Syria: Integrating into global system in harmony with the West on a fragile domestic basis

The Syrian interim president Ahmad al-Sharaa’s visit fueled a lot of debates both within the country as well as internationally. Ramazan Bursa is a distinguished expert to describes the outcomes and limitations. He has travelled to Syria after former President Assad’s fall and maintains good contacts into the new government in Damascus. Here’s how he evaluates Al-Sharaa’s visit.

The Syrian President went to Washington and met with Trump. These are the first meetings in Washington in decades. What is your general assessment of this?

It should be interpreted as a strong sign of Syria’s return to the global system. This is also the interpretation within Syria. As you know, towards the end of September, Ahmed Sharaa also addressed the United Nations General Assembly. This was the first time a Syrian official addressed the GA since 1967. Therefore, all these steps signify Syria’s integration into the global system in harmony with the West, its return on a global scale. Another aspect of this are some security issues within Israel and Syria.

There have been discussions for a long time aimed at resolving these issues. This visit signals that these have reached a certain point, a certain stage.

What stage have they reached?

Two stages. First, there are two issues. There are two issues regarding Syrian security. First, there is Israel’s support for Hekmat Ali Hijri, the Druze leader who represents a portion of the Druze in southern Syria, and the consequent withdrawal of the Syrian army from the south, followed by Israel’s increased military presence in and around Quneitra after the Golan Heights. Second, there is the issue of the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) east of the Euphrates. These two issues are the two most important security issues within Syria.

These issues have been discussed before, with the Americans, Türkiye, Israelis, and Syrians. But now Ahmet Sharaa has personally discussed this issue with Trump. Let me explain what’s being discussed first. First, with Israel. As you know, during Trump’s first term, the United States opened a file called the Abraham Accords.

Within the framework of this document, some Arab countries, such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco, have initiated diplomatic relations with Israel under this agreement. Embassies have been opened reciprocally. The US also wants Syria to be included in this agreement. However, the Syrian government opposes this for several reasons.

First, the Syrian government argues that the positions of the Arab countries that normalized relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords are not the same as Syria’s. First, the reason for this is that these countries have no border with Israel, while we do. Second, Israel has not occupied any of their lands. However, Israel has occupied the Golan Heights from 1967 to the present. Therefore, because we are different from other countries, joining the Abraham Accords is out of the question.

Syria and Israel

Ahmed Sharaa last made a statement last month: ‘Saudi Arabia is not a party to this agreement, and we are evaluating this agreement in negotiations with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. Therefore, we will not make any move to join this agreement on our own’.

So, what is being discussed with the Israelis? An agreement was made with the Israelis in 1974, during the first years of Hafez al-Assad’s rise to power. This is a disarmament agreement.

Under this agreement, signed in 1973, Israel will not advance beyond the occupied Golan Heights. The Syrian army will not maintain heavy weapons in Quneitra and will maintain a certain number of troops. This is a security agreement. Today, Syria and Israel are choosing to amend some of the provisions of this agreement and develop it further, and this is being discussed. There have actually been negotiations with Israel. This was discussed there as well. The Abraham Pact was never on the agenda. Furthermore, the issue of developing this agreement regarding the Israeli issue was discussed with Trump.

Regarding the SDF, as you know, on March 10th, Mazlum Abdi came to Damascus under American auspices and signed an agreement with President Ahmed Sharaa. This agreement stipulates that the SDF will be integrated into the Syrian army by the end of the year. The SDF also has a political wing. An agreement was made to integrate it into other state institutions. However, since then, the SDF has consistently taken steps to prevent this agreement from being implemented.

They recently held a conference east of the Euphrates. At this conference, the SDF raised the issue of federation. The leader of the Nusayri movement and the Israeli-backed Druze leader Hikmet al-Hijra participated in this conference via teleconference. Mazlum Abdi emerged as the defender of their rights in this federation issue and the person who would represent both sides in the negotiations. However, neither Türkiye nor the Syrian government accepts this. There will be a centralized administration, and the SDF’s dominance in the region will end.

Today’s talks with the US are progressing within this framework. Therefore, in the coming period, the integration of the SDF into the army and its military wing into the army will be discussed. But there’s a problem here, too. The SDF isn’t rejecting integration. Instead, they want to integrate as a bloc.

