The Gulf States felt relief upon Trump’s electoral victory, but the path ahead is not an easy one.
The Gulf States felt relief upon Trump’s electoral victory, but the path ahead is not an easy one.
By Islam Farag, Cairo / Egypt
Despite his departure from the White House in 2021, Gulf states’ ties to US President Donald Trump have not been severed. The Trump Organization has struck business deals with a number of his allies in the region, notably the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Oman.
His son-in-law, Jared Kushner, has maintained close ties to Gulf regimes. For example, he has held several talks with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Congressional investigators say Riyadh invested $2 billion in Affinity Partners; a private equity fund Kushner founded after leaving the White House. Kushner also was a prominent guest at the 2022 World Cup, which Qatar hosted.
Even prominent allies of the president who have held key positions in his administration have been tapped for important roles in the Gulf states. For example, Dina Powell McCormick, who was his deputy national security adviser, was tapped to work on the Saudi Aramco IPO in 2019.
There is no meaning to the continued relationship between the Gulf states and the Trump family and his allies, except that the Republican president has succeeded in strengthening his relations with them to a degree that does not depend on continuing in his political position.
Relief
So, relief was the actual state of mind that gripped the Gulf states after Trump was declared the winner over his Democratic rival Kamala Harris in the race for the White House.
In the midst of the election campaign, the Gulf capitals were very cautious in expressing their preferred candidate, but those familiar with Gulf affairs and those following the media that express the orientations of the governments of those countries could easily distinguish that those countries preferred the return of their old friend to the forefront of the American political scene.
Trump’s first term (2017-2021) was characterized by non-interference in the internal affairs of countries, which is a very important issue for countries with traditional absolute regimes that depend for their continuity on different standards that are acceptable to their people, but which seem to contradict the Western standards that the United States and its European allies trumpet and use as a pretext to violate the sovereignty of countries and interfere in their affairs.
This characteristic of Trump’s years in the White House helped cement his friendship with Arab rulers, particularly in the Gulf states. These rulers have long favored win-win relationships, which is how Trump presented himself, earning him the reputation of a dealmaker.
Over those four years, Gulf leaders have become intimately familiar with Trump and his team and the ways to reach satisfactory understandings that meet their political, economic and defense interests.
On the contrary, the Gulf capitals saw in Democratic Candidate Kamala Harris only a natural and pale extension of Democratic President Joe Biden, for whom she was vice president and his alternative in the final meters of the electoral race.
Although the Gulf states generally prefer Republican candidates over their Democratic counterparts, considering them more suitable to their interests, this was not the only reason for their lack of preference for Harris.
For example, the Saudis viewed it as a repeat of Biden’s term, which began with sharp criticism of the kingdom’s human rights situation and reduced support for Riyadh in its war against the Houthis in Yemen.
Strategic gain
This comprehensive and brief look at the Gulf states’ position on the results of the US elections includes many details that lead them to believe that Trump’s victory represents a strategic gain for them.
These elections took place while the ruling regimes in the region were groaning from the repercussions of the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip, which expanded into a war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, and risks a confrontation between Tehran and Tel Aviv.
Regardless of the strategic implications of the results of this war that has been going on for more than a year, Gulf leaders see an urgent need to stop it due to popular discontent with the genocide taking place in the Strip.
This discontent, although it has not translated into tangible pressure against the ruling institutions there due to the complete security control that prevents it from escalating into chaos, is reaching the ears of officials and they realize the importance of containing it.
The only way to calm this discontent is to stop the war, something the Biden administration has shown no serious interest in turning into a reality. For Gulf capitals, Trump may not change the US’s pro-Israel policy, but he could easily influence Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to stop the ongoing war.
Not only that, but the Gulf states also expect that the president-elect, with his influence, can play an important role in convincing the Israelis to move forward towards the two-state solution.
Another issue that makes Trump a strategic asset for these countries is oil, which plays an important role in relations between Washington and the Gulf states.
