Where is Milei’s Argentina headed after the legislative elections?

By Ursula Asta, from Buenos Aires / Argentina

The reality of Argentina demands urgent reflections that contribute to political action capable of changing the course of an economy that is heading towards a new collapse and deepening of the crisis, with the social pain that this entails.

The national legislative elections of October 26, taking place halfway through the current government’s term, are always interpreted as a plebiscite on who controls the Executive branch. This time, La Libertad Avanza, the political party of President Javier Milei, won both nationally and in several key districts.

In both houses of Congress, the ruling party increased its representation, although it will have to negotiate within the chamber, something that, a priori, does not appear to pose major obstacles. Among the keys to victory was a surprising outcome: winning in the populous province of Buenos Aires, as well as in districts such as Santa Fe, Córdoba, Mendoza, and the City of Buenos Aires.

So, what impact did the political capture imposed by the United States on Argentina have? How does the election result reaffirm the government’s program? How should we understand the historical period in which Milei won the presidency in 2023 and what has transpired up to 2025? What are the key implications of the crisis of representation for a population whose voter abstention rate was the lowest since the return to democracy in 1983? What is happening within the main opposition movement, Peronism? Is it capable of reshaping a political program with popular appeal that truly represents the majority?

Impact on Milei’s program

Facundo Cruz, the consultant and political analyst who coordinates Pulsar, the public opinion observatory of the National University of Buenos Aires, stated that, with these results, “La Libertad Avanza (LLA) is confirmed as a widespread national force, with support in key districts and growth in other districts where it had struggled to gain a foothold, for example, the provinces of La Pampa and Misiones.”

According to Cruz, “the government is strengthened in the face of the Congress that will take office on December 10, because the governors (district leaders) are even more marginalized than they were until now. For example, the governors who represent provincialism, some of whom built the United Provinces party, a new centrist option, lost in their districts against LLA, and those who chose not to be part of United Provinces and to run independently also lost to LLA.”

In this way, “the Casa Rosada can then negotiate with the governors one by one and not face a homogeneous, solid, and consolidated bloc. This will facilitate the conditions for negotiation. The national government faces the second stage of the presidential term in a stronger position to build the consensus that various sectors are already demanding.”

Indeed, in the days following the election, Milei led a lengthy meeting with 20 provincial representatives, marking his first indication of seeking negotiations to address reforms, such as labor, tax, and penal reforms. Only four representatives, all from Peronist backgrounds, did not attend, having not been invited: Axel Kicillof (Buenos Aires), Gildo Insfrán (Formosa), Ricardo Quintela (La Rioja), and Gustavo Melella (Tierra del Fuego).

When asked about this, Natalia Salvo, who was a candidate for national deputy for Fuerza Patria, the Peronist party, in the Buenos Aires City district, analyzed that the consequences of this election are “disastrous.” “One tends to say that all elections are important, but in this case, knowing that the government itself had framed it as a plebiscite, we see what the consequences are. They are already talking about a labor reform, which is tantamount to a statute of slavery and the destruction of unions. There is already talk of a regressive tax reform for those with the least ability to pay, and, in addition, a pension reform,” she stated.

The capture by the United States

In the weeks leading up to the election, the US Treasury intervened directly in Argentina’s coffers. This occurred after a meeting between Milei and Donald Trump, who at the time warned that “if he loses the election,” he wouldn’t be “generous with Argentina.” He later added further statements when questioned about why American farmers hadn’t received support while Argentina had. “You don’t know anything,” he told the journalist, “Argentina is dying,” “they have nothing.”

In the Argentine government’s desperate attempt to maintain the dollar exchange rate until the October 26 elections, it decided to have the Central Bank intervene by burning through reserves, went to the US for a bailout, and lowered export taxes on grains and oilseeds to zero so that these multinationals would quickly liquidate dollars, which meant a great deal for a handful of companies.

The “Caputo -Bessent-Package”, named after the Argentine Minister of Economy and the US Treasury Secretary, was yet another symbol of the model of financial speculation, indebtedness, and capital flight. This, coupled with a patronage-based investment system and the opening of imports at the expense of protecting local industry, has led to a sharp decline in economic activity, business closures, job losses and precarious employment, as well as high prices in both pesos and dollars.