There are concerns that such a form of integration, as a bloc, could create security problems in the coming years. That’s why he refuses to accept it. Türkiye also opposes it. Therefore, this was also discussed in the meeting with Trump. Additionally, as you know, there’s an international coalition in Syria fighting ISIS, led by the US.

There was the issue of not being included in this. This was also discussed. After the meeting concluded, Syrian Information Minister Hamza Mustafa made a statement on the matter. He stated that Syria had joined the international coalition to fight ISIS, but that this entry had no military component. He stated that the agreement was purely political, and that this agreement had no military dimension. What does this mean?

We see that there will be mutual intelligence sharing and, politically, a political will, a common will, and mutual information sharing in the fight against ISIS—not just ISIS, but other radical organizations like ISIS. On the military side, the International Coalition will conduct its own operation. The Syrian army will conduct its own. As you know, an operation was conducted against one of ISIS’s leading leaders in recent weeks. Initially, it was reported as a joint operation, but it was an intelligence sharing operation. The operation was carried out by the Syrian army itself.

This actually shows how this agreement works. There’s information sharing, but everyone is conducting their own operations. We see that it doesn’t involve a joint military operation.

Ongoing domestic tensions

As a result of this shared political stance, who is it targeting in this case? You mentioned that there are other similar groups it targets.

Yes, for example, al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch also has groups formed by foreign fighters, also known as muhajirs. This encompasses all of these. Indeed, this agreement was signed yesterday, but in recent weeks, the Syrian army surrounded the foreigners’ camp near Idlib, creating an operational situation there. Later, the organization’s leader surrendered under an agreement. Therefore, the foreigners’ stance and the Syrian government’s security policies are incompatible.

Their numbers aren’t very large either. Around 3,000-4,000. But their military presence there will be ended in the coming period. This includes them, too.

But these are Ahmet Sharaa’s former allies.

Now, of course, there’s another thing about these. They came to fight against the Assad regime. For example, one of these foreign groups is led by a black man with French citizenship. There are those from East Turkestan, Chechens, Uzbeks, and so on. Yes, they are allies, but instead of eliminating them through military operations, they want to end their military activities with an agreement based on the old alliance law. And they’ve focused on a solution like this: grant them citizenship.

They should completely end their military activities, live in Syria, engage in trade, and become completely civilian. There’s such a plan. But these groups are so far unwilling to accept it. However, when alternative options emerge—in other words, when a military operation emerges to eliminate their existence—then a different approach, and a different one for them, may be in order.

So how was this Trump meeting reflected in Syrian public opinion, and how was it evaluated?

Now, of course, there are two issues here. One group supports this meeting. Or rather, no one opposes it. But factions are divided as the results are concerned.

Some of them believe these talks are a success, that they are how they should be, that they are the greatest sign of Syria’s return to the international arena. They also argue that these talks will play a significant role in the permanent lifting of sanctions, which America calls the Caesar Act, and that they will contribute to attracting investment from both the West and the East, contributing to Syria’s faster development and normalization, and that they will contribute to resolving these chronic problems, both in the south and in relations with Israel, as well as those east of the Euphrates.

Others meanwhile do not oppose these talks, but they may oppose, for example, an agreement to cooperate militarily with the International Coalition.

Actually, such a cooperation could lead to internal conflicts in the coming period. There is such a danger. It could create a security problem, and the ones opposing it are not foreign armed groups; these are factions that have been integrated into the army since December 8th. Some of their leaders have become generals. Their fighters have become soldiers. There are also lower-ranking individuals, including those who have become deputy ministers of defense, etc.

This has the potential to create a different kind of security crisis within the state. Therefore, all of these were evaluated. Joining the International Coalition was signed. But it has no military dimension and does not require military cooperation. This is a purely political agreement. It consists of cooperation and intelligence sharing.

This is a fragile situation. The integration of groups into the army is a crucial matter. Nor is it an easy task. Indeed, thousands of people who have fought for years, despite the complete lack of rules—or rather, rules within themselves—and who are not like a professional army, will join the army. And from there, you will build a professional army out of them.