Republican candidates in general, and former President Donald Trump in particular, are seen as pro-fossil fuel industry and less supportive of rapid transitions to alternative energy. This attitude is in line with the economic interests of the Gulf states, which still rely heavily on oil exports.
On the other hand, Trump’s policies have long encouraged deregulation and lower corporate taxes, which could allow GCC investments in US energy sectors to flourish.
Harris, on the other hand, was not a promising choice as a Democratic candidate who is pushing for a faster transition to renewable energy and higher corporate taxes, policies that Gulf states do not like because they could negatively affect global demand for oil and the conditions for investing in energy in the United States.
Unrealistic wish
This progress on the peace track, in my view, may be an unrealistic wish that has no support for its achievement, given that the Trump administration in its first term did nothing to suggest any intention or credibility in this regard.
His administration moved the Washington embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, in contrast to all previous US administrations, which postponed this decision until after the two-state solution was achieved.
His administration also decided that settlements in the West Bank do not violate international law, in defiance of decades of U.S. policy that Israeli expansion is a major obstacle to resolving the conflict.
Trump did not stop there with regard to the Arab conflict with Israel. In March 2019, he recognized Israel’s sovereignty over the Syrian Golan Heights, an occupied territory under all Security Council resolutions.
Despite these precedents that do not give any hope or indication of the possibility of establishing peace or resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict on its various fronts, the Arabs in general and the Gulf states in particular are betting otherwise for two basic considerations.
The first of these considerations is that Trump, who is passionate about ending wars and providing economic aid to some allied countries, may see stopping the war as an opportunity to achieve his goal.
The second of these considerations is that the Gulf states, specifically Saudi Arabia, can maximize gains for the Palestinian cause and the two-state solution, through the path of normalization between Riyadh and Tel Aviv.
Riyadh is under the illusion that Trump, who in his first term sponsored the Abraham Accords for normalization between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, cannot resist the temptation to add to his political legacy the achievement of this normalization with Saudi Arabia, which has a prominent position in the Arab and Islamic worlds and has enormous economic potential. The Kingdom believes that it may exploit this temptation to persuade him to pressure Tel Aviv to make concessions in favor of achieving the two-state solution.
As for the first consideration, what Trump may reduce in military aid to Ukraine in the face of Russia may not apply to Israel.
The president-elect may be more inclined to end the war in Ukraine, even at Kiev’s expense, but he takes a different view on Israel. In his election campaign, he alluded to the small size of Israel and suggested that it should be expanded, something that would never happen by stopping the war or rushing to revitalize the two-state solution.
Therefore, his call to stop the war may be just an election propaganda or a temporary matter until opportunities are explored to seize gains through secret channels that were not possible with guns.
As for the second consideration, the Kingdom ignores that concessions are not made through a simplified process, but rather through a complex process based on the gains that exist on the ground. For example, Israel is preempting Trump’s assumption of power by taking measures that make it realistically difficult to make the required concessions.
According to Hebrew media, the Israeli Prime Minister is moving towards developing a gradual program to annex large areas of the West Bank, on which there is consensus between the ruling right and the opposition parties. This program begins with imposing sovereignty over those areas, which are mostly the Jordan Valley and the settlement bloc located between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, in a blatant exploitation of Trump’s statements about his desire to expand the territory of Israel.
According to sources, the Israeli government is moving towards offering Trump a deal that includes recognizing Israel’s sovereignty over those settlements in exchange for ending the war in Gaza and Lebanon.
Suspicious history
Another detail that makes Gulf states feel good about Trump’s election is that some of them want firm security guarantees and more American investment in diversifying the region’s economy.
The Gulf states have failed to achieve a push in relations with Washington on this path, thanks to the deep differences in visions and priorities with Washington under the Biden administration.
“We have worked with President Trump before, so we know him and we can find a way to work with him well,” Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan said during his recent participation in the Kingdom’s annual investment forum.
