Equations and balances in the triangle of Iran, Israel and Egypt, with the US position in the background. A look from Cairo.
Equations and balances in the triangle of Iran, Israel and Egypt, with the US position in the background. A look from Cairo.
By Mohamed Sabreen, Cairo / Egypt
There is a state of intense anxiety throughout the region about Iran’s expected response to the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, and what Hezbollah will do in retaliation for the killing of Fouad Shukr, one of its most important military commanders, in an Israeli attack on the southern suburbs of Beirut. Days have passed and there has been no response until this moment. Netanyahu leaks that he is planning a pre-emptive strike against Tehran, and at the same time Washington, Cairo and Qatar are trying to reach a ceasefire agreement in Gaza, to stop the process of rushing to a large-scale regional war.
Most likely, the anxiety of a regional war is justified, but the explosion is not inevitable. Washington wants to modify the Iranian regime’s behavior and cause it to explode from within, even after a while. In return, Netanyahu wants to overthrow the regime in Tehran, destroy Iran and its nuclear program at the hands of America and a Western coalition, and implicate Arab countries. Cairo stands strongly at the head of the camp that rejects the explosion of the region, and just as it previously refused to get involved in any reckless movements and adventures of the neocons in Washington, it stands strongly against any adventure by Israel, and demands that Iran control its reaction to attempts to involve it in a large-scale war. Here we will try to read what is happening in the terrible game going on now.
Intensive dialogues between Cairo and Tehran
The recent period witnessed an intense dialogue between Cairo and Tehran on regional issues and post-war arrangements in Gaza, which reflects Cairo’s keenness to reach rapprochement with Iran and show that it is not a party to any attempts to contain or besiege the Iranian regime.
Dr. Badr Abdel Ati, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs and Immigration, recently made a phone call with Ali Bagheri Kani, the Iranian Foreign Minister-designate. Ahmed Abu Zeid, the official spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, stated that the call comes within the framework of the communications that Egypt is conducting with all concerned parties with the aim of containing the current escalation and easing of tension in the region.
Minister Abdel Ati stressed that the recent developments in the region are unprecedented and dangerous, and threaten to expand the scope of the conflict in a way that threatens the stability of the countries of the region and the interests of their people, which requires all parties to exercise calm and restraint to avoid the situation getting out of control.
Minister Abdel Ati reaffirmed the Egyptian position calling for stopping the war on the Gaza Strip as it is the main reason for the increase in tension and confrontation in the region. He stressed Egypt’s position rejecting the Israeli escalatory policies, the policy of assassinations and violating the sovereignty of states, indicating that these policies will not be in the interest of any of the countries and it will only inflame the conflict, making it difficult to contain the crisis.
Telephone conversations between the Egyptian and Iranian foreign ministers raised questions about what contacts between Cairo and Tehran could lead to in terms of efforts to reduce the extent of tension and conflict in the region.
It seemed remarkable that Cairo focused during its contacts with Tehran on “deep concern” about the expansion of the conflict areas regionally, its denunciation of the expansion of military tensions in the southern Red Sea region, and its warning of “dangerous consequences for the region and international peace and security.”
Egypt’s deep concern comes from the expansion of the conflict in the region, given that it has cast a negative and dangerous shadow on the sovereignty and stability of a number of sisterly Arab countries, which portends serious consequences for the region and international peace and security, and that the expansion of the scope and scope of the conflict is not in the interest of any party, and it negatively affects the efforts made to resolve the crisis.
Egypt expressed several times “concern and denunciation” of the expanding military tensions in the southern Red Sea region, which it said negatively affects the interests of many countries, including Egypt, as a result of the threat it poses to international shipping traffic in this important and strategic international shipping lane according to a recent statement by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
For his part, the Iranian Foreign Minister-designate expressed his appreciation for the Egyptian initiative to communicate, and its keenness on the security and stability of the region. At the end of the call, Bagheri also thanked the Foreign Minister for his participation in the inauguration ceremony of the new Iranian president, an indication that expresses Egypt’s interest in the participation of the government and people of Iran in this important event at a high ministerial level. The last contact came as a continuation of a series of Egyptian-Iranian contacts that have intensified since the outbreak of war in the Gaza Strip on October 7, as Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi met his late Iranian counterpart, Ibrahim Raisi, for the first time on the sidelines of the emergency Arab-Islamic summit hosted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia last November.
