A lifeline for a dying NATO: the 6th Corps and the military fuel pipeline
A lifeline for a dying NATO: the 6th Corps and the military fuel pipeline
By İhsan Sefa – Retired Air Force Colonel
At the Ankara summit, the handover of the 6th Corps to NATO is expected to be approved.
Through this (and similar projects), whose groundwork had already been laid in advance, Türkiye is trying to demonstrate its “loyalty” to NATO. In return for these moves, the US, NATO’s patron, is offering Türkiye a number of “carrots.”
The delivery of F110 engines for Türkiye’s national combat aircraft KAAN, and efforts to bring Türkiye back into the F-35 program, are examples of these carrots from the US’ side.
Both F110 engines and the F-35 program, however pleasant and attractive they may appear at first glance, are in fact traps for Türkiye. They are poisons disguised as carrots.
The Cyprus operation of 1964
There is a concrete example of this in Türkiye’s own history. In 1964, when an operation against Cyprus was being planned, the batteries of the F-84 aircraft in inventory had run out, and the US refused to provide Türkiye with replacements. Because the aircraft could not fly, Türkiye found itself in a predicament. The US’ aim was to prevent Türkiye’s operation on Cyprus.
During this period, Turkish engineers, using their own means, produced seven-eight prototype batteries for the F-84s and achieved major success in the trials. Once the US saw that the Turks had managed to produce their own batteries, it immediately sent Türkiye a cargo plane full of them, twice as many as needed, in order to cut off domestic production and preserve Türkiye’s dependence on the US.
Today, the US is following the same strategy on the KAAN engine issue. Because Türkiye has begun developing its own engine, Washington is offering to supply engines in order to obstruct that development and keep Türkiye dependent on the US.
The realities of the F-35 program
The efforts to return to the F-35 program are a similar mistake for Türkiye. The F-35 is, in effect, a troublesome aircraft. It is a model the whole world is trying to avoid and that no one is eager to buy. Even the US Air Force has cut its orders for this aircraft by half and has instead begun producing new models of the F-16.
The F-35 has countless structural and systemic flaws. It has 1,500 separate suppliers, and its parts are produced by eight-nine different countries. This makes both storage of its parts and logistical support nearly impossible.
Due to structural failures, the combat readiness and operational availability rate of F-35 aircraft has not exceeded 50 percent in any country, not even in the US. But according to NATO standards, this rate should be at least 70 percent. Having ended up with these F-35s on its hands, the US now deeply regrets having removed Türkiye from the program and wants to sell them back to Türkiye.
Certain circles inside Türkiye, who aren’t aware of where the country’s interests lie, are desperate to acquire the F-35. If Türkiye reenters the F-35 program, this will set back the national KAAN project.
Türkiye has no need for the F-35 today. Türkiye’s UAVs and UCAVs have given the country tremendous strength in the struggle for air superiority. Moreover, thanks to its ballistic missiles, Türkiye has gained a major advantage over potential adversaries such as Greece and Israel. In any possible conflict, all of Greece’s military airfields could be struck at once with ballistic missiles; under such circumstances, aircraft may not even be necessary. What I want to say is not that Türkiye shouldn’t look for more aircraft, but when Türkiye already possesses UAVs, UCAVs and strong air defense systems, acting as if the country is desperately dependent on the F-35 is completely wrong.
A lifeline for a dying NATO: the 6th Corps and the military fuel pipeline
As Türkiye heads toward the NATO Summit in Ankara, it is, with two major projects it has put forward, trying to throw a lifeline to the dying NATO.
The first of these is the allocation of the 6th Corps to NATO. The 6th Corps will serve within NATO as a “Rapid Response Force.” This force will be structured so that, in the event of any crisis, it can complete all preparations within 10 days and take part in operations.
The area where this corps will be deployed is NATO’s southeastern flank. NATO would certainly not use this force against Israel. It would use it against Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Syria and even Russia, in other words, directly against Türkiye’s neighbors and friends. Positioning Türkiye’s own military power against its own friends is extremely misguided and dangerous.
The second project is the military fuel pipeline planned to start in Türkiye and extend through Bulgaria and Romania, ultimately reaching Poland. This project, too, is a lifeline for NATO, but it carries serious risks for Türkiye.
Türkiye will be solely responsible for securing this line. In a possible NATO conflict with Russia, the first targets of the opposing military would be these fuel pipelines, and the storage systems located on Turkish territory.
In the end, while NATO is already a burden in itself, trying to keep the Alliance alive is dragging Türkiye into further major dangers.