Sudan’s Crossroads: Settlement or Partition?

By Islam Farag, from Cairo / Egypt

The ongoing war in Sudan between the national army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is no longer a domestic issue. Viewed within the context of escalating tensions in the Middle East and the expanding conflicts across the Red Sea and Africa, it essentially represents a struggle for influence and resources in this strategically vital country, rich in gold deposits.

Although the conflict between the two sides has raged for over two years, it has attracted limited attention; due either to the dominance of the Israeli war on Gaza in Arab and international media headlines or to a tacit agreement among international backers of both factions, allowing Sudanese civilians to die and flee in silence.

The fighting between the Sudanese army and the RSF had been back-and-forth until the army achieved several battlefield victories months ago, recapturing numerous cities and areas. In response, the RSF established a parallel government abroad to project the existence of two competing legitimacies in the country; a move aimed at paving the way to translate future wartime gains into political leverage through negotiations or even preparing the ground and international community for the possibility of Sudan’s partition.

Horrific scenes

However, the horrific scenes of civilian bloodshed in Al-Fashir city at the hands of the RSF in recent days leave no room for doubt about the scenarios awaiting Sudan. The RSF did not seize the city in such a gruesome manner—after an 18-month siege—except for its strategic importance and the decisive role it could play in determining the country’s future.

Before falling to the RSF, Al-Fashir was the last stronghold of the Sudanese army and its allied armed movements in the Darfur region.

North Darfur state, whose capital is Al-Fashir, spans 296,000 square kilometers—roughly 12% of Sudan’s total area and more than half of Darfur’s landmass. The city’s geographic location further amplifies its significance, serving as a convergence point for communication lines with Chad, Egypt, and Libya, as well as the main route connecting western and eastern Sudan.

While RSF control over Al-Fashir marks a major battlefield shift in the militia’s favor, it does not necessarily reflect a decisive strategic turning point in the war’s balance. Rather, it signals a serious attempt by the RSF to entrench its political influence ahead of any potential negotiations, during which it could present itself as a de facto power controlling an entire region; using that leverage to impose its political and economic conditions, which would undoubtedly safeguard its interests and those of its international backers.

Yet the fall of the city—and its dangers—simultaneously galvanizes the international supporters of the Sudanese army, who fear it could become a strategic launchpad threatening northern Sudan.

From peaceful nation to global arena

Understanding the nature of this conflict requires answering a fundamental question: How did this once-peaceful nation become an arena for international rivalry, and its gentle people turned into refugees and displaced persons?

Sudan holds immense geostrategic importance as a gateway to the security of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. It shares borders with seven African nations and is endowed with vast agricultural and mineral wealth, making it a battleground for numerous international and regional powers—either directly or by proxy.

At the same time, Sudan is a sprawling country, ranking third in Africa by land area after South Sudan’s secession in 2011 stripped it of its former top position. Its population is remarkably diverse, encompassing a broad spectrum of tribes and ethnic groups—57 in total—spread across its geography and sometimes extending into neighboring countries, alongside dozens of local languages and dialects.

Since independence in 1956, the country has seen the proliferation of military formations due to prolonged civil wars. According to some reports, more than 87 armed movements operate nationwide, with 84 actives in Darfur alone. These range from official institutions to irregular armed factions and militias, some created by successive ruling regimes.

The RSF emerged as one such formation under former President Omar al-Bashir. It evolved from the Janjaweed militia, which had served as an auxiliary force to the army during the first Darfur war in 2003 to counter rebel movements that rose up citing political marginalization and lack of development.

The core of the rebel movements came from African tribes, while the Janjaweed were primarily drawn from Arab tribes. With the outbreak of the second Darfur war in 2013, the “Janjaweed” were rebranded as the “Rapid Support Forces” to lend them legitimacy. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti,” became their commander and was promoted to brigadier general before age 40, despite lacking basic education.

Path to open conflict

In 2019, the RSF played a pivotal role that the army leveraged to orchestrate al-Bashir’s ouster after mass protests against his 30-year rule. In return, the militia secured a major political role in managing the transitional arrangements—until it turned against the army in 2023. The stated pretext was disagreement over those arrangements, but the underlying reality was a struggle over wealth distribution, local influence, and subservience to external powers’ agendas.