Since then, there have been numerous phone calls between the two sides at the presidential or ministerial level, and those calls focused on “the situation in the Gaza Strip and fears of escalating regional tension,” according to official statements issued by both sides.
A test of Iranian intentions
Iranian affairs expert at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Dr. Mohamed Abbas Naji, believes that Egyptian-Iranian relations at the current stage, “do not go beyond the communications stage,” and it is not possible to speak clearly about “joint coordination.” He explained that communications between Cairo and Iran preceded the crisis in the Gaza Strip, but the current situation in the wake of the Israeli aggression on the Strip “provided a new test for Iranian intentions.”
Naji pointed out that the situation in Yemen and the repercussions of the operations carried out by the Houthis at the entrance to the Red Sea have become an important aspect of Egyptian communications with the Iranian side, especially in light of the negative impact of those operations on international navigation and the transit movement of ships in the Suez Canal.
The head of the Egyptian Suez Canal Authority, Lieutenant General Osama Rabie, said last month that the canal’s revenues had decreased by 40 percent since the beginning of the year compared to 2023, after Houthi attacks in Yemen on ships led to their sailing routes being diverted away from this corridor. Rabie explained in televised statements at the time that “ship transit traffic declined by 30 percent in the period from the beginning of last January on an annual basis.”
The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have prompted maritime transport companies to change their routes, with an increasing number of ships avoiding the Suez Canal. According to International Monetary Fund data, the movement of goods transport through the Suez Canal decreased at the beginning of last month by 35 percent compared to the same period in 2023. During the same period, the Fund reported an increase in the transport of goods via the Cape of Good Hope route in Africa by 67.5 percent. The Houthi group says it is targeting Israel and ships associated with it to pressure it to stop the attack on the Gaza Strip.
Regarding the possibility that Egyptian-Iranian contacts could lead to reducing the intensity of the regional escalation, especially in the Red Sea region, which represents strategic importance for Egypt, the Iranian affairs expert pointed out that the crisis is “more complex than being dependent on bilateral relations,” adding that the escalation in the Red Sea It represents an Iranian “pressure card” against Israel and the United States in an attempt to raise the strategic cost of any operations targeting Iran, especially in light of “speculations indicating the imminence of American strikes on Iranian targets.”
He added that it is difficult to predict specific scenarios regarding the development of Egyptian-Iranian relations, or the nature of the developments that the region will witness in the coming period, considering that “the ball is now in the court of the United States,” and that the nature of what it will do “will largely determine the nature of the Iranian response, and what it will do. If the matter entails a direct Iranian response, it may exacerbate regional tension.”
The Palestinian resistance is renewing itself
And from another side, it is no longer a secret that Cairo is not satisfied with the behavior of the Israeli occupying state, due to Netanyahu’s procrastination and disavowal of all agreements reached for a ceasefire in Gaza. Egyptian diplomat Mustafa al-Feki believes that the Egyptian position on Israel currently is a natural outcome due to the occupation’s escalation of crimes and massacres, the absence of global conscience, and the unjust position of the United States of America in support of Israel. He confirms that what Israel is doing is state terrorism that has no equal.
For his part, former Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed Al-Orabi says in television statements that religious fanaticism is something inherent in the Israeli character, and it is a very important issue that must be taken into account when analyzing positions. They call themselves the only democratic oasis in the region, and this is illogical and not true.
Al-Orabi stated that the Israeli Prime Minister has absolute authority, and the Knesset does not have the ability to stop the fire. He stated that the Prime Minister is the one who decides with the war council, without consulting institutions, and the whole world follows him. He added: “We are facing a very complex society”. But the region has specifications that must be adhered to not to deviate from it, and the determinants of the region are simple, which are peace, stability and development.
Al-Orabi stated that public opinion within Israeli society has no direction towards real peace with the Palestinians.
At the same time, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry stressed the lack of political will on the Israeli side to end that war, in response to an Israeli massacre committed by the occupation against Palestinians performing dawn prayers in a school housing displaced people in the Gaza Strip.
On the other hand, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, Emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and US President Joe Biden, in a joint statement, called on Israel and Hamas to resume negotiations on the ceasefire agreement in Gaza.
A high-ranking Egyptian source denied the existence of gaps in the tunnels between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, in which members of the Palestinian resistance are hiding. He stressed that Cairo has adhered to the utmost levels of restraint since the beginning of the war in Gaza, in the hope of achieving calm and to avoid entering the region into a vicious circle of conflict.
