Renewed tensions over the Zangezur Corridor: Why now?

By Mehmet Akif Akıncı

Following a meeting between Iran’s former president, Ebrahim Raisi, and Ilham Aliyev, the president of Azerbaijan, on the banks of the Aras River, many believed that the tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan over the Zangezur Corridor had finally subsided. It was thought that both sides were moving toward a joint project without further disputes on the issue.

However, in recent days, the Zangezur Corridor has unexpectedly become a source of tension between Iran and Russia. Iran summoned the Russian ambassador to Tehran to its Foreign Ministry to express its concerns about the Zangezur Corridor and reaffirm its opposition to its establishment. A few days later, on Thursday, September 5th, Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi shared his thoughts on the matter on his social media account on X, stating that “Peace, security, and regional stability are not merely priorities but one of the pillars of our national security. Any threat to the territorial integrity of our neighbors, or redrawing borders—whether in the north, south, east, or west—is completely unacceptable and represents a red line for Iran.”

Iran’s ambassador to Armenia, Mehdi Sobhani, echoed this stance on Friday, September 6th, in a statement to reporters, asserting that the dreams regarding the Zangezur Corridor “will never come true.”

Following these remarks by Iranian officials, members of Iran’s parliament quickly began reacting to the issue, particularly on social media platforms. Over the past week, the Zangezur Corridor has emerged as one of the key topics in Iranian social media and press, with various political factions dedicating their headlines to this subject. But what exactly is fueling Iran’s concerns?

What is Iran concerned about?

Iran’s concerns can be categorized into two groups: Those that are openly stated and those that remain unspoken. The latter group reflects the primary reasons for Iran’s strong opposition to the Zangezur Corridor, while the former can often be seen as a pretext.

The main issue raised by Iran, from its highest political circles to the press, is the potential geopolitical changes along its borders. Iran claims that the establishment of the Zangezur Corridor would cut off its border connection with Armenia, a development that would naturally be seen as contrary to Iran’s interests. Beyond the general undesirability of limiting direct border relations between the two countries, there are concerns about how this might impact Iran’s ability to bypass sanctions through Armenia. However, Iranian officials have never provided a detailed legal explanation of how a transit route would sever its border with Armenia.

In contrast, Afshar Soleimani, Iran’s former ambassador to Azerbaijan, argues that the concern about losing the Iran-Armenia border is largely an excuse. He believes the real worry stems from a security and ideological perspective regarding the South Caucasus region and the so-called “near abroad” of Iran. Soleimani adds that Iran is concerned about the potential connection between Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and the Turkic countries of Central Asia, the strengthening of the Organization of Turkic States, the involvement of NATO in the region, and Azerbaijan’s diminishing dependence on Iran for transportation and energy routes to reach Nakhchivan.

Some Iranian analysts, often labeled as “Turkophobes,” have accused Azerbaijan and Türkiye of acting in NATO’s interests and have referred to the Zangezur Corridor as a “NATO corridor.” However, in recent years, it has become clear that Armenia, more so than Azerbaijan, has pursued a pro-Western agenda, aiming to align with Western interests against regional powers, while Russia, China, and Central Asian countries, along with Azerbaijan, support the Zangezur Corridor.

It appears that Iran’s primary objection to the corridor stems from exaggerated concerns over the potential internal threats that could arise from strengthening the Turkish presence in northern Iran. Iran is also displeased at the prospect of losing its relative control over the transit routes between Central Asian countries and Türkiye, which currently pass through Iran. Consequently, Iran is attempting to promote the “Aras Corridor” as an alternative to the Zangezur Corridor.

Despite these concerns, it should be noted that even if the Zangezur Corridor is not realized, Azerbaijan will still connect to Nakhchivan and Türkiye through Armenian territory. Additionally, Armenia, which finds itself in a semi-blockaded state, seeks to reopen its transportation routes with Azerbaijan and Türkiye, which share a 600-kilometer border, and this will likely happen regardless of Iran’s position. Moreover, the argument by some Iranian analysts that a direct land connection between Türkiye and Azerbaijan poses a significant threat is far from accurate. Türkiye has had an extensive transportation network with Central Asia for years through the 1,000-kilometer Kars-Akhalkalaki (in Georgia)-Baku-Caspian Sea-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan railway.

Why now?

The recent political tension, this time involving Russia rather than Türkiye and Azerbaijan, raises the question of why the Zangezur Corridor has resurfaced as a key issue at this particular time. With a new government in Iran that is focusing its attention on the confrontation with Israel, why has a conflict emerged with Russia, which is considered a close ally of Iran?

Two main perspectives dominate the discourse in Iranian media when analyzing why this situation has arisen:

1. Russia applying pressure on Iran:

Some analysts, predominantly from the reformist camp, argue that Moscow is concerned about improving relations between Tehran and the West. They believe Russia is using various issues, such as the Zangezur Corridor, to exert pressure on Iran’s diplomatic apparatus. This group contends that Russia was the main obstacle to the resumption of nuclear negotiations during Biden’s administration, and that delays in completing the Bushehr nuclear plant have effectively crippled Iran’s nuclear industry. According to this perspective, Russia’s approach is designed to create a political crisis for Iran’s diplomacy, preventing Tehran from moving closer to the West. Additionally, these analysts argue that Russia’s support for the Zangezur Corridor runs counter to Iran’s national interests and contradicts the principles of friendship between the two nations.

2. A Reformist strategy:

Another group of analysts, mostly from the conservative camp, believes that the recent statements by Russian officials do not reflect any new or surprising policies. They argue that Russia has consistently emphasized the reopening of all Soviet-era transit routes since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement. The reopening of the Zangezur Corridor is one such transit route agreed upon by Baku and Yerevan in the November 9, 2020, ceasefire. According to this group, while there are still legal and regulatory issues to be resolved regarding supervision and details of the corridor, Moscow’s stance is not new or unexpected. They argue that the media tension generated by reformist factions is primarily aimed at sending a message to the West. Reformists, they claim, are signaling that if the West offers significant concessions to the new Iranian government—allowing it to achieve substantial domestic success—there could be room to reconsider Iran’s relationship with Russia.

The future of the tension

Although the issue of the Zangezur Corridor may seem minor in the context of the larger crises occurring in the Middle East, the diversity of influencing factors, the number of interested parties, the complexity of the positions involved, and the multilayered reasons for Iran’s stance all contribute to the uncertainty surrounding the future of this tension.

Given the depth of relations between Iran and Russia, it can be expected that the recent political tension between Tehran and Moscow will soon be resolved. However, this does not signal the end of the matter. Iran will likely face renewed tensions with Baku and Ankara over this issue in the coming months, as it has in previous years. Notably, even Yerevan is not aligned with Iran on this matter.

In reality, while Iran is attempting to prevent its isolation by opposing the creation of the Zangezur Corridor, it finds itself increasingly isolated, with disagreements surfacing with some of its most important northern neighbors.

It seems that in the coming months, Russia and Türkiye may develop solutions to address Iran’s concerns, leading Tehran to soften its position. At the same time, Iran will have little choice but to align with the will of its neighboring countries.

The biggest challenge for Iran in this matter—one that has become a chronic problem in its foreign policy—is the negative influence of domestic issues on its external strategies. Iranian officials are under significant pressure from domestic public opinion, and as a result, they may be forced to pursue a less costly solution.