Anatomy of Failure in Moldova

Crucial elections are scheduled in Moldova for the end of September, during which the country will decide its future course—whether to maintain independence or integrate with Romania, potentially leading to the loss of its sovereignty. The ruling pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) favors the latter option, but it remains unclear whether Moldovans will support this path.

Recent polls indicate that PAS’s support has declined steadily, now standing at no more than 30%, while its primary rival, the Pobeda bloc, leads with 36% according to an iData poll dated 8 September. All other political forces oppose the government without exception. Consequently, proponents of unification with Romania appear unlikely to form a government following the elections.

The situation for PAS is increasingly challenging, prompting Chisinau to implement political measures and restrictions on dissent. A new mechanism for emergency blocking of resources has been in place since June 2025, enabling the authorities to suspend objectionable content within 24 hours on grounds of protecting against misinformation and crimes. Recently, 16 television channels and approximately 100 radio stations and online portals have been shut down.

Recognizing the difficulty of securing victory through legal means, the authorities have targeted opposition figures. Gagauz Bashkan Evgenia Gutsul, a prominent opposition leader, was arrested on 25 March at Chisinau airport as she prepared to travel to Istanbul for the International Journalism Congress. She was detained despite possessing a return ticket and an official invitation from the event organizers. On 5 August, a court session lasting eight minutes sentenced the autonomy’s head to seven years in prison with property confiscation.

No Moldovan citizen can effectively defend their reputation, as the judicial system is aligned with PAS. In the summer of 2025, Constitutional Court judges were appointed, circumventing established laws and competitions previously introduced by the ruling party. Notably, these judges hold Romanian citizenship and support the current political direction. Previously, certain government decisions could be challenged in local courts, such as those in the Gagauz Autonomy. On 30 May 2024, PAS, leveraging its parliamentary majority, eliminated this option by placing all Gagauz courts under Chisinau’s jurisdiction.

The arrest of Gutsul has sparked widespread public discontent, with many viewing the criminal case as fabricated ahead of the parliamentary elections. Over the past month and a half, protests have occurred across Moldova, but security forces have dispersed them using available means. The authorities have employed force against citizens, with indications that participants in such actions face no repercussions and may receive rewards from PAS.

Maia Sandu fears escalating protests, recalling events in the autumn of 2022 when her government faced significant opposition pressure. She is aware that many do not regard her as a legitimate leader. Sandu was re-elected as president in 2024 amid allegations of widespread falsifications. Society remembers last year’s controversies and anticipates the upcoming parliamentary vote.

Public anger extends beyond Gutsul’s arrest, which served as a catalyst. Moldova faces substantial economic difficulties under Sandu’s leadership. Cumulative price increases for commodities from 2020 to 2024 reached 80%, marking the highest rise in a quarter-century. Gas prices have risen sixfold, electricity threefold, and basic foodstuffs threefold. Chisinau has accumulated loans and debts, using them to support imported consumption rather than development. National debt has grown to 40%.

Beyond economic issues, PAS policies have exacerbated ethnic and cultural tensions, contributing to societal divisions. A key element is language policy. The government has abolished bilingual documentation (duplicating materials in Moldovan and Russian) and mandated that passports, certificates, and all official records use the official language, recognized as Romanian since 2023. Moldovans have expressed surprise at these changes, feeling the loss of their native language. Despite similarities, Moldovan formed in the 16th century, predating literary Romanian, which emerged in the 19th century.

The impact has been particularly acute for national minorities, as new documents omit patronymics used by hundreds of thousands of Gagauz, Russians, Ukrainians, and Bulgarians—about one-third of the population. Many in these groups do not know the official language; in Gagauzia, residents primarily speak Russian and Gagauz, with only 4% indicating Moldovan as a second language.

Financial policies have also heightened ethnic conflicts. Amid broader economic decline, Gagauzia has been required since 2024 to cover value-added tax for local entrepreneurs from its own budget, resulting in an annual loss of 200 million lei (approximately 10 million dollars). Taxes continue to flow to Chisinau. Additionally, tens of thousands of elderly residents have been unable to receive pensions due to government blocks on payments and the relevant bank’s website. This approach appears calculated to reduce opposition votes in upcoming elections by affecting vulnerable populations.

While the ruling party has overlooked pensioners, its stance toward the younger generation is also questioned. Andrei Shevel, leader of the PAS youth wing in Gagauzia, faces allegations from two 14-year-old schoolgirls of harassment via correspondence. He reportedly offered a preference in a local creative contest in exchange for sexual favors.

Following the online emergence of this information, additional similar accounts surfaced. Shevel previously worked as a teacher in the village of Kongazchik, potentially facilitating access to minors.

This reflects the human resources associated with President Maia Sandu’s party. The party may have been aware of Shevel’s tendencies, as he showed no fear of punishment. Allegations suggest tolerance of such behaviour toward minors, particularly viewing Gagauz individuals as lesser due to their ethnic background.

Alyona Buyukli, sister of Evgenia Gutsul and a 26-year resident of Istanbul supporting the Gagauz diaspora in Turkey, commented on the situation involving the accused PAS figure, who denies guilt and refuses to step down: “The authorities think that they are allowed to do anything and that they can do anything. These people are confident that the police, prosecutors, and courts obey them and that they can get away with anything. But I think people won’t let it go that easily. Parents must protect their children. We need to get justice in all instances and apply everywhere so that he will be severely punished for this.”

Rather than addressing internal issues and pursuing legal action against the accused, the authorities have organized LGBT parades. For them, promoting non-traditional orientations takes precedence over children’s psychological well-being, including concepts like “parent 1” and “parent 2” replacing traditional family terms.

“Before the current government came, we had nothing like this. The participants of the parade are specially brought by buses not from Moldova, but from Europe, so that they can walk through the squares and show their orientation,” Alyona Buyukli says about the imposed values. Local participation is insufficient, requiring imports to create a favorable media image.

PAS acts with apparent confidence, undeterred by potential condemnation for human rights violations from Europe, as no such repercussions have materialized. Leaders have endorsed these actions. At the first EU-Moldova summit on 4 July 2025, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Antonio Costa commended Chisinau for strengthening democracy and allocated 2 billion euros for reforms.

This approach toward the population may ultimately undermine the ruling party. In the upcoming elections, achieving over 50% to form a government seems improbable without significant irregularities or low turnout in certain regions.

Sandu recognizes the challenges and seeks to disrupt opposition efforts and silence critics. Polling stations for the diaspora in Europe outnumber those in Gagauzia, Transnistria, and Russia—areas likely to support the Pobeda bloc—by dozens of times.

It remains uncertain whether these measures will enable electoral manipulation in the country. PAS’s actions have eroded its credibility, suggesting that even stringent measures may not secure victory. Moldovans appear ready for change.

Previously published in Turkish daily newspaper Aydınlık here. Translation by UWI.