Gaza Strip: Quicksand Dragging Gulf States into the Israeli Quagmire

Shifting paradigms, political opportunities, words and actions and a dangerous alliance.

By Islam Farag, from Cairo / Egypt

The Palestinian issue has long been a pivotal matter shaping the foreign policy of Gulf Arab states for decades. Official stances of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, expressed through statements by leaders and formal declarations, have consistently reaffirmed a steadfast position on this issue, which intertwines religious, historical, political and economic dimensions

For decades, Gulf states have supported the Palestinian people’s right to establish an independent state on their entire national territory, with East Jerusalem as its capital, in line with international legitimacy resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative. Each time Israel launched an aggression against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank, these countries promptly called for a ceasefire and a return to negotiations to achieve a two-state solution, leading to the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders.

A traditional stance

This position did not waver following the Israeli aggression on Gaza after the attack carried out by Hamas on October 7, 2023. Gulf states called for an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire in the sector, protection for civilians, and the urgent and sufficient delivery of humanitarian aid.

However, the protracted war and its catastrophic consequences for Palestinian civilians have reached what can be described as genocide, employing starvation as a weapon. Coupled with a regional and expansionist war waged by the Hebrew state on multiple fronts—in Lebanon, Yemen, Iran, and Syria—this has created an extraordinarily complex regional situation. This complexity has compelled decision-makers in every Gulf capital to meticulously reassess their approach to the Palestinian issue.

No Gulf capital can now afford the luxury of addressing the region’s issues in isolation. All are now compelled to treat them as a single, interconnected unit.

The situation has deteriorated to the point where negotiating the very existence of a Palestinian state has become nearly impossible, given serious Israeli efforts to liquidate the issue through the forced displacement of Gaza’s population. This is being pursued by blocking humanitarian aid, destroying the vast majority of homes, and bombing essential infrastructure necessary for sustaining life. Should this scenario succeed, Tel Aviv would likely turn to annexing the remaining territories of the West Bank and displacing its population as well.

A Shifting Paradigm

Worse still, the wide war waged by Israel has weakened all resistance movements in the region, which the Palestinian resistance relied on as a support front to strengthen its capabilities to confront Israeli aggression. It has debilitated Hezbollah in Lebanon, launched powerful airstrikes against the Houthis in Yemen, and delivered humiliating blows to Iran. Additionally, it has paved the way for expanding its influence by creating a state of controlled chaos, seizing Syrian territory following the fall of the Assad regime. Israeli forces have advanced to Mount Hermon and intervened under the pretext of protecting Syria’s Druze population to establish a buffer zone between Israel and the new regime in Damascus.

This chaos, amidst the fluidity in Syria since the collapse of the previous regime and the current government’s inability to address the demands of various minorities and ethnic groups, coupled with the anticipated explosion in Lebanon due to disputes between the government and Hezbollah over disarming the latter and monopolizing weapons under state control, signals that the region is on the brink of a major upheaval that could redraw the maps of geography and spheres of influence.

These accelerated geopolitical shifts, preceded in recent years by the normalization of relations between some Gulf states and Israel, have dismantled the paradigms that once guided Gulf capitals in addressing the Palestinian issue.

Pragmatism Over Ideology

Over the past two decades, Gulf states have found themselves sinking into a sea of quicksand. At times, this was due to the Arab Spring revolutions, which witnessed a temporary but significant rise of political Islam movements in major Arab capitals—a rise that, if sustained, could have threatened the survival of several Gulf monarchies. At other times, it was due to the growing Iranian influence in the region through loyal armed Shia militias targeting the stability and interests of Gulf states. This is in addition to Tehran’s missile and nuclear programs, which the Gulf states believed could be used against their interests and strategic facilities.

The Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip over the past nearly two years, accompanied by regional chaos, has further complicated the calculations for Gulf decision-makers. The Palestinian issue has become a burden for some capitals, while others have opted to maintain the traditional official stance. Each capital’s actions are driven by its motives, interests, and visions for the future of the issue and its impact on regional and international alliances. Calculations of gain and loss, ambitions for influence, and security concerns have become variables painting a picture starkly different from the Gulf’s historical positions toward the central Arab cause over decades.

These transformations alone are not the sole reason for the shift in Gulf engagement with the Palestinian issue and Israel. The emergence of a new generation of Gulf leaders has been a primary factor. Educated in the West and closely aligned with Western political and economic elites, this generation does not strongly prioritize Arab causes as an ideology, except where it serves their political and economic ambitions. With Iran emerging as a clear threat, Gulf states found in Israel a regional counterweight. Cooperation with Tel Aviv transitioned from covert to overt, from limited frameworks to broader horizons, most notably encapsulated in the normalization agreements known as the Abraham Accords, signed by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Saudi Arabia, the largest Gulf state and a leader in the Sunni Islamic world, has deferred normalization pending the establishment of a Palestinian state that meets the aspirations of the Palestinian people. Observers view this stance as a form of pragmatism that balances national interests with historical and religious legacies.

A Political Opportunity

From the perspective outlined earlier, it is entirely inconceivable that Gulf states are addressing the outcomes of the Israeli war on Gaza and the proposed scenarios through a purely pan-Arab or nationalist lens. Rather, some of them see the unfolding events as an unmissable economic and political opportunity.

