Lebanon’s Turn to the Eastern Mediterranean

By Masoud Sadrmohammadi

Over the past year, the Lebanese government has initiated a series of political, diplomatic, and strategic measures that, taken together, signify a fundamental shift in the country’s regional orientation. These measures—encompassing a broad range of domestic pressures on Hezbollah, the deterioration of relations with Iran, rapprochement with Gulf and Western powers, and the formation of new alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean—should not be interpreted as isolated or merely reactive steps. Rather, they reflect a coherent strategy of realignment being advanced by the ruling elite in Beirut, grounded in the belief that Lebanon’s survival, reconstruction, and reintegration into the international system now hinge on alignment with the Western–Arab political and security bloc.

The martyrdom of Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah functioned as an accelerating rupture in Lebanon’s internal balance of power. In its aftermath, the Lebanese government has sought to redefine sovereignty, monopolize security narratives, and reposition itself within the evolving geopolitical architecture of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Although many of these moves may initially appear to be directed primarily against Iran’s interests, a deeper analysis reveals that Beirut’s strategic horizon is broader: Lebanon is entering into a transactional, “win–win” partnership with the Western bloc at the cost of isolating Iran, Türkiye, and Russia. In effect, the rulers in Beirut are signaling to the United States and the Arab Gulf states that they are willing—provided their own political interests are secured—to act against the strategic interests of the Iran–Türkiye–Russia triangle, positioning themselves as a lever of pressure and a constraining force on the interests of these three countries.

Lebanon’s Historical Strategy of Balancing

For nearly two decades following the 2006 war, Lebanon operated under a hybrid strategic model. This model consisted of a weak central state endowed with international legitimacy; a powerful non-state deterrent actor (Hezbollah); and a delicate balancing game among Western actors, Arab states, and the Axis of Resistance.

This arrangement allowed Lebanon to simultaneously benefit from Western assistance and institutional legitimacy, maintain Iran’s strategic support and deterrence against Israel, and preserve its economic and political engagement with Türkiye and the Gulf states. The model was heavily dependent on charismatic leadership, regional ambiguity, and Hezbollah’s ability to deter Israel without triggering an all-out war. The death of Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah disrupted this architecture at its very core. Developments in Syria, Bashar al-Assad’s departure from the country’s leadership, and subsequently the twelve-day war between Iran and Israel have collectively pushed Beirut away from its long-standing strategy of balance.

Domestic Reorientation: Sovereignty as a Political Instrument

Following Nasrallah’s martyrdom, the Lebanese government intensified its rhetoric around concepts such as the “monopoly of arms in the hands of the state” and the “restoration of national sovereignty”—discourses that, in practice, have aimed at neutralizing Hezbollah without imposing any constraints on other political currents aligned with Israel and Saudi Arabia. While the issue of Hezbollah’s disarmament may at first glance appear consistent with principles of statehood, its selective implementation reveals deeper motivations.

As pressure on Hezbollah has increased, the ruling elite in Beirut has proven incapable of establishing deterrence against Israeli air and missile strikes, effectively mobilizing international mechanisms, or enforcing UN resolutions in a reciprocal manner. For nearly two years, Israel has carried out intermittent bombardments deep inside Lebanese territory. The absence of any meaningful response by the Lebanese state indicates that the discourse of state sovereignty is inward-looking rather than externally oriented. This asymmetry reflects a strategic redefinition: Hezbollah is increasingly portrayed as a “problem undermining sovereignty,” while Israel is treated as a “manageable external reality.”

When one considers that this restrictive policy is directed exclusively at Hezbollah, while other groups are exempt from similar scrutiny, it becomes evident that this redefinition aligns precisely with the security narratives promoted by Western powers and the Gulf states. The pressure exerted by the Lebanese government on Hezbollah is not confined to the military sphere; through financial oversight mechanisms, legal constraints, and the management of public opinion, Beirut is seeking to present itself as a “normal state,” eligible for integration into the Western-led order in the Middle East.

