There are “antagonistic contradictions” between Russia and the West

By Onur Sinan Güzaltan

UWI author and political scientist Onur Sinan Güzaltan answered questions from Sputnik Türkiye. Güzaltan discussed the course of negotiations and the new positions taken by global powers, as well as Europe’s stance and Russia’s diplomacy.

The fragmented West and a short-lasting agreement

Güzaltan says the divisions inside the Trump team, in Europe, and in Kyiv are hurting any real chance for peace. Despite Moscow’s warning that it won’t engage in “megaphone diplomacy,” he argues that leaks are being used to put pressure on Russia and unless the West accepts a multipolar order, another major confrontation in the next few years looks inevitable:

“The situation is a mess. Everyone is saying something different about the so-called 28-point Trump peace plan. The plan deals with territory, rules out Ukraine’s NATO membership, addresses frozen Russian assets in Europe and the sanctions issue, and includes articles about limiting the Ukrainian army. But is this an official document, a formal proposal, a draft; these are not yet clear.

The special military operation began on February 24, 2022, and from the beginning, Moscow kept the door open to negotiations. That hasn’t changed. Remember the Istanbul talks. Since Trump’s return, there are claims that Washington and Moscow have already been talking directly and continue to do so. There are also reports about meetings in Abu Dhabi.

When you look at the full picture, you see a negotiation table with too many actors. On one side, you have the US; on the other, Russia. Inside the US itself, there are opposing factions, those who want to keep the war going and those who want a deal with Moscow. Some say similar divisions exist within Trump’s own team. Europe is no different; some want to keep the war going, others want an agreement. Even Zelenskyy’s administration is split. Lastly came the corruption scandal. With this level of cacophony, even if a deal emerges, I doubt it will hold for long.

Quoting not mot à mot Peskov said, ‘We won’t do megaphone diplomacy. We will not do this through the press or leaked documents, etc. If you want a real negotiating table, we’re ready’. But the leaks keep coming, and that seems deliberate. The idea is to manipulate Russia. Washington throws out a 28-point draft and forces everyone to argue about it publicly, hoping to push Russia into giving pre-emptive concessions. Then you have Europe presenting its own drafts. All this, in essence, is an attempt to wear down Russia that is currently winning on the battleground.

I said I doubt any agreement will hold for long. Both sides know this. Western leaders know it; Russian officials have said it many times. A final confrontation is unavoidable because the contradictions between the sides are irreconcilable. The ‘globalist’ camp in the West and Russia have irreconcilable contradictions. Maybe they’ll postpone the clash with short-term deals. But if the West refuses to accept multipolarity and refuses to accept Russia as it is, then that larger conflict is coming.

“Russia has the upper hand on the ground, Europe is escalating the conflict”

Güzaltan argues that Russia has already achieved most of its military objectives, while Ukraine is struggling with corruption and political instability. He believes Trump wants Europe to pay for the defeat, and warns that Europe’s insistence on a hardline anti-Russia stance is pushing the situation toward open conflict:

“If you look at the reality on the ground, Russia has fulfilled a large part of its military goals. Ukraine, on the other hand, is dealing with serious weaknesses in its army and a major corruption crisis. The country is unstable, its future is uncertain, and it has already lost a huge part of its territory. Economically, it lives only thanks to Western aid.

So, there is a defeat here, and someone will have to pay for it. Trump wants Europeans to shoulder this cost. And while doing that, he has a strategy of normalizing relations with Russia. But this shouldn’t be misunderstood as a strategy friendly to Russia and embracing multipolarity. What he’s trying to do is repair a US strategy that has been failing, both in the region and globally. In his view, the current line is producing losses, so he wants to reform it.

That’s what the internal fight in the US is about. On one side you have the globalists, on the other side you have, not isolationists despite some people portray Trump as so. I actually think the opposite: Trump wants to continue imperialist policies, but with a different method. That’s where the clash comes from. The criticisms at Trump are driven by those who want to stick to the old approach, from the same capital circles. This globalist approach holds power in Germany, the UK and France.

