Accelerating transition to a multipolar world.
Accelerating transition to a multipolar world.
By Orçun Göktürk, Beijing / China
There are no everlasting allies or enemies in international relations. With Trump’s re-election as the President of the United States after a one-term break, this rhetoric has become more frequent. Recently, experts on television have often argued that Trump’s agreement with Putin, bringing the Ukraine war to an end, creates a “danger for China” or that the U.S. is isolating China by focusing on its “Indo-Pacific” strategy.
Of course, during this discussion, the historical example of the “Ping-Pong diplomacy”(1), when Nixon visited Beijing in 1972 and met Mao Zedong, and the China-U.S. agreement that isolated the Soviets, is also referenced. However, all these analogies lead to an oversimplified view, overlooking the current China-Russia relations and the changing international geopolitical landscape.
Let’s first start with the historical background of Nixon-Mao’s meeting.
Step by Step China-Soviet Conflict
After Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953, Mao criticized the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) on three main points: the path it took in building socialism, its interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, and its approach to international relations. Mao accused the CPSU’s 20th Congress of “revisionism” and “de-Stalinization,” and condemned the Soviet foreign policy concept of “peaceful coexistence” with imperialists, arguing that “it is impossible to coexist with imperialists.”
During this period, Mao’s statement that “the U.S. is a paper tiger, U.S. imperialism seems powerful but has become distant from its people and masses” was met with Khrushchev’s verbal response: “Well, the paper tiger has nuclear teeth,” leading to a verbal conflict. Mao labeled Khrushchev as “betraying Marxism,” and in 1961, he also described CPSU leaders as “capitalist roaders.” (2)
This process led to an undeclared military conflict in 1969 between the two largest socialist states, which lasted for seven months on Zhenbao Island. Border conflicts also spread to the Xinjiang region.
The Communist Party of China (CPC), claiming that the Soviet threat was increasing, secretly hosted Henry Kissinger in 1971, and a year later, U.S. President Richard Nixon visited Beijing, marking the beginning of a new era.
From Border Conflicts to ‘Unwavering Friendship’
Since World War II, international politics has largely shaped the triangle of the U.S., Russia, and China. We are now on the brink of another major geopolitical shift. However, this change does not turn Trump into Nixon or Putin into Mao.
As we described earlier, the Soviet-China relations shaped within a great ideological storm eventually led to military border conflicts.
Putin-Xi relations, however, are quite different. Let’s go back to March 2023. A few days after the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for Putin’s arrest, Moscow hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping and his team. At the state banquet at the Kremlin, Xi turned to Putin and said, “We are witnessing changes unseen for a century, and we are advancing this together.” (3)
The two countries signed a joint declaration, calling their relationship “unwavering” which included commitments to increase trade, oppose the U.S.-led unilateral international order, and enhance their partnership in space, among other things.
For Xi, Russia represents indispensable military technology and diplomatic support in breaking any potential U.S. blockade, particularly concerning Taiwan. He is well aware that a possible Russian defeat in Ukraine would embolden the U.S. and its allies.
Xi has a personal historical connection with the Soviets. Xi Jinping’s father, Xi Zhongxun, was one of the CPC’s significant post-revolution leaders and accompanied Soviet experts who came to China in the 1950s for heavy industrial projects. After a visit to Moscow in 1959, Xi Zhongxun brought Soviet-made toys for his son. Xi Jinping was also influenced by famous Russian novels like ” How the Steel was Tempered” and “War and Peace” during his time serving in a far village during the Cultural Revolution.
In 2012, when Xi became the General Secretary of the CPC, the international political atmosphere shifted, strengthening his position against the West, whose charisma had waned after the 2008 crisis. This empowered Xi to elevate his relationship with Putin, making Russia his first overseas visit. Over the past 13 years, the two leaders have met nearly 50 times.
China’s Concerns
Certainly, Russia’s confrontation with NATO in Ukraine and the U.S. focusing more on Russia than China has significantly relieved Beijing. A possible dramatic change in U.S.-Russia relations after Trump’s attempt to establish good ties with Moscow could put China at a disadvantage. However, an end to the war in Ukraine would align with the traditional foreign policy concept of “economic development,” initiated by Deng, which China still adheres to.
