Russia-Türkiye gas negotiations

Türkiye’s natural gas import contracts with Russia are set to expire at the end of 2025, and negotiations have accelerated as the deadline approaches. According to Turkish media reports, alongside both governments, Russia’s Gazprom and Türkiye’s state pipeline operator BOTAŞ are still at the negotiating table.

As talks between Türkiye and Russia continue, two closely related developments have drawn attention: a liquefied natural gas (LNG) agreement between Türkiye and the US during President Erdoğan’s visit to Washington in late September, and the European Union’s decision to first limit, then prohibit the flow of Russian-origin gas to Europe via TurkStream in mid-October.

Plus: the sixth meeting of the Partnership for Transatlantic Energy Cooperation (P-TEC) in Athens: Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis said Europe’s ban on Russian gas “must be enforced” and warned that “Moscow’s gas should not get into Europe through the back door via Türkiye.” In this regard, Mitsotakis praised the agreement dated November 6 between ExxonMobil, Energean and Helleniq Energy, saying the project reflects Greece’s determination to use its own resources as Europe seeks to replace Russian gas supplies.

Developments are unfolding rapidly, involving multiple dimensions and moves by different actors. We asked senior Turkish journalist İsmet Özçelik for his assessment.

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Will Gazprom offer “generous favors”?

Is the Turkish government considering an alternative to Russian gas? And is that even possible?

The Türkiye–Russia natural gas agreement expires at the end of this year, and negotiations for a new deal are ongoing. In previous agreements, Gazprom had offered generous favors to Türkiye, so to speak. Of course, since these fall under “commercial confidentiality”, we don’t know the full details. But based on what I’ve gathered about the current talks, it’s not at all clear that Russia will offer similar “favors” this time. It appears that Russia intends to sell gas to Türkiye at normal global market prices, while Türkiye is demanding a discount.

During President Erdoğan’s visit, the LNG agreement signed with the US was intended to be presented as if it could give Türkiye some bargaining leverage in the talks with Russia. But I don’t think it will have much impact. Türkiye relies on Russia for a very large share of its energy needs, and it’s simply not possible to replace that volume with LNG. And Türkiye’s gas consumption exceeded the planned figure in 2025.

As you know, Europe took this path, replacing Russian gas with LNG from the US, and the results have hit their economies hard. Shifting to LNG is not a very realistic scenario for Türkiye.

Is there any difference between the private sector and the state in their stance on Russian gas?

In Türkiye, pipelines are operated by BOTAŞ, so it essentially holds a monopoly. Moreover, the Turkish state subsidizes natural gas for producers. Because of this, I don’t think there is, or can be, any meaningful difference between the private sector and the state.

“Bypass Türkiye and work with Greece”, but feasible?

On October 15, the EU released a document concerning, inter alia, TurkStream. EU energy ministers have agreed upon a text to first limit, then prohibit reexports of “natural gas imported into the Union (…) arriving via TurkStream (…) originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation.” How will Türkiye respond to this, thinking that such a decision seems likely to undermine Türkiye’s plans to become a “regional natural gas hub”?

The US is pushing a plan to turn Alexandroupolis in Greece into an energy hub and to move LNG into Europe from there. Washington wants to bypass Türkiye and work with Greece instead. They’ve even held new meetings on this recently. But as someone who has studied these issues before, I can say that such projects are not realistic in practice. From both a profitability and a security standpoint, they simply don’t work. For gas coming from Qatar, the Eastern Mediterranean, or anywhere else in that region, Türkiye is the only feasible transit route.

“Sanctions on the neighbors means sanctioning Türkiye”

It’s normal for a country to conduct a large portion of its trade with its neighbors, that’s what you would expect. But until the 2000s, this wasn’t the case for Türkiye. This wasn’t something “natural”, it was rather imposed on Türkiye. As a result, trade with its neighbors remained extremely low. Since then, things have changed, Türkiye’s trade with both its neighbors and North African countries has increased significantly. This has had very positive effects on Türkiye’s economy.

But now consider the consequences of the US’ sanctions policy for Türkiye. For decades, Washington has imposed, and is imposing, sanctions on Russia, Iran and Syria. In practice, that also means sanctioning Türkiye. How can a country thrive economically when it cannot trade with its closest neighbors in the items it needs the most? And now, as you mentioned from the EU document, Türkiye is being asked to comply with sanctions on Russian gas as well.

Delegating the responsibility to private sector

Unfortunately, successive Turkish governments, including the current one, have been too weak, too hesitant to push back against these sanctions. Since the war in Ukraine began, sanctions have dramatically reduced other countries’ exports to Russia. Türkiye could have filled that gap. Yes, Ankara declared that it would not comply with the sanctions on Russia, but instead of taking initiative, the government left everything to the private sector. And because most of the Turkish private sector’s business is with the West and only a small portion with Russia, they were unwilling, or unable, to take that “risk”.

US Treasury officials in Türkiye

Take Iran as an example: for years, Türkiye hasn’t imported even a single liter of oil from Iran. Why? Because the government delegated the issue to private companies, and the private sector simply didn’t take that risk. It’s understandable for the private sector when you know that there have been plenty of deterrent precedents. In some cases, companies working with Russia were pressured to withdraw their money from the banking system. These kinds of things scare them off. Now US Treasury officials have practically set up camp in Türkiye, doing everything they can to obstruct trade with Russia and Iran.

Taking these “risks” should be the government’s responsibility. For example, Türkiye has done this before during Saddam’s era in Iraq bypassing sanctions when it deemed it necessary. Today, however, there is a clear gap between the government’s words, “We will not comply with sanctions”, and what happens in practice. There are multiple reasons for this, but the main economic one is the expectation of hot money from the West.