Lebanon–Iran Relations: Managed Distancing, Not Open Hostility

Recent months have witnessed unprecedented verbal disputes in the public sphere between Lebanese officials and representatives of Iran. This marks a departure from Lebanon’s traditional diplomatic ambiguity toward Tehran. Nevertheless, the nature of this tension is instrumental rather than ideological. Beirut is not seeking direct confrontation with Iran; instead, it is signaling a “strategic rupture.”

By distancing itself from Iran, Beirut aims to persuade Western capitals and Gulf states of its non-alignment with Tehran. In other words, Beirut is demonstrating that, should it receive the necessary support from the Arab–Western front, it is prepared to undertake more serious measures to pressure Iran and constrain Iranian interests.

The Turn Toward the Eastern Mediterranean: Continuity in Signaling Readiness for the Arab–Western Front

The Lebanese government’s efforts to attract Western attention are not limited to pressuring Iran; Beirut is willing to implement more assertive measures to restrict the interests of all countries perceived in some way as rivals to the West. Russia and Türkiye stand at the forefront of these countries. Lebanon’s maritime border agreement with Southern Cyprus constitutes one of the clearest indicators of its new strategic orientation. Lebanon undertook this step despite the fact that, for nearly the past two decades, Beirut had refrained—out of a desire to preserve political balance—from actions that might provoke tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and antagonize Türkiye.

This move, which prompted formal protests from Türkiye, integrates Lebanon into the European Union–supported maritime frameworks and effectively turns Lebanon into one of the EU’s platforms of influence in the Mediterranean Sea. This agreement—best understood within the context of the Greece–Israel power balance against Türkiye and Iran—serves no purpose other than to tilt the scales further in favor of the Greek–Israeli camp in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, while simultaneously threatening Russian interests. In effect, Lebanon is conveying the message that, while it can neutralize Iran domestically through pressure on Hezbollah and direct political confrontation with Tehran, it can also play an active role in the Western strategy of containing Türkiye and Russia.

In other words, the Lebanon–Southern Cyprus maritime agreement carries political implications that go well beyond bilateral relations, and Beirut has acted with full awareness of these consequences. Alignment with Western Mediterranean energy blocs, participation in limiting Türkiye’s maritime expansion, and indirect assistance in constraining Russia’s strategic depth constitute the most salient and explicit outcomes of this move by the Lebanese government. It is only natural that Lebanese political elites were fully cognizant of these ramifications. Accordingly, Beirut’s Mediterranean policy is not merely economic in nature; it represents a deliberately designed geopolitical alliance.

Reintegration into the Western–Arab System

Attention to the prevailing approach in Beirut indicates that the Lebanese ruling elite—having come to power after several years of internal political crisis—has redefined itself as a peripheral yet cooperative actor within the Western-led order. In this context, it is seeking to leverage the presence of “Tom Barrack” (the United States Ambassador to Türkiye and a figure of Lebanese origin) to create channels of communication and confidence-building for lobbying on its own behalf. From this perspective, Iran is not the only loser in this arena; Türkiye and Russia, too, have been placed under strategic constraints as a result of Lebanon’s new positioning.

Naturally, this new policy will not be without cost for Lebanon. It may entail consequences such as the loss of deterrence against Israel and long-term dependency on external patrons. Given that anti-imperialist sentiment has a significant presence among Lebanon’s broader public, the continuation of these policies could also generate a crisis of internal polarization and the erosion of national consensus. This risk emerges against the backdrop of Lebanon’s contemporary history, which demonstrates that the country’s stability has never been sustained solely through external alignment but has instead depended on internal balance. Lebanon is now migrating toward a single strategic orbit and is seeking stability through “conformity” rather than resistance. Whether this model will prove sustainable depends not only on external support, but also on Lebanon’s capacity to manage the domestic consequences of abandoning its previous paradigm.