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, recent attacks in Moscow, the targeting of student dormitories and civilian infrastructure and a civilian Belarusian bus). These developments suggest that a broader plan is at play. There are indications that Zelenskyy is attempting to escalate the war, potentially widen its geographical scope, draw Belarus into the conflict, and provoke a harsher Russian response that could, in turn, pull NATO and European states more directly into the war. In this regard, particular attention should be paid to Zelenskyy’s reception in Kyiv of the so-called Belarusian opposition in exile, his increasingly confrontational rhetoric towards Minsk, the attack on a civilian Belarusian bus and strikes on refinery infrastructure.

NATO Summit and Türkiye

At this point, the NATO summit in Ankara on 7–8 July could prove significant. A degree of cosmetic fixes at the Summit may create an image of a “unified NATO”, after which various provocations could increase.

Türkiye’s stance will be decisive. The current orientation I have described -support for Ukraine, remaining silent in the face of actions directly targeting Türkiye, alignment with NATO’s policy line, participation in Trump-initiated projects in the South Caucasus, Syria and Palestine, and a renewed shift towards Western-led energy and nuclear frameworks- may not contribute to de-escalation- all this would further fuel escalation and expansion of the conflict. But if Türkiye pursues the opposite direction, cooperating with Russia, China, Iran, the Turkic world and the Islamic world, it could play a role in preventing further escalation of the war.