After the Ukraine war, Russia faced heavy sanctions from the West, especially the U.S., and China advanced all kinds of commercial and technological cooperation, including providing the electronic components Russia needed to continue the war. As a result, dozens of Chinese officials and organizations were also sanctioned by the U.S. for “assisting Russia.” Additionally, Russia alleviated its financial situation by increasing oil and gas exports to China. It’s worth noting that trade between China and Russia grew by 70% between 2021 and 2024.
Trump’s return to the Oval Office created a significant shift. Trump argued that the war in Ukraine was provoked by Zelensky and labeled him a “dictator.” In the U.S.-Russia relations, Trump’s moderation has led to increasing comments of “anti-Nixon” behavior. However, the situation is vastly different from 1972, and China is not in a position to be isolated from the world as the Soviets were.
Certainly, U.S.-Russia rapprochement creates considerable “pressure” on Beijing. However, this pressure does not stem from any distrust toward Russia. The real reason is that Trump’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific strategy and his attempt to encircle China by closing a front and refocusing on the South China Sea and Taiwan.
Indeed, on February 24, during a phone conversation with Putin, Xi indicated their support for a diplomatic resolution process set up in Saudi Arabia, which excluded Ukraine. The CPC’s newspaper, the People’s Daily, known in the West for its “hawkish” stance, published an editorial saying: “Our relationship with Russia is based on a solid foundation and is of a strategic nature. Those who say that U.S.-Russia talks on the Ukraine conflict are ‘worrying’ China are greatly mistaken. These voices underestimate China-Russia relations and are trapped in Cold War thinking. They don’t truly understand the essence of China-Russia great power relations. China-Russia cooperation is open, constructive, mutually beneficial, and based on win-win principles.” (4)
Conclusion
China’s possible rapprochement with Trump and Putin is historical and is taking shape in the context of a new geopolitical landscape. The dynamics of China-U.S. relations, which began with Nixon-Mao’s 1972 meeting, have now entered a new phase. China’s strategic partnership with Russia is not limited to military and diplomatic cooperation; it has also established strong ties in trade and energy. However, Trump’s re-election, particularly the Indo-Pacific strategy targeting China and the increased focus on issues like Taiwan and the South China Sea, will pose serious concerns for Beijing.
Despite its “unwavering friendship” with Russia, China must remain cautious in the face of changing global balances. While Beijing closely monitors developments in U.S.-Russia relations, its primary concern is the creation of a coalition involving Southeast Asian countries, potentially intensifying U.S. pressure on China. In this context, China will continue to pursue a balanced and pragmatic approach in its foreign policy. Trump’s re-election brings with it multiple geopolitical tipping points, but China, drawing strength from its past experiences and current strategic partnerships, will seek to break this encirclement by deepening its friendship with Russia.
Today, with the rise of Asian powers, a new geopolitical climate has emerged, and with Trump’s intervention in the situation in Ukraine, the geopolitical balance will be disrupted in favor of Putin and Russia, which will also strategically benefit China. China sees in Trump not a strengthening U.S., but a declining one, and in a sense, the end of Pax Americana. It knows that the challenges it will face in the long term will not be significant, and most importantly, it is certain that Putin and Russia will prefer China’s friendship over the U.S. Look at the Munich Security Conference, once the summit of Anglo-Saxon and European elites; today, many more Asians and Africans are attending, and the theme of the summit is ‘multipolarity.’ Now, we are living the opportunity to establish this. China is an important X factor in this rising new system, and neither Trump nor his successors can prevent this.
References
(1) Greene, S. (2021, August 5). Ping-Pong Diplomacy: Artifacts from the Historic 1971 U.S. Table Tennis Trip to China. The National Museum of American Diplomacy.
(2) Vámos, P., Kaple, D., Friedman, J., & Stiffler, D. A. (2010). Mao, Khrushchev, and China’s Split with the USSR. Journal of Cold War Studies, 12(1), 120-165.
(3) The Xi-Putin partnership is not a marriage of convenience. (2025, February 27). The Economist.
(4)中俄关系在复杂国际形势下更加稳健成熟. (2025, February 27). 环球时报.