Politically, Gulf states are fully convinced that any solution for the Gaza Strip cannot be implemented on the ground without practical reconstruction plan costing tens of billions of dollars, a burden that no one else can bear. Over the past two decades, Israeli military assaults on Gaza have recurred since Hamas assumed control. From the Gulf’s perspective, Hamas has failed to responsibly govern the sector and its people, conflating two distinct roles: state administration and resistance.

Consequently, Gulf capitals align with Israel’s demand to disarm Hamas, viewing it as a means to prevent Tel Aviv from launching further attacks on Gaza and to lend substance to reconstruction efforts. These states are unwilling to see their financial investments squandered again due to Hamas’s initiatives, which could provoke new Israeli aggressions.

Simultaneously, these states see ousting Hamas from Gaza as a way to curtail Iran’s expanding influence, which has grown through Tehran’s relationship with the movement in recent years. This would also mark another failure for political Islam groups, of which Hamas is a key manifestation. Both outcomes could enable Gulf states to persuade the United States to propose even a loosely cohesive two-state solution, relieving regional leaders, particularly Saudi Arabia, from the embarrassment of deepening ties with the Hebrew state.

It was thus unsurprising that the international conference held last July at the United Nations headquarters in New York, co-sponsored by Saudi Arabia and France, explicitly called on Hamas to relinquish governance of Gaza and hand over its weapons to the Palestinian Authority. Among the 17 signatories to the New York Declaration was Qatar, a supporter of Hamas and, alongside Egypt, a mediator between Israel and the movement since the outbreak of the latest war.

Economic calculations

Economically, Gulf states view neutralizing resistance in Gaza as a prerequisite for a major reconstruction process that would pave the way for large-scale economic projects involving Israel and the Gulf. According to many observers, some Gulf states may not object to the displacement of Palestinians from Gaza if deemed necessary to make way for these projects. The “Gaza Riviera” plan points to an economic vision for the sector, through which Israel aims to fully control Gaza and transform it into a tourist or commercial hub, allowing it to focus on tightening the noose around West Bank residents and pushing them toward migration into Jordan or elsewhere.

The ongoing war in Gaza hinders the establishment of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, which comprises two routes: one connecting India to the Gulf and another linking the Gulf to Europe, with Israel serving as the linchpin between them. This corridor promises immense geopolitical and economic gains for Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia.

Should this plan succeed, it would mark the first step in a grand Israeli regional expansion project known as the “David Corridor,” which threatens the sovereignty of countries like Syria and Iraq. This corridor would begin in the Syrian Golan Heights, an area Israel is strenuously attempting to claim as its own, and extend through Quneitra, Daraa, and Sweida, reaching the city of Al-Tanf, home to the largest U.S. military base in Syria, and then continuing to Al-Bukamal.

This corridor would grant the Hebrew state access to the Euphrates River and influence over a trade route to be established for the exchange of goods with countries deep in Asia. More critically, it would provide Israel with a strong bargaining chip to secure a share in the larger anticipated project of transporting Qatari gas to Europe.

Words Versus Actions

These political gains highlight the contradiction between the Gulf’s official stance and what it can realistically achieve for the Palestinian cause. For instance, when Riyadh and Doha sought to influence Washington’s position toward the new Syrian regime, they succeeded during U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to the region. Trump did not return home before granting his hosts recognition of Ahmad al-Sharaa’s legitimacy and easing sanctions on the new regime. Yet, during the same period, the U.S. president offered nothing substantial to the Palestinians, not even persuading his Israeli allies to allow the entry of humanitarian aid that could save civilians from certain death. While Gulf states have long called for lifting the siege on Gaza, they have expended none of their leverage to secure gains, not for the Palestinian issue itself, but even to save those on the brink of death.

On the contrary, some Gulf capitals have engaged in negative propaganda holding Cairo responsible for the lives of Palestinians by blocking aid, despite Egypt’s repeated assertions that the Rafah crossing is open on its side, with the burden falling on the occupying state, which prevents the aid’s entry. According to some observers, this propaganda aims to push Egypt into miscalculations, potentially leading to a confrontation with Israel that could create conditions for Palestinians to be driven into Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, effectively imposing a forced displacement scenario against Cairo’s will.

It is thus unsurprising that President Trump once stated that Israel would be in trouble without Saudi Arabia. Nor is it surprising that the UAE, despite calls for boycotting Israel and its supporters, has become Tel Aviv’s most prominent Arab partner during the Gaza war. Meanwhile, Bahrain recorded an unprecedented surge in trade with Israel during the first ten months of the conflict.

A Dangerous Alliance

Naturally, there are dozens of indicators and statistics confirming the flourishing relations between these countries and Israel, underscoring that the Palestinian cause has become little more than an opportunity for dividing influence and interests among the region’s financial and military powers. From this perspective, it is unimaginable that any agreement paving the way for peace in Gaza, or the establishment of a Palestinian state would exclude the Gulf’s interests, which take precedence over all other considerations.

But the quicksand from which those states seek to escape by allying themselves with Israel may well lead them into a mire that will not only swallow their feet but could engulf their heads as well—simply because Tel Aviv, as it has always done, will never accept sharing the spoils when the prizes are handed out. The weapon of chaos, wielded by the Hebrew state to redraw the region’s maps of influence, will be easily unsheathed in the days to come against those who seek its favor today.