From this standpoint, the Saudis aspire to link acceptance of normalization with Israel to obtaining a defense agreement with Washington and American support for a Saudi civilian nuclear program. Riyadh has failed to complete this path in light of the obstacles caused by Washington, especially the explicit support for the continuation of the genocide in the Gaza Strip.
The incoming Trump administration’s lack of interest in human rights issues may reduce the areas of tension with the Gulf states in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular. But this does not mean in any way that the Gulf states’ bet on Trump will be a winning one all the way.
Although Trump’s relationship with the Gulf states was described as strong, and perhaps based on a personal friendship with some of their leaders, he did nothing to defend Saudi Arabia when Aramco’s oil facilities were attacked.
At that time, he considered himself not concerned with the matter, which made Riyadh realize that it had to diversify its options, and this is what actually happened when it strengthened its relations with Russia and China.
Among the issues that the Gulf states in general are counting on the next administration is the threat that Iran poses to the region and its stability.
Issues awaiting resolution
When Gulf-Iranian relations were experiencing political and security tensions, Gulf capitals expressed their dissatisfaction with the Iranian nuclear agreement concluded by former US President Barack Obama with Iran in 2015. However, they later expressed remarkable relief when Trump withdrew from this agreement.
Today, the relationship between most Gulf capitals and Iran has improved, while tensions still exist between Tehran and Washington.
Despite the improvement in relations between the Gulf states and Iran, some problems remain that the ruling regimes in the Gulf would like to see resolved. The most prominent of them are the armed militias supported by Tehran in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, and Iran’s ballistic program and drones.
The Gulf states expect Trump to use his usual methods of pressuring Iran to clip the wings of those militias and limit their military programs. But those same states may be subject to American pressure to get involved in roles that strain their relations with Tehran and may even make their economic assets a target for sabotage.
One exception
All these strategic details were a controlling and encouraging factor in the Gulf capitals’ preference for Trump’s victory, with the exception of one country, Qatar.
Doha’s relations with Washington were poor during Trump’s first years in office. During that period, Qatar was boycotted by four Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt, on the grounds that it supported and funded extremism and terrorism.
Despite Qatar’s calls for the United States to intervene to end this blockade, Trump did little to deter its neighbors. His administration has at times appeared to support the Saudi and Emirati positions.
According to an American diplomat, Trump was partly responsible for the continuation of the crisis because he was acting on the basis of personal interests rather than the public interest. His positions were governed by the economic relations that linked him and his family to the rulers in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates.
Under Biden, Doha has managed to build strong relations with his administration, which has classified it as a “strategic ally” of Washington outside the North Atlantic. However, this classification is not expected to change with Trump’s return, because Qatar has established itself as an international mediator in important arenas, such as the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, and thanks to its efforts to stop the fighting in Gaza. Doha is also a prominent player in global energy markets, particularly liquefied natural gas.
Indirect challenges
Whatever the Gulf states’ view of Trump’s victory as a favorable outcome for them and their interests, the next US administration will create indirect challenges for them.
For example, Trump’s protectionist policies regarding trade with China could, among other factors, lead to a slowdown in the Chinese economy, which could lead to a reduction in demand for oil exports from the GCC countries, affecting oil prices and the economies of the six countries.
On the other hand, over the past few years, the Gulf countries have succeeded in diversifying their political alliances and trade partnerships, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
The two countries, for example, have expanded trade ties with Russia and China, and joined BRICS. Saudi Arabia has been granted dialogue partner status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a Chinese-led Asian security and economic bloc. These countries also have even eased tensions in their relations with Iran.
The goal of all this was to avoid falling prey to the blackmail of US, which is adept at playing this game with allies as well as opponents.
In my view, these countries may face a major challenge under the next administration, as they are expected to be subjected to enormous pressure to disengage from China in certain areas.
As for the blackmail game they fear, they will find it before them thanks to Trump, who may be one of the most skilled Americans at playing it. In short, their bet on the president-elect is a bet fraught with challenges and risks.