Moscow’s support for Tehran: Nuclear and military cooperations

By Azar Mahdavan, from Tehran / Iran

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran and Russia developed a new dynamic in their relationship, emerging as significant players on the international stage. This relationship evolved through different phases during the terms of Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. Particularly during Putin’s tenure, the two countries’ shared opposition to the unipolar world strengthened the bond between Moscow and Tehran. Last year, the signing of a 20-year strategic cooperation agreement stood out as the clearest expression of this bond.

In our interview with Russia expert Dr. Ruhullah Modabber, we explored the details of this agreement, the impacts of the Syrian crisis, and the political, military, and economic dimensions of the cooperation between the two countries.

Opposing unilateralism: The driving force behind the agreement

Countering unilateralism is considered one of the key factors strengthening the ties between Tehran and Moscow. China is also on this front. Do you think the signing of the 20-year strategic cooperation agreement between Iran and Russia is motivated by this policy? What kind of framework does the agreement establish for political, military, and economic cooperation?

The relationship between Tehran and Moscow is complex and multi-layered. The Islamic Republic of Iran and its various governments have approached ties with Russia in different ways. At times, the rise to power of Western-leaning politicians in Iran created hardships in relations with Moscow and Beijing. Such administrations didn’t prioritize Russia. But the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has consistently emphasized the importance of deepening ties with Moscow. During the administrations of Khatami, Ahmadinejad, and especially Rouhani, Tehran-Moscow relations largely weakened and remained mostly symbolic.

However, this trend reversed under the martyr Raisi. He took significant steps to sign a strategic agreement with Russia. While deepening ties with Russia and China initially has been serving the purpose of countering American unilateralism shallowly, the goal of this 20-year strategic agreement was to make Tehran’s cooperation with Russia independent of domestic political changes and to achieve genuine strategic depth. In short, the agreement was designed to transform the relationship into an unbreakable bond.

One problem for Tehran has been its inability to capitalize on opportunities to deepen ties with Russia because of its Western-leaning politicians. For example, the North-South Corridor proposal of the Russian President to Tehran in 2000 was at times hampered by the policies of Western-leaning Iranian governments.

Delays, political Shifts and missed Opportunities

The passing of the late President Raisi and the sudden shifts in Iran’s political landscape had delayed the signing of the strategic agreement. The new Iranian government, which included Western-leaning figures such as Zarif who played a key role in bringing Pezeshkian to power, postponed the agreement for over ten months. While the Russian President was the first to congratulate Pezeshkian, and Foreign Minister Lavrov invited Minister Abbas Araghchi to Moscow, Araghchi didn’t go for more than seven months. He limited his visits to European countries.

In contrast, the late Raisi’s first foreign trip had been to Moscow, symbolizing the start of a new era of cooperation. This period had created opportunities for Iran to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS.

The new Iranian government, however, preferred negotiations with the European trio without involving Russia or China. The Russian government repeatedly expressed its readiness to sign the strategic agreement and invited Pezeshkian to Moscow. Eventually, Pezeshkian traveled to Moscow to sign the agreement, but the overall atmosphere suggested that the government was following the policies of former President Hassan Rouhani. The removal of the mutual defense clause from the agreement was seen as the greatest strategic mistake. Some officials within the Pezeshkian administration said about this removal that Iran would not need Russian support in future wars.

Nevertheless, considering that much of Iran’s foreign policy is guided by Ayatollah Khamenei, the main structure of the agreement can be said to have been preserved. It should also be noted that the Iranian government has yet to take concrete steps toward implementing the agreement. The frequent high-profile interviews given by Iran’s ambassador in Moscow, and visits by various Iranian officials to Russia, are mostly ceremonial. Economic cooperation remains weak. Despite Russia welcoming Iran as a member of BRICS, the SCO, and the Eurasian Economic Union, and granting customs exemptions on 7,000 products, Iran’s total exports to Russia remain below $2 billion. To put this in perspective, Belarus exports over $35 billion to Russia, and Uzbekistan more than $12 billion.

Unless Tehran demonstrates a serious commitment to comprehensive cooperation with Russia across multiple sectors, it risks missing significant opportunities. Ultimately, this situation reflects the complex and pervasive influence of pro-Western currents in Iran, which continue to view dialogue and collaboration with the US and the West as the key to resolving all major issues.

Russia’s support during the 12-Day War

During the 12-Day War, some media outlets reported and analyzed that Russia had not provided significant support to Iran against the West. Some experts even suggested that this indicated Iran doesn’t hold a privileged position in Russia’s strategic policies, particularly within the new world order. However, Russia strongly supported Iran on nuclear matters. How would you assess Moscow’s stance during the 12-Day War?

At the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, when a journalist asked President Putin about Moscow’s silence in the face of NATO and Israel’s direct attacks on Iran, he replied, “It is impossible for us not to stand by Iran.” He also emphasized that Moscow had repeatedly offered to sell S-400 defense systems, but the Iranian side had declined. Putin added that Russia has always been ready to sell any kind of weaponry to Iran. This confirms the statements from Iranian military officials who said that they did not request the S-400 system from Russia.

As I mentioned, certain pro-Western currents negatively affect Iran-Russia relations. These groups spread false claims suggesting that Russia has withheld defense systems and support from Iran. Moreover, they don’t mention the removal of the mutual defense clause from the strategic agreement. This pervasive propaganda in Iranian society diverts public attention from the US’s role in attacks against Iran.

Nevertheless, as I noted before, since Moscow’s relationship with Tehran does not depend on changes in the Iranian government, Russia demonstrated a serious and consistent approach in supporting Iran during the 12-Day War. For instance, Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Vasiliy Nebenzya, took a strong stance in support of Iran. The Russian Foreign Ministry organized a dedicated division for this purpose. The President of Russia frequently engaged in talks with Israel, the US, and France. Russia’s Defense Minister also communicated directly with the Iranian side several times. Moscow was very active.

