Perspectives on the context and necessity of constitutional amendment
Perspectives on the context and necessity of constitutional amendment
By Masahiro Takasaku (Professor, Faculty of Law, Kansai University)
Introduction: Movements toward Constitutional Revision
“Seventy years since the party’s founding. The time has come.” “Regarding the proposal for amendment, I want to be in a position where I can say, ‘We have finally reached a point where we can see the light at the end of the tunnel,’ and I look forward to welcoming next year’s party convention together with all of you.” At the 93rd Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Convention held on April 12, 2026, President TAKAICHI Sanae made this bold declaration. However, many of the constitutional amendment proposals put forward by the LDP and others generally seek to “unleash power” and “restrict human rights,” which is problematic. In particular, LDP politics has consistently sought liberation from the constraints of Article 9* of the Constitution (such as limitations on the right to self-defense and overseas deployments), and through repeated legislative revisions and policy changes, has effectively gutted the normative content of the Constitution.
Perspectives on the context and necessity of constitutional amendment
For example, the recognition of the right to collective self-defense through the Security Legislation, the recognition of “counterattack capabilities” (“enemy base attack capabilities”) through the Three Security Documents, the expansion of the purposes and geographical scope of Self-Defense Forces deployments overseas, increases in defense spending far exceeding the conventional 1% of GDP cap, the abolition of the “Three Principles on Arms Exports” and the formulation of the “Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfer,” further, the abolition of the “five categories” of non-combat purposes that restricted arms exports (lifting the ban on arms exports), and references to revising the Three Non-Nuclear Principles—all of these have altered the various “rules” that have shaped the very form of Japan as a nation. Furthermore, laws such as the Anti-Espionage Bill and the bill criminalizing the desecration of the national flag are being debated, laws that seem to target ideology and seek to brand citizens opposed to constitutional revision as “non-citizens” or “internal enemies.”
However, the constitutional amendment proposals released so far are problematic. Of the four items presented by the LDP, the elimination of merged constituencies in the House of Councilors and the provision of free education could both be implemented through legislation, making a constitutional amendment unnecessary. Moreover, the merged constituencies in the House of Councilors were introduced at the request of the Supreme Court to ensure the equality of the value of each vote. Abolishing these merged constituencies through constitutional amendment was an attempt to protect politicians’ vested interests and undermine the public’s right to equality. The very notion of trading the vested interests of those in power for human rights runs counter to constitutionalism, which seeks to limit state power. Furthermore, the “designated slots” introduced in the 2019 House of Councillors proportional representation election—which set aside slots where candidates are elected with priority over other candidates on the same list—were intended to provide a safety net for candidates who had been shifted to the proportional representation system due to the consolidation of constituencies. The objective of resolving the consolidation issue has already been achieved through legislation. This suggests that, when discussing constitutional amendment proposals, we must seriously debate whether there is any need for such amendments in the first place.
Amending Article 9: The “core Issue” of constitutional revision
Among the constitutional amendment proposals put forward by the LDP, the “core” issues are the amendment of Article 9 and the creation of emergency provisions. Previous proposals for amending Article 9 have included plans to explicitly mention the Self-Defense Forces (proposals to add a new Paragraph 3 to Article 9 or a new Article 9-2) and proposals to delete Paragraph 2 of Article 9. Regarding the proposals to explicitly mention the SDFs: (1) If the intention is to write the name of a specific state organ—the “Self-Defense Forces”—into the Constitution, this is fundamentally flawed. The Constitution explicitly lists state institutions such as the Diet, the Cabinet, the courts, and the Board of Audit, yet it does not even include the names of ministries and agencies, including the Ministry of Defense. It is unclear what purpose it serves to single out the SDFs—a subordinate organization—for inclusion. Under this approach, a constitutional amendment would be required every time the organization’s name is changed; how do they intend to address this inconvenience?