Unless one side forces the other to back down, this crisis won’t be resolved. To be more open: in Europe, in France, the UK, Germany, the governments in power are all pushing for the confrontation with Russia to continue. But look at the second-largest parties or the new main opposition forces: Le Pen in France, the AfD in Germany, similar examples in the UK. All of them break from the governments when it comes to Russia policy. If Europe goes through political change, and there’s a real chance it will, given the social, economic, and cultural situation, then Russia–Europe relations might improve without and before an open conflict.”

“The war in Ukraine is a matter of survival for European governments”

Güzaltan says the current European government, just like Zelenskyy’s, is politically sustained by the continuation of the war, and that fragmented landscape of politics in the West keeps sabotaging diplomacy:

“Europe’s motivations are actually very similar to Zelenskyy’s. The political leaderships that back him are, to a certain extent, surviving thanks to the continuation of this war. Here’s a striking example: ahead of the second round of the French presidential elections, the two candidates go on national TV and debate. Macron and Le Pen appeared on France’s state broadcaster, and the first issue Macron brought up was Le Pen’s ties with Russia. He said Le Pen had taken a loan from a Russian bank during a previous campaign. Think about it: France is about to vote, two candidates are on air, and the very first topic is one candidate’s relationship with Russia. Their stance toward Moscow has become a defining political marker.

How much influence do they really have over the US? To answer that, you first need to ask how firmly Trump has a grip on power in the US? Because as far as we can see, even within Trump’s government there’s a highly fragmented structure. Take Russia, for example: it’s said that the Secretary of State Rubio takes a different position.

At the negotiation table you have the Russians, the Ukrainians, the Europeans, the Americans. But the forces aligned against Russia are divided. There’s no unified bloc. Whom are the Russians supposed to sit down with? If they try to make a deal with one party, another one creates trouble, even sabotages. Around every Istanbul meeting, before and after, there were major attacks: the Crocus attack inside Russia, terrorist attacks in Russia, decisions to supply long-range missiles… Every time, the process was sabotaged. Line up the big attacks on Russia chronologically and compare them with the dates of the Istanbul talks or the US–Russia discussions, you’ll see the pattern.”

“Russia has rediscovered its identity in Eurasia”

Güzaltan says that in the aftermath of Western sanctions, Russia has reduced its economic and political dependencies and rebuilt its geopolitical identity by pivoting toward Asia and Africa. He thinks that the deepening cultural, ideological, and economic alignment with China will shape not only the future of the two countries, but the world as a whole:

“This conflict has pushed Russia to rediscover its identity. A Russian official said, ‘It’s a good thing they imposed these sanctions. We returned to a public, national economy, our dependence on the West in certain areas ended, and we regained confidence in our own economic capacity’. The same applies politically and diplomatically.

Russia is a country with multiple layers: an imperial tradition, the Soviet legacy, there are also liberal, pro-Western currents. But with this war, Russia has found its place again in Eurasia and Asia. Its relationships with China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Vietnam, and likewise with African states from Burkina Faso to Mali; all of these moves show that Russia is building a new identity outside the Western world.

What does closer cooperation with China entail? In my view, the Russia–China relationship is not just economic, it’s political, cultural, and ideological. And it will be one of the major forces shaping the next 30 or 40 years. The implications matter for humanity as a whole. China has its own model, Russia has its own, and their interaction is intensifying. If you look at everyday life: there are TV screens in the metro, broadcasting programs featuring Chinese festivals and products more and more. Russian media is producing more documentaries about China. Parents are encouraging their children to learn Chinese. These are some of the signs. They won’t transform things overnight, but in a 10–20-year perspective, this interaction can have profound consequences.

So, one cannot understand what is going on solely as ‘a conflict with Ukraine’ or ‘confrontation with the West’. Something far bigger is unfolding.”