Therefore, this integration, the adoption and acceptance of these professional military rules by those involved, and their ability to act accordingly, require time. It was precisely during this transition period that people were wary of making an agreement that would create security problems.

In my personal opinion, if such an agreement, that is, an agreement on joint military operations, had been reached, or if a political will had emerged to include the Abraham Accords instead of the 1973 agreement, a security crisis would undoubtedly have erupted in Damascus.

Turkish foreign minister’s shadow, or even more, over the Trump-Sharaa meeting

So, are they fundamentally opposed to Damascus getting too close to the West and cooperating too much?

They don’t oppose establishing relations with the West. They want them to be balanced. They are disturbed by a relationship that would completely strip them of their political sovereignty, that of Syria, and that would erode the gains achieved after the December 8 coup, that is, the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad. And they are absolutely opposed to normalization with Israel.

Why was Hakan Fidan in Washington on the same day as Sharaa?

There are many reasons. We know that Hakan Fidan was also in the White House when Ahmet Sharaa and Trump met. Inside the White House.

The trio of foreign ministers held a trilateral meeting: Rubio, Shaibani and Fidan. We don’t know for sure, but considering the course of events, it’s highly likely that Hakan Fidan attended part of the Trump-Sharaa meeting. This is because some of the issues discussed require Türkiye’s approval for decisions to be made. One of these is undoubtedly the SDF.

Because Türkiye currently stands on the brink of an operation targeting the SDF. Therefore, this SDF issue concerns Türkiye as much as it concerns the Damascus administration. Therefore, because of these shared concerns, Hakan Fidan was simultaneously present at the White House. It’s likely that he attended part of the Trump-Sharaa meeting.

But on the other hand, the Syrian Foreign Minister himself has already made the announcement. Türkiye’s official news agency, Anadolu Agency, has also reported on the Shahra-Fidan meeting.

Al-Sharaa in Washington: Repercussions for Moscow and Teheran

At the outset, you said that this visit was the strongest indication that Syria had returned to the international arena. In your next sentence, you mentioned being within the Western system. So, what consequences might this visit have for Russia and Iran?

In reality, Syria’s relationship with the West doesn’t revolve around positioning itself against another country. From December 8th to the present, we see that while the Syrian government maintains contacts with the US, France, and the UK, talks have also been held with Russia, despite its military support for Assad and its actual involvement in operations after 2015. Initially, the Deputy Foreign Minister responsible for Syria, Bogdanov, came to Damascus and held talks.

Later, Shaibani went to Moscow. Finally, he visited Ahmed Shar as President. And some talks are taking place. Military bases, locating Russia, how to find it, etc. On the other hand, the Chinese arrived in Damascus before the Russians, and after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, they established contact through economic cooperation. In other words, intense dialogue with the US doesn’t necessitate a position of opposition to China and Russia. A balanced process is being pursued.

Iran’s situation is slightly different from Russia’s. The first decision the administration made after December 8th was to ban citizens of two countries from entering Syria. One of these was Israel, the other Iran. The decision regarding Israel remains in effect. However, they softened the decision regarding Iran.

They can come to Syria by obtaining a special visa. Of course, the reason for keeping a slightly more reserved approach towards Iran was this: During the Syrian civil war, Iran organized fighters from various parts of the world, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and even Azerbaijan. It brought them to Syria. Hezbollah itself came.

Russia, on the other hand, supported the Assad regime there with its own warplanes and troops. Therefore, the two situations are different. Another point is that the current Syrian administration views Russia’s presence in Syria differently than Iran’s. It will have a certain influence on both the Shia and Alawite Syrians. There is a concern within the Syrian administration that it could cause further internal unrest.

But he knows Russia’s ability to organize such a relationship is weak. Therefore, he approaches Iran and Russia differently. He already has and continues to have contacts with Russia. Diplomatic relations with Iran will certainly begin, but it will take time.

“Qatar pays the salaries”

I’ll ask about sanctions. The exemption decision regarding sanctions has been extended for 180 days. Now, there’s an expectation of foreign capital coming into Syria. Primarily for reconstruction efforts. But beyond that, an economic revival is also expected. There’s also hope in Türkiye that this can be achieved without being hampered by US sanctions. How realistic do you think this expectation is?