All of this shows that Iran holds a special and privileged position in Moscow’s foreign policy.

High-level diplomacy and the “Friends of Iran” coalition

After the 12-Day War, Iran’s Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijanic visited Russia to deliver a message from Ayatollah Khamenei. According to some analysts, the significance of this visit is even greater considering Russia’s supportive stance toward Iran regarding the revival of the “sanctions” mechanism. The Kremlin doesn’t recognize the reimplementation of Security Council sanctions on Iran. Recently Russia issued a statement noting that with the expiration of UN Resolution 2231, restrictions and procedures related to Iran’s nuclear program no longer hold legal force. How do you assess the Iranian security official’s visit to Russia?

It should be noted that Europe opted to activate a sanctions mechanism that had been prepared for years. About a decade ago, Russia warned the Iranian negotiation team to pay attention to this mechanism, but Iran disregarded that. Nevertheless, over the past ten years, Russia consistently stood by Iran and repeatedly protested Europe’s hostile policies.

As Europe moved toward triggering the mechanism, Russia launched an extraordinary and unique initiative by establishing a coalition called the “Friends of Iran” within the Security Council and the United Nations. Led by Russia, this coalition brought together a group of sovereign states to formally address Resolution 2231, issuing a statement that they would not support the reimplementation of sanctions on Iran. No comparable coalition has been seen before in UN history. Despite numerous negative signals from the Iranian government, Russia continues its approach.

Mr. Larijani’s visit to Moscow was not only about Resolution 2231. It is also related to developments in Syria and the Caucasus, new US movements in international waters and a potential new Israeli attack. This shows that contacts between Tehran and Moscow are being maintained at the highest level.

Coinciding with Larijani’s visit, former Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif, whose approach is often openly anti-Russia, made a completely anti-Russian speech with baseless accusations. One of the purposes of Zarif’s statements was to downplay Larijani’s visit, create a crisis in Iran-Russia relations, and send a deterrent message to Moscow. However, the Russian side ignored this.

It is worth noting that Iran has repeatedly violated Article 33 of the strategic agreement. This Article states the need to combat terrorism and propaganda efforts targeting the bilateral relationship. Western-leaning media and political movements in Iran have consistently tried to undermine the ties between the two states.

Russia’s support is also evident in its insistence on the necessity of Iran continuing its peaceful nuclear enrichment activities. During Energy Week in Moscow, Putin stressed the importance of easing tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear program in a private meeting with International Atomic Energy Agency Director Grossi. Moreover, Moscow signed agreements with Tehran to build several new nuclear power plants, complete the second and third phases of the Bushehr Nuclear Plant, and construct modern new facilities. This is another clear message to the US and the West that Moscow will neither accept sanctions against Iran nor allow violations of Iran’s nuclear rights. Russia affirms Iran’s right to possess peaceful nuclear technology. This is exactly opposite of the policies of Europe and the US.

Syria as the center for cooperation in the region

One of the factors driving regional cooperation between Iran and Russia has been the Syrian crisis during Bashar al-Assad’s leadership. Last week, Moscow hosted Syria’s President Al-Sharaa. Media coverage of the visit largely focused on the future of Russian bases in Syria. Following the meeting between Al-Sharaa and Putin, Russia’s Special Envoy for Syria Aleksandr Lavrentiev traveled to Tehran to meet with Iranian officials. This shows the importance Moscow places on Tehran’s views regarding Damascus. Given these developments, do you think Tehran and Moscow are reconsidering their policies toward the “new Syria”?

Yes, that is correct. Syria has been a key area of regional cooperation for Tehran and Moscow. I have repeatedly emphasized that the continuation of Russia’s presence in Syria is in Iran’s interest.

An interesting point is that when Al-Sharaa was appointed in Syria, he promised to end the Russian presence. During her first visit to Damascus, the then German Foreign Minister and current UN General Assembly President Annalena Baerbock warned Al-Sharaa that the Russians should leave Syria. However, after some time fully coordinated with Western powers, Al-Sharaa concluded that he needs to cooperate with Russia to maintain his rule. Russia has now become an indispensable pillar of the new order.

Communication and cooperation of Syria’s new government with the Russians help protect Iran’s interests in Syria. Iran maintains a special role in these relations.

The visit of Russia’s Special Envoy for Syria to Tehran is not only about collaboration on the Damascus issue but also about a channel for exchange of views on various security matters across West Asia. Close cooperation between Tehran and Moscow on the Syria axis could help resolve multiple crises.

In conclusion, all evidence indicates that Moscow has specific plans to deepen its ties with Iran. If Tehran develops the necessary infrastructure for this, it can capitalize on this opportunity effectively.

“Eurasian Security Model”

Also, there is a special Russian initiative repeatedly mentioned by President Putin. This is Eurasian Security Model. This is a new security pact that goes beyond the Collective Security Treaty Organization signed with the Commonwealth of Independent States. The pact is multidimensional, taking into account both economic and political aspects.

In practice, although Iran is not yet a formal participant in this agreement, we see Russia providing economic, political, and security support to Tehran. In my view, Tehran should sign a mutual defense agreement with Moscow and significantly deepen security and intelligence cooperation. This would help address threats effectively.

The opportunities Russia provides by establishing Iranian banks in Moscow and other cities will be particularly beneficial to eliminate the impact of sanctions. Tehran should take steps with its embassy in Russia. This embassy now remains largely superficial.

I believe Tehran should open a new chapter in its relationship with Russia through a comprehensive security, political, and economic approach. This should include appointing a military attaché to Moscow and sending a senior security general. This could help Tehran to make the most of opportunities in sensitive situations and in the face of threats.