Five economic impacts if conflict erupts
Perhaps one of the most important concerns of the countries of the region, including Egypt, is the fear of the economic effects if a large-scale war erupts. Robert Mogielnicki, senior researcher at the Gulf States Institute in Washington, and Ahmed Abu Al-Douh, researcher in the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House, present five possible effects of the expansion of the war in the region:
Shipping and food prices
It is unclear how and when Iran will respond, as US officials have twice revised their assessments of the situation, adding to the uncertainty in markets overall.
Observers warn that if ports and airports stop, some countries may stop receiving basic supplies, leading to severe shortages of food, medicine, and fuel.
Regarding the shipping sector, Mogilinki, a specialist in the political economy of the Middle East and North Africa, says that this sector has already dealt with a tremendous number of challenges since the outbreak of Covid-19 and in the recent period of Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.
He adds that the expansion of the conflict across the region would “lead to increased shipping and insurance costs which will then lead to higher prices for consumers, and we will look at the inflationary impact for consumers in the region and globally.”
For his part, Ahmed Abu Al-Douh, a specialist in geopolitical affairs and security, focused on the impact of the disturbances in the Red Sea on global shipping movement in general, and on Egypt’s revenues from the Suez Canal, and expressed his fear that “this impact will turn into a crisis in the long and medium term.”
Sanctions and growth
Mogielnicki also points out the need to consider indirect economic impacts if the regional conflict escalates. He says: “There will be countries in the Middle East and North Africa that feel the impact of this escalation more than others. For example, Egypt, which is already facing multiple economic challenges, will suffer additional repercussions in areas such as tourism, foreign direct investment, and trade. While there are other countries such as Saudi Arabia that seek “To promote ambitious development agendas, this strategy relies heavily on a continuous influx of foreign and resident investors, but the tense conditions in the region may make this more difficult to achieve.”
For his part, the researcher at Chatham House, Ahmed Abu Al-Douh, says, “It is difficult for some economies, such as the Israeli economy, to grow in light of this situation, especially amid expectations of a reduction in the country’s credit rating, which will make it difficult for Israel to borrow, which it needed and will need Certainly in the future, it is a dilemma that other countries in the region, such as Egypt, may face with the increase in debt service.”
On the other hand, it is expected that countries with fragile economies will witness an additional decline, especially those facing crises in vital sectors such as the banking sector in Lebanon, or countries that are permanently subjected to international sanctions such as Iran, and some actors in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, which will increase the deteriorating economic conditions that these countries and their people suffer from.
Oil and energy markets
Oil prices jumped by more than $2 per barrel just hours after Haniyeh’s killing. Investors are closely monitoring the chances of expanding the escalating hostilities between Israel and Iran, which could threaten global oil supplies and thus raise energy prices.
Mogielnicki warns that the scenario of an all-out war with the participation of regional parties may include attacks on energy facilities, whether related to vital oil and gas infrastructure, which will lead to disruption of supplies. In this case, we may see serious fluctuations in energy prices, and this will have a global impact, not just a regional one.
Tourism and travel
Since the beginning of the war in Gaza, travelers’ posts on social media have not been without questions about traveling to Israel, the occupied West Bank, Lebanon, and Sinai, and concerns have spread to broader circles such as Dubai, Türkiye, and Cyprus, with several countries updating travel warnings for their citizens.
The war broke out in Gaza at a time when tourism in the Middle East was at its peak following the closures caused by the Corona epidemic, and the number of visitors arriving to the Middle East was 20% higher than the same period in 2019, making it the only region in the world that exceeded Pre-pandemic, according to the United Nations World Tourism Organization.
Tourism plays an important role in the economies of countries such as Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, as this sector contributes between 12 and 26% of the total revenues from abroad for these three countries, according to a recent report issued by the S&P Credit Rating Corporation.
According to the report, “These countries, which are directly adjacent to Israel and Gaza, are more vulnerable to a tourism slowdown, given concerns about security risks and social unrest.”
In this context, Mogielnicki notes that the Middle East and many Gulf Cooperation Council countries host large numbers of expatriates who are of vital importance to their economies and the economies of their countries.
Livelihood and human losses
Tehran and Washington stand before delineating the features of 4 new years, which includes complex files, such as the war on Gaza, the Iranian nuclear program, sanctions, and the missile file.
