Redefinition of the Persian Gulf Geopolitics from Iran’s Perspective

By Mohammad Reza Moradi, General Director of Mehr News Agency’s Foreign Languages and International News Department, from Tehran / Iran

With the beginning of the US and Israeli attack on Iran, we are also witnessing changes in Iran’s view toward the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. The alignment of some of these countries with the aggressor nations against Iran has caused Iran to consider different and diverse strategies for the future of its relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. At the macro level, it might be assumed that Tehran analyzes the Persian Gulf states within a single similar security framework, but in practice, the experience of the recent war showed that Iran has increasingly moved toward a strategic differentiation among these countries—a differentiation shaped on the basis of the level of participation, type of behavior, and role-playing of each country in the region’s security equations.

From Apparent Convergence to Real Divergence: The End of an Assumption

In recent years, especially after the Beijing agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the assumption had been reinforced in Tehran that the region was moving toward a new kind of balance and de-escalation. This agreement, achieved through China’s mediation, was regarded by many in Iran as a turning point in overcoming the exhausting rivalries with Saudi Arabia. However, the recent war challenged this perception and showed that the underlying layers of mistrust remain active. From Iran’s perspective, the behavior of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and even Kuwait during this war indicated that these countries not only stepped outside the circle of neutrality but in some cases positioned themselves directly or indirectly within the framework of action against Iran. This experience has created a paradigmatic shift in Iran’s view—a shift whereby, based on it, one can no longer rely solely on diplomatic agreements or political signals for a real change in the security behavior of these countries.

The Quadruple of Crisis: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait in Iran’s New Assessment

In Tehran’s new assessment, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait are placed on a common spectrum but with varying intensities—a spectrum whose main feature is participation in the structure of pressure against Iran. From Iran’s perspective, these countries became part of the confrontation equation during the recent war, especially through providing logistical, intelligence, and in some cases operational infrastructure.

This perception is particularly bold regarding Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Iran believes that these two actors, in addition to operational alignment, have also sought at the political level to encourage and provoke Washington to adopt a more aggressive approach. Such a perception has effectively cast serious doubt on the diplomatic investment of recent years between Tehran and Riyadh and has raised the question whether a cooperation-based order between these two regional powers is even possible.

Regarding Bahrain, this mistrust had already taken shape, especially after that country’s normalization of relations with Israel, and the recent war merely consolidated it. Kuwait, which until then was seen by Iran as a moderate and somewhat neutral country, found a different position in this war and, from Tehran’s viewpoint, moved away from its balanced position.

Accordingly, it can be said that in the post-war phase, Iran will no longer define these four countries as potential partners or even neutral actors, but rather will consider them as part of the threat environment—an environment where any interaction with it requires a redefinition of the rules of deterrence and accountability.

Oman: Continuity of a Historical Role and Elevation to a Strategic Level

Among the Persian Gulf countries, Oman holds a completely different place in Iran’s view. Not only did this country avoid entering the cycle of confrontation during the recent war, but it also made significant diplomatic efforts to prevent the escalation of the crisis. This behavior has led Tehran to regard Muscat not merely as a reliable partner but as a potential ally in regional equations.

This view gains double importance particularly regarding the Strait of Hormuz. Iran and Oman, as the two countries that overlook this strategic waterway, possess a unique capacity to shape its legal and security regime. Given that the recent war has once again highlighted the vital importance of this strait, Iran seeks to define new frameworks for managing and even controlling this route through closer cooperation with Oman.

Such an approach could mean moving toward a kind of “joint security management” in the Strait of Hormuz—a model in which extra-regional actors play a diminished role and the littoral states, especially Iran and Oman, take the initiative. Although this faces significant legal and political challenges, from Iran’s perspective it is considered one of the most important strategic objectives in the post-war period.

Qatar: Between Geopolitical Duality and an Opportunity for Repair

Qatar has a complex and dual position in recent equations. On the one hand, its historical and relatively friendly relations with Iran place it in a different position from other Arab countries. On the other hand, the presence of US military bases on Qatari soil and the use of these bases during the attacks against Iran made this country unavoidably subject to Tehran’s military responses.

During the war, Iran acted according to a specific doctrine: any point used as a launchpad for attacks against Iran would be considered a legitimate target. Accordingly, despite its desire to maintain positive relations with Tehran, Qatar was not exempt from this rule. However, Qatar’s important difference from other countries is that Tehran still regards this country as a potentially positive actor capable of returning to the orbit of cooperation.

In this context, Türkiye’s role as a potential mediator acquires special importance. Ankara, due to its close relations with both Iran and Qatar, has a high capacity for reducing tension and facilitating dialogue. Some reports also indicate that Turkish consultations during the war helped reduce the level of tension and even limit certain attacks. If this trend continues in the post-war period, Türkiye could become one of the key actors in rebuilding Tehran-Doha relations.

Iran’s Differentiation-Based Policy: From a Single Scale to Multiple Levels of Engagement

What emerges from all of these developments is that Iran no longer places the Persian Gulf countries on a single “scale of the balance.” On the contrary, Tehran has moved toward a differentiation-based policy in which each country, based on its actual behavior on the ground, finds a different position.

Within this framework, three general levels of engagement can be identified: First, the level of confrontation and deterrence, which includes countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and to some extent Kuwait. Second, the level of strategic cooperation, in which Oman is situated. And third, the intermediate and repairable level, in which Qatar is defined.

This classification not only shows the complexity of Iran’s view of the region but also expresses an important shift in Tehran’s grand strategy—a shift whereby Iran’s foreign and security policy has become more dependent than before on field realities and the practical behavior of actors, not merely on stated positions or formal agreements.

Conclusion

The recent war has been a kind of turning point in redefining the equations of the Persian Gulf from Iran’s perspective. Tehran, now with a different experience and a deeper understanding of its neighbors’ behavior, is reconstructing its strategic frameworks in this region. This reconstruction is based on differentiation, smart deterrence, and at the same time, preserving paths of cooperation with reliable actors.

In such circumstances, the future of the Persian Gulf, more than ever, depends on how these differences are managed and on the ability of actors to move beyond the logic of confrontation toward new patterns of cooperation. In this context, the role of countries like Oman and Türkiye could be decisive—countries that, by adopting balanced approaches, can help reduce gaps and form a more stable order in the region.