Divergence in the New Persian Gulf Order

By Mohammad Reza Moradi, General Director of Mehr News Agency’s Foreign Languages and International News Department

The Middle East, in the third decade of the twenty-first century, is witnessing one of the most significant power realignments in its contemporary history. For years, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as the two main pillars of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, had formed a united front against common threats. However, the consolidation of power by Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh and Mohammed bin Zayed in Abu Dhabi has opened a new chapter, in which the “brotherly alliance” has given way to “persistent competition.” This paradigm shift is not limited to personal disagreements between the two leaders; it stems from a deep-rooted conflict between two divergent doctrines for the region’s future. Saudi Arabia is striving to redefine itself as a stable hub and a peaceful actor by moving beyond its past aggressive policies. In contrast, the UAE, adopting an interventionist approach and focusing on supporting non-state actors and separatist movements, is following a path that many analysts consider a source of structural instability in neighboring countries. This article examines the dimensions of this confrontation, from economic cold wars to conflicts over regional dossiers such as Yemen and Sudan, and its worrying implications for collective security.

Diplomatic Pivot of Riyadh and Return to Structural Realism

Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy under Mohammed bin Salman has undergone a fundamental transformation in recent years. After a period of intense interventionism that imposed significant costs on the kingdom’s economy and international credibility, the crown prince has now reached the strategic understanding that achieving “Vision 2030” is impossible without regional stability. This shift has led to a transition from an “ideological foreign policy” to “economic realism.” Riyadh, recognizing that endless conflicts with neighbors hinder foreign investment, has chosen a path of de-escalation with major powers such as Iran and Turkey. Beijing’s agreement to revive relations with Tehran and the improvement of ties with Ankara and Doha indicate Mohammed bin Salman’s intention to create a “regional concert” in which Saudi Arabia acts as a mediator and balancer. This new strategy stems from economic nationalism aimed at transforming Saudi Arabia into a hub for transit, tourism, and technology. Within this framework, Riyadh is no longer willing to bear the costs of military adventures by former allies and prefers to consolidate its influence through diplomatic and financial tools—an approach clearly at odds with the UAE’s power-balancing strategies.

UAE’s Networked Influence Doctrine and the Consequences of Supporting Separatism

While Saudi Arabia moves toward strengthening central governments and securing borders, the UAE, under Mohammed bin Zayed, follows a model of power based on intervening in geographic divides and supporting local and ethnic actors. Abu Dhabi, understanding its territorial and demographic limitations, seeks to expand its influence by controlling strategic ports and supporting separatist movements in key parts of the Middle East and Africa. The most prominent example of this policy is observed in Yemen, where the UAE, by providing financial and military support to the Southern Transitional Council, has effectively advanced the country toward fragmentation. This approach, also repeated in Sudan through support for the Rapid Support Forces, reflects the UAE’s preference for working with parallel structures rather than strong central governments. From Abu Dhabi’s perspective, weakening central authorities in countries around the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa creates space for the UAE to act as a maritime and logistical power. However, this doctrine poses a significant threat to regional stability, as encouraging separatist tendencies can, like dominoes, challenge the fragile stability of other countries in the region and create permanent zones of unrest that no single actor can control.

Abraham Accords and the Changing Security Balance in the Persian Gulf

One of the most serious points of divergence between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi lies in their approach to Persian Gulf security and relations with Israel. With the signing of the Abraham Accords, the UAE elevated its ties with Israel from covert cooperation to a strategic and overt alliance. For Mohammed bin Zayed, proximity to Israel is not merely a diplomatic maneuver; it is a tool for access to advanced military and security technologies and for creating a counterbalance to Iran. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, despite positive signals toward normalization (with Israel), continues to insist on the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the Arab Peace Initiative. The increasing Israeli security and intelligence presence near the southern Persian Gulf borders, with the green light of the UAE, has raised concerns for Riyadh. Saudi Arabia fears that this bilateral alliance could overshadow its own de-escalation model with Iran and turn the region into a field of unintended confrontations. Furthermore, UAE-Israel technological collaboration in cyber and surveillance fields has increased the UAE’s intelligence superiority among its Arab neighbors, pushing the Persian Gulf hegemony competition into a complex security phase that could result in a new polarization across the Arab world.

Implications of Hegemonic Competition for the Future of the PGCC

The continuation and deepening of the rift between Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed casts serious doubt on the future of institutional cooperation in the region. The rivalry has now extended from proxy wars to economic and energy arenas; sharp disagreements over OPEC sessions on production quotas and Saudi efforts to relocate international company offices from Dubai to Riyadh are only the tip of the iceberg. Strategically, the UAE’s policies of supporting non-state actors and its unrestrained closeness to Israel increase the risk of creating “failed states” along Saudi borders. This could undermine bin Salman’s efforts to transform the region into an economic bloc akin to the European Union. If the UAE continues its interventionist path, the cohesion of the PGCC is likely to collapse, and new security blocs may emerge. In such a scenario, instead of moving toward sustainable development, the Middle East could be caught in a recurring cycle of arms races and internal instability, the costs of which will be borne primarily by the countries of the region.

Conclusion

The confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the UAE goes beyond a simple competition for power; it reflects a clash between two contrasting visions of security and development. Saudi Arabia, recognizing the imperatives of the twenty-first century, has moved toward stabilizing state structures to provide a foundation for economic growth. In contrast, the UAE’s approach—based on managing disorder, influence through non-state actors, and forming security alliances with extra-regional players—has high potential for reproducing crises. The real danger is that Abu Dhabi’s policies, by undermining national sovereignty in weaker states, could create fragmentation and disorder that ultimately threaten the security of the entire region, including the UAE itself.

The UAE’s interventionist behavior, particularly its support for non-state actors and separatist movements in neighboring countries such as Yemen, has significant implications for regional peace and stability. These policies not only weaken central governments, but also exacerbate ethnic and sectarian tensions and reduce the crisis management capacity of the targeted states. Over the long term, the repetition of such interventionist patterns could create “permanent zones of instability” that undermine collective security in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea (region). Furthermore, the UAE’s closeness to Israel and its security and technological cooperation with extra-regional actors heighten the risk of polarization and military escalation in the region. Such actions erode trust among PGCC members and limit opportunities for regional cooperation. Ultimately, without a transparent and collective framework to manage regional rivalries, this approach could not only obstruct economic and social development but also lead to a partial collapse of security cohesion and the emergence of complex crises, whose costs will fall on all countries in the region.