“The biggest losers in these conflicts are the countries on the front lines,” says Mogielnicki. “We cannot ignore the victims of the population who suffer greatly from the consequences of these wars, whether they are direct victims of the conflict or face worsening poverty, food insecurity, and displacement.” He notes that it is unfortunate that we will see the worst economic and social impacts continue across the region.
While negotiations for a ceasefire in Gaza are in full swing in Doha, the Egyptian and Arab political elite are closely following all possibilities, proposing and evaluating multiple scenarios.
A deal is on the horizon
Amid this hectic atmosphere, there is news of a deal sponsored by Oman. Some believe that the race is intense between trying to reach a ceasefire deal and exchange of prisoners within days or entering into a major confrontation. Several sources say that negotiations have been ongoing between Washington and Tehran, under Omani mediation, for months, until today, about the fate of the Gaza war and the entire region, and that the two countries do not want to expand the war.
On the other hand, former Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed Kamel Amr revealed that Egypt focused during the Gaza war on reducing escalation, a ceasefire, the exchange of prisoners, and the introduction of aid. He explained that recently the Egyptian role has been directed towards reducing tension between Israel and Iran, not sliding towards expanding the conflict, and sparing the region the risks of instability and threats to the interests of its people.
The commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s satellite air forces had previously revealed that Israel had sent messages to Tehran via Egypt. Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh said that Israel sent messages through the Egyptian Foreign Minister offering concessions in the war in Gaza to avoid Iranian retaliation, after the bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus.
At the same time, informed sources said that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, in his conversation with Macron, identified for Washington and Western countries ways to avoid the outbreak of war, calling on them to force Israel to stop the genocide and accept a ceasefire.
On the other hand, White House spokesman John Kirby called on Yahya Sinwar to accept a ceasefire and release the hostages and revealed that there was a good proposal presented to both parties that must be accepted. He in turn addressed Iran by saying that our diplomatic efforts are continuing, and if Tehran decides to implement its threat, we are in a good military position to deter her.
The leaks were not limited to Arab sources, as there are Israeli and American reports talking about an American move to advance a “regional settlement” that would prevent the outbreak of a comprehensive war. The Ynet website revealed an American attempt to begin a large-scale movement to achieve a “regional settlement” now, under which a deal would be concluded that would bring hostages and a strategic solution to regional tensions and prevent escalation.
According to the Hebrew site, the scenario that senior security officials in Israel are pushing more and more towards could turn the tables for the better and calm the entire Middle East, instead of dragging Israel into a multi-stage war, abandoning the fighting in Gaza, and leaving the kidnappers in a bad situation for many months and perhaps years, in the Hamas tunnels.
The site pointed out that Iran and Hezbollah are sending messages that the ceasefire will stop the attack, and therefore, the Americans are showing some optimism.
At the same time, it says that assuming that the messages coming from Iran and Hezbollah do not constitute part of the deception that precedes the attack, Yahya Al-Sinwar may believe that time is playing in his favor, and would prefer to wait for a scenario of convergence of arenas. It pointed out that “the Americans prefer that there be a deal that leads to a domino effect, that is, a deal to release the hostages, a ceasefire in Gaza, calm in Lebanon, and perhaps normalization with Saudi Arabia.
Reasons for the delay in the Iranian attack on Israel
And on his part Dr. Amr El-Shobaki, a researcher at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, explains the delay in the Iranian response to Haniyeh’s assassination due to what he considered “Iran’s complex calculations.” He explained that Tehran refuses to rush in launching a strike that might trigger strong international reactions, taking into account the recent European statement. In addition to the American military movement via aircraft carriers and a submarine in the region, Al-Shoubaki says that Iran is evaluating its calculations carefully and is well aware that any strike it strikes will have a price. It does not want a provocative strike, and at the same time it wants to save its face. Al-Shoubaki rules out that Iran will expand the size of its strike against Israel, which would expose it to the risk of direct confrontation with American forces. He expects that the Iranian response will be of a different nature, by targeting an intelligence headquarters, and it will ensure that the response is not broad and leads to the outbreak of war.
Al-Shoubaki believes that Israel will likely respond to the weak Iranian attack by targeting the leaders of the first ranks of the Revolutionary Guards, or vital facilities, but it will not lead to a widespread response.
Iran has rejected attempts by Western countries to persuade it not to launch a military strike against Israel. The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman announced that his country rejected the tripartite statement of the European Troika, Britain, France and Germany, which warned Iran against attacking Israel.