Thus, the conflict in Sudan straddles a thin line between internal war and regional/international rivalry, where calculations of gold and influence intersect with those of arms.

So, who are the regional and international players in this conflict?

The complex human geography of Sudan, as noted, has enabled the existence of military formations that do not operate according to the logic of a unified national state. The RSF was originally a military contractor used by al-Bashir in an internal war and, in 2015, as a source of mercenaries fighting in Yemen during the Saudi-Emirati-led campaign against the Houthis. After al-Bashir’s fall, this military formation found itself in political circumstances requiring it to operate with national unity in mind. Yet, as the famous Arab proverb goes, “The jar remains a jar even if its beard grows long.” The RSF proved incapable of acting as anything but a military contractor seeking to impose its terms on the state.

It is well known that Darfur—the cradle of the RSF and its leaders—is the primary hub of Sudan’s gold wealth, making the country one of the world’s richest in reserves of this precious metal. Consequently, certain regional states saw an opportunity in backing the RSF and fostering instability to ensure the continued illegal smuggling of gold into their territories. Foremost among them is the United Arab Emirates, which the Sudanese army accuses of bankrolling RSF massacres with money, weapons, logistics, and intelligence support.

The UAE’s interests extend beyond securing smuggled Sudanese gold shipments. Some believe Abu Dhabi sees Sudan’s fragmentation—and Darfur’s secession under an allied proxy—as a foothold to win multiple battles in the volatile Horn of Africa, facilitating control over its wealth and key ports. Even without secession, the current situation provides bargaining chips to extract concessions from Khartoum.

Israel, too, is involved, supporting Hemedti’s forces due to Darfur’s strategic position as a crossroads between several West African states. Instability there poses a grave threat to Egypt—Tel Aviv’s strategic adversary—regardless of how long peace between the two countries endures.

Egypt and Türkiye on the same page

Egypt, meanwhile, is a staunch backer of the Sudanese army, driven by its deep conviction that preserving Sudan’s unity is essential to safeguarding its southern interests, particularly its water security from Ethiopia via Sudan. Cairo also recognizes that Sudan’s tribal and ethnic makeup makes it prone to further fragmentation if secession is reopened—an outcome that could turn southern Egypt into a tinderbox, with risks extending northward through refugee waves, drug and arms smuggling, or even orchestrated by hostile actors.

Türkiye never officially declares support for one side over the other in Sudan, but evidence and indicators place it closer to Egypt’s stance in favor of Sudan’s unity and its army. Ankara has offered mediation multiple times between army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the UAE to resolve the internal conflict. Numerous reports highlight the role of Turkish drones in tipping key battles in the army’s favor. On the eve of Al-Fashir’s fall, al-Burhan held an emergency meeting with Türkiye’s ambassador in Sudan, Fatih Yıldız—an encounter observers interpreted as a possible request for Turkish military support.

This is the conflict map in Sudan and where it stands today. But what comes after Al-Fashir’s fall?

A cautious Egyptian move

According to Egyptian sources, Cairo is moving cautiously to craft various formulas to halt the war, steering clear of a prolonged military resolution that threatens the country’s unity. One potential scenario is arranging a meeting between al-Burhan and Hemedti.

However, per the source, this hinges on both sides accepting the humanitarian ceasefire proposed by the international quartet. With the RSF agreeing but al-Burhan rejecting it, the prospect remains suspended. Al-Burhan fears that immediate acceptance could be construed as defeat, demoralizing his fighters and allies on the ground and potentially fracturing his support base; a risk he desperately needs to avoid.

In my assessment, all parties engaged in the conflict recognize the impossibility of military victory, yet none appear ready for a ceasefire. The political cost of retreat outweighs the price of continued war. Even the United States limits its actions to perfunctory calls for temporary humanitarian truces without engaging in a comprehensive political solution. The African Union remains absent, unable to formulate any serious initiative amid the warring parties’ rejection of political settlement for now.

Sudan now stands at a crossroads, its future on trial. Any meeting between al-Burhan and Hemedti could open the door to a realistic settlement preserving what remains of balance, or become the prelude to a new explosion pushing toward partition.