First, sanctions must be lifted, because the current Syrian government’s revenues are insufficient to even pay salaries. Therefore, due to sanctions, Qatar pays the salaries of state employees, except for those in the Ministry of Interior and Defense, through the United Nations. For Syria to be able to pay its own employees, the lifting of sanctions is absolutely essential. The situation was no different during the Bashar al-Assad era. Consider that a colonel earned a salary of $50 during Bashar al-Assad’s administration. Most recently, Prime Minister Jalil earned a salary of $140.

After Bashar al-Assad’s fall, Celil said, “My salary was $140. I’m an engineer. After working as prime minister, I work on my profession to make ends meet.” Salaries had already plummeted during Bashar’s term. This was one of the reasons the army couldn’t fight seriously.

The current Trump administration wants the sanctions lifted. But, as you know, the reason they’re extending the sanctions suspension for another 180 days is because the president doesn’t have the authority to lift them permanently. Congress must do that.

Republicans and Democrats need to collaborate here so Congress can repeal this Caesar Act. Because it’s impossible these days, they’ve postponed it for another 180 days. Because they need to open the government first. Because thousands, hundreds of thousands of people, are not receiving salaries.

Because these sanctions haven’t been lifted, no one can make a lasting investment. Because they can’t see the future. Investment is like that. For example, roads will be built. Ports will be built in very poor condition.

There’s the issue of airports. They’re operational now, but they need to be modernized. There’s a lot of work to be done. There’s also the issue of mining. There’s the issue of oil extraction. There are other kinds of underground resources.

It’s not like investing in an agricultural product. These are permanent investments. Therefore, companies and governments that intend to invest want to see the future. The most important factor in this is the lifting of sanctions. In other words, no one can undertake a multi-billion-dollar investment without the lifting of sanctions. Because they’re hesitant.

But we can say that the other billion-dollar investments we mentioned are on hold for a while longer.

Statehood of Syria

Last question. The Syrian President has travelled to the US and met with the US president. He’s accompanied by the Syrian Foreign Minister and a delegation. Agreements are being signed. The image released to the press shows leaders of two different states meeting with each other and trying to reach an agreement. On the other hand, you mentioned that security problems may arise between groups in the coming period for various reasons. Certain areas of Syria are not under full control of the central government. There are different armed groups. Fighting has already begun with some of these, and fighting is anticipated with others. Your last example: civil servants’ salaries are paid by Qatar. When we look at this aspect, on one side, there’s the image of a state, while on the other, the image is different. It’s more of a political entity. What is your general assessment?

Now, when we look at the political sciences for answers, we see the following. First, there is a state. Officially, the Syrian Arab Republic exists and is a member of the United Nations. But on the other hand, there are several steps that need to be taken to build a state system, a political system. This isn’t just about Syria. Wherever a state or a political system is to be built in the world, these steps apply to them as well.

One of these, the first and indispensable, is the issue of the current administration, the administration that built the state, having sovereignty over all the lands where the state and the political system will be built. Therefore, the Damascus administration has not fully achieved this today. This is quite reasonable, because from 2011 until December 8, 2024, Bashar al-Assad also lost that.

And today, the new regime is in the same situation. They’re facing the same situation, but the point here is this: this is a transitional period. Because we call it the President of Syria, but the official equivalent in Syria is this; the decree states that in Syria, the President of Syria is a transitional period. Because he wasn’t elected by the people, he was chosen by groups. Therefore, every country has such a transitional period.

The most recent example of this in this region is the 1979 Iranian revolution. There, the Shah was overthrown and replaced by a new government led by Ayatollah Khomeini. However, because there was no civil war, the transition period was completed much more quickly. The constitutional vote was held a few months later.

In Syria, the devastation is immense. A major war has raged for nearly 15 years. The transition period there will take a bit longer. Similarly, the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, destroyed all state institutions, dismantled the army, and built a new system. That system, for example, still hasn’t held up today.

In this regard, there is a transition period in Syria. This transition period is defined as five years. Therefore, yes, when we look at visits, contacts, and relations, there is a state. But when we look on the ground, we cannot fully see that state. You are right. It has not fully established sovereignty over its territory, but transition periods can produce certain images like this. The important thing is to address these deficiencies quickly.