Meanwhile, analysts agree on the scope of the Iranian strike and the weakness of its potential impact, while Mehr News Agency reported on Tuesday that Iran is conducting military training in the north of the country.
What is the outcome of the war between Iran and Israel if it occurs? A big question that imposes itself on experts, countries in the region, and international research center circles. Here we present an Iranian answer that sheds some light on “how Tehran thinks.”
Iran and the policy of “thousand stabs”
At the same time, according to former Iranian Ambassador Sayyed Mohammad Hosseini, Israel and Iran enjoy comparative advantages. While Iran outperforms Israel in the “proxy war,” Hosseini stressed that Israel is relatively superior in psychological, information, and cyber warfare, especially in economic warfare, where it gained this advantage from the support of the Western bloc led by the United States and some countries in the region.
Hosseini explained in an article in the Iranian reformist newspaper Arman Emroz that a direct war between Iran and Israel would certainly result in Tehran’s loss, given the possibility of US intervention, and the fact that Iran’s strength lies in proxy war, which he believes could become more effective against Israel over time.
Hosseini stressed that Iran was able to put Israel on its gradual death bed through the “thousand stabs policy”, pointing out that Israel is on the brink of destruction, and entering into a direct war with it would inevitably mean saving it from this destruction, and he believes that the confrontation between Tel Aviv and Tehran will be long-term.
The effectiveness of the strike did not last long
Informed Iranian sources revealed in press leaks that Benjamin Netanyahu is proving with fire his violation of Iranian geography. The assassination of Haniyeh is only the tip of a sinking iceberg of operations that repeatedly crossed red lines and did not find sufficient Iranian deterrence to prevent them.
The sources say that, therefore, Israel did not pay a real price that would make it think about the moment after it takes any action throughout the region. Perhaps what happened on the night of April 14, 2024, changed the balance of deterrence relatively, and the American entry into the crisis line contributed to this to ensure a safe landing, but the effectiveness of that Iranian dose did not last long, and it collapsed due to the transformations in the major battle at the regional level. This was also influenced by Netanyahu’s personal desire to gradually drag Iran into the conflict, so that the theme of the day following the current Gaza war would be building an alliance to confront the nuclear Tehran.
Refrain from responding
On the other hand, informed sources say that Arab and Western capitals advised Tehran not to respond, and perhaps this advice is correct. They say that their proposal stems from the fear of entering a tunnel with no horizon, which may lead to exhausting Iran and weakening it and the axis it leads if it becomes involved in a vicious circle of mutual targeting with Israel. There are still proponents of this theory, both abroad and
Inside Iran, they are counting on a settlement with America that will avoid the region from this confrontation with minimal losses.
They believe that silence now can be used with the Americans to build a new direction in the relationship, which would be the best response to Netanyahu’s “uncalculated” adventures. Those who hold this opinion heard the response to their words clearly from Khamenei, who linked any non-tactical retreat, that is, in the area of strategy, to divine wrath.
New stage
On the other hand, some Arab analysts believe that adapting to the new form of battle and the possibility of the response turning into a long confrontation will not stop with a strike or a counter-strike, and may require more. The basic principle before the decision to take the step is to arrange the necessary tools for it.
They confirm that this system was not completely zero-sum in the past or suicidal, as it is not so at this moment. Therefore, it exhausts all possible means before entering the new gate, realizing that the moment it crosses the threshold will not be the same as before, and that the costs resulting from such a step will impose an additional cost on it and on the axis he is leading.
They argue that waiting for ceasefire talks and the opportunity to achieve a serious breach is not a secondary option on the regime’s priority list, but it also treats the response as “a legitimate right to defense, and this has no connection to the ceasefire in Gaza,” in the words of the Iranian permanent mission representative to the United Nations, which hoped that the response would be “in a timing and manner that does not harm the potential ceasefire.”
The major options after Gaza
On the other hand, informed Arab circles reported that Tehran is considering its major options, the most important of which are the nuclear question and the increasing pressure within the corridors of the regime to redefine its doctrine, in line with the new challenges facing the country. It is no secret that Khamenei’s fatwa prohibiting the manufacture, storage, and use of nuclear weapons has become the subject of question at very high levels, about whether it serves the requirements of Iranian national security and deterrence power in light of the increasing threats since the exit of the former US president, and the current presidential candidate, Donald Trump, from the nuclear agreement In May 2018.