More importantly, (2) we must pay close attention to the dangers of explicitly mentioning the SDFs. In the context following the passage of the security legislation, explicitly mentioning the SDFs in the Constitution means that an organization now capable of exercising the right to collective self-defense would be enshrined in the Constitution. Furthermore, if new provisions are added while retaining Article 9, Paragraphs 1 and 2, it would create an inconsistency between the traditional interpretation of the Constitution and the new provisions permitting the right to collective self-defense. In this case, under the “principle of the supremacy of later laws” (the principle that provisions added later take precedence), the interpretation of the new provisions would override the existing interpretation, even while Article 9, Paragraphs 1 and 2, remain in place. Furthermore, proposals to use a name such as “National Defense Force” instead of “Self-Defense Forces,” or to delete Paragraph 2, would effectively remove the constitutional checks and balances in the first place, thereby signifying the formal recognition of the SDFs as a military force.
What about the proposed state of emergency provisions and the extension of the terms of Diet members?
Concerns have long been raised regarding the dangers of the state of emergency provisions. (1) A system designed for “state of emergencies” entails a concentration of power in the administration and restrictions on individual rights to overcome the crisis. The declaration of a “state of emergency” enables the enactment of “emergency ordinances” that have the same legal force as laws, thereby concentrating power in the administration. This amounts to nothing less than the suspension of the separation of powers and the protection of human rights—in other words, the suspension of the Constitution. (2) While the declaration of a “state of emergency” might be assumed to be the role of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister, it is precisely this “declaration” that becomes the greatest source of power. Because the “declaration”—the trigger for the exercise of power, such as through “emergency ordinances”—is carried out by the administration itself, the administration is able to decide on the initiation and execution of special powers. This is where the pitfall of abuse of power lies. (3) A look at history reveals many instances that should be viewed as abuses of martial law or national emergency powers, and Japan is no exception. The Public Order Maintenance Act, enacted in 1925, was amended by “emergency imperial decree” (in 1928) in an attempt to further strengthen regulations and expand its scope of application. The state of emergency provisions created a legal system that has been called one of the worst law systems in the land.
Regarding the extension of the terms of office for members of the Diet, the following points are cited as reasons. (1) While the House of Councillors may convene for an emergency session in the event of an emergency, the Constitution stipulates that such sessions may not exceed 70 days (it states that “a general election for members of the House of Representatives shall be held within 40 days of the date of dissolution” and that “the Diet shall be convened within 30 days of the date of that election”). Furthermore, (2) emergency sessions of the House of Councillors are limited to cases where the House of Representatives has been dissolved and do not apply to emergencies arising at the end of a term. However, regarding point (1), there is an opinion that the intent of the constitutional provision should be interpreted as aiming to prevent the executive branch from abusing its power to dissolve the House of Representatives and to prevent a government that does not reflect the will of the people from remaining in power for an extended period due to elections being indefinitely postponed after dissolution. Therefore, it is argued that holding an emergency session of the House of Councillors exceeding 70 days is unavoidable in emergency situations where there is no risk of abuse of the power to dissolve. Regarding point (2), in addition to the view that the matter should be addressed by applying the House of Councillors’ emergency session system by analogy, there are criticisms such as the fact that deferred voting (Article 57 of the Public Offices Election Act) is available in areas where voting is not possible, and that “a general election due to the expiration of the term of office of members of the House of Representatives shall be held within 30 days prior to the day on which the term of office of the members expires” (Article 31, Paragraph 1 of the Public Offices Election Act), meaning that elections can be held with ample time.
Conclusion: The logic of resistance and the movement
As of the time of writing (May 15), the House of Representatives Constitution Review Committee had already held discussions (on May 14) based on a draft outline prepared by the House of Representatives Legislative Bureau. The draft outline includes the definition of a “state of emergency,” “emergency ordinances” and “emergency fiscal measures” during a state of emergency, the designation of a “situation making elections difficult” during a state of emergency, and the “extension of the terms of Diet members,” among other provisions. In an exclusive interview with the Sankei Shimbun on April 30, LDP President Takaichi indicated her intention to prioritize discussions on themes likely to garner public understanding in order to achieve constitutional revision, specifically the abolition of joint electoral districts in the House of Councillors and the state of emergency provisions. However, both are highly problematic proposals, and it will be necessary to firmly oppose the arguments for constitutional revision through logic and movements.
* Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
This article was published in Shiso-Undo, June 2026, No. 187a