Discussions to change Iran’s nuclear policy
A senior Iranian official explained to the Lebanese writer Ali Hashem during a visit to Tehran, detailing that the basic pillars of his country’s nuclear doctrine are: first, Imam Khamenei’s fatwa prohibiting the manufacture, use, and storage of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, second, the right to possess peaceful nuclear technology, and third, a nuclear-weapon-free zone.
This senior official revealed that there is a high-level discussion taking place in the country about the feasibility of the current doctrine, and that the main motivation behind this is the restrictions imposed by the current doctrine on preserving Iran’s interests.
“The recent Israeli threats give Iran many reasons to rethink its strategy, but this is not the only reason,” he says.
He adds that the United States’ exit from the nuclear agreement is one of the reasons for this, explaining that Iran’s decision to enter into nuclear talks was primarily aimed at securing the lifting of sanctions in exchange for imposing restrictions on the program. “But what happened?” He wonders and returns to answer the question: “Iran had to face the American maximum pressure policy without doing anything, so what next?”
The Iranian official continues to explain his point of view by saying that the new matter that has entered the area of challenges is the repetition of the Israeli threat to strike Iran with nuclear weapons. In this context, he says, “The threats demonstrated by the Zionist entity and the shift from a policy of ambiguity regarding their nuclear program to a clear policy of nuclear threat against Iran at the United Nations, including striking a defensive radar that protects Iranian nuclear facilities, which suggests that they may later target the nuclear facilities themselves.” “
The senior official goes on to explain, saying, “In addition, the Zionist ministers issued threats regarding the use of nuclear weapons against Gaza and a member of Congress called on to strike Iranian nuclear facilities. Netanyahu also threatened that Iran must face a real nuclear threat, before he later retracted his threats that “It was said in front of the whole world.”
The official concludes the introductions he mentioned by saying, “Iran needs to preserve its sovereignty, and on this basis, it is discussing reviewing its doctrine. If nuclear weapons are not removed from Israel, there will be competition to possess nuclear weapons in the region, and Iran will absolutely re-evaluate its strategy.”
I asked him whether, if Iran changed its nuclear doctrine, it would move towards manufacturing nuclear weapons, especially since Western and Israeli estimates say that it is at least a week away and a month at the furthest from producing a nuclear warhead. He answered me in the negative: “Any change in the nuclear doctrine does not necessarily mean moving towards nuclear weapons. Perhaps it means removing one of the three elements in our current strategy or adding a fourth element, etc.,” stressing that any change is directed towards Israel because it is the one that threatens Iran.
As for the concern that could arise from such a change at the level of Iran’s neighbors, the official confirms: “We are open to any method to reassure our neighbors about our nuclear capabilities, but the question remains whether our neighbors are ready to reassure us about their purchases of weapons and the threats posed by the presence of American bases on their land.”
What the senior official did not mention clearly, but he hinted at, is that any shift in Iranian nuclear doctrine will place the project in an area of ambiguity that will make it difficult for the world, specifically the United States, to track the stages of development it is witnessing, which may increase the risks at the military levels And security, especially if Israel decides to take a shortcut towards ending the Iranian nuclear project.
It remains that the Iranian revenge operation in this context is subject to several governing matters, the most prominent of which are: the necessity of avoiding entering into a comprehensive war with Israel, given that it possesses nuclear weapons.
Secondly, it is difficult to protect Iran from Israeli strikes, given that its territory represents sixty times the size of Israel.
Third: The Iranian regime will not commit suicide to avenge Haniyeh’s assassination in Tehran, especially since a sector of Iranians does not support the Iranian regime’s regional policy.
Fourth: Masoud Pezeshkian was elected to protect Iran from chaos, and to embrace dialogue with the West in the hope of lifting US sanctions on his country, especially since these sanctions exacerbate a deep economic crisis in Iran.
Fifth: Tehran does not want a worse situation internally. Rather, it is working to avoid facing the protest of a sector of public opinion in the event of a military escalation and Iran’s territory becoming part of the war zone.
It appears from the above that Iran will not deliberately escalate the situation, but rather is trying to avoid the outbreak of a comprehensive war, and in this it agrees with Egypt because this protects the vital interests of the countries of the region and is even consistent with the declared American policy. However, many are wondering: Will these calculations be correctly implemented on the military level, or could a random military incident or an operation orchestrated by Netanyahu might erupt the regional situation, or even an all-out war? No one is certain that reason will always prevail in the face of Israel’s brinkmanship policy and America’s protection of its crimes.