Adding to the above, two days before the election, a delegation arrived in Buenos Aires headed by Jamie Dimon, global CEO of JP Morgan, as well as former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, who is now chairman of JP Morgan’s board, and former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, a partner at the bank. Furthermore, Argentina’s new Foreign Minister, Pablo Quirno, is a former JP Morgan employee; JP Morgan is an investment bank with interests in Argentina’s financial and energy sectors.

Regarding the consequences, Peronist leader Natalia Salvo added a geopolitical perspective and criticized “an alliance solely with the United States, when there is a multipolar world, which could be used to advance national interests in defense of our own heritage, strategic resources, and also our lands.”

“Regarding the regional consequences, there is also a resurgence of the radical far right in Latin America. This is no small matter in terms of how geopolitics is currently functioning, and the second Operation Condor being launched by the US empire. In this context, dissenting voices, like Lula (Brazil), become fewer and far between,” he opined.

Notes for looking at Argentine reality

Analyst Cruz highlighted that, in the elections, the ruling party “gained an advantage over Peronism, which, when its various lists are combined, reached 34% of the vote nationwide. This leaves it trailing by 6 points, and the province of Buenos Aires was key to this, for two reasons.” “First, because it symbolically reversed the district election result of September 7 (when Peronism won). So now, the province symbolically gives an additional boost to La Libertad Avanza. Second, because the province shows that the surge in voter turnout (from September to October) ultimately benefited Milei, capturing votes that, in that provincial election, opted for other, more localized forces, and this time the ruling party absorbed the non-Peronist vote.”

For her part, Peronist leader Salvo pointed out that “besides not winning the elections, the analysis needs to be deeper. First, we must recognize the strong anti-Peronist sentiment that exists. This is evident in the votes in the province of Buenos Aires after September 7th. Second, consider what happened in the City of Buenos Aires, where abstention occurred in the most vulnerable districts, and, with the right wing mobilized, Milei’s vote share reached 50% in that district.”

For her, “there was a lack of a clear project from the national level about what will happen with the debt, with work and with health,” while at the same time she considered that, regarding the economic aspect and the pressure on the dollar, “the fear factor hit very hard,” that is, “the fear that this will explode.”

In recent days, former president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who is imprisoned and barred from holding political office, published a letter. Among other points, she emphasized one of the main points of contention among politicians within Peronism: that the Buenos Aires district election (a province representing 40% of the Argentine electorate) in September, where Peronism prevailed, should not be held separately from the national election in October, where Peronism ultimately lost.

National Deputy Vanesa Siley, representing the province of Buenos Aires, was asked about this: “I agree with what Cristina said in that letter. Regarding the Buenos Aires election, the enthusiasm of our political force didn’t wane, but what did increase was the reflection of an anti-Peronist vote. And that reflection was made possible by having separated the elections, so you give the adversary time to regroup and advance.”

“I don’t think we did badly, but we did lose, and the one who has to take responsibility for the defeats is the one who made the leadership decisions,” he pointed out, referring to the dispute with the Peronist governor of the province of Buenos Aires, Axel Kicillof.

As has been the case for some time, the congresswoman revealed the internal debates within the opposition: “Seeing people talking about Cristina dancing on the balcony, when she is a woman deprived of her freedom, shows that hidden desire of a certain part of the Argentine leadership, who are afraid of going to jail, and who don’t fight for the workers, but do want to fight with Cristina.”

Crisis of representation

One reality is undeniable: October 26th saw the lowest voter turnout since the return to democracy, reaching only 67.92%. Of more than 35 million registered voters, just over 24 million went to the polls—that is, a third did not vote. Given this statistic, the winners account for no more than 25% of the electorate who actually cast their ballots. From this perspective, addressing what appears to be a profound crisis of political representation is urgently needed in any analysis.

Natalia Salvo, a leader in the City of Buenos Aires, emphasized that “people, regardless of whether they have become depoliticized or vote for their true oppressor, always understand what is happening. And Javier Milei is currently occupying the space for sincerity and disruptive action.” She maintained that it is necessary to put forward proposals, such as, once in government, “creating a registry of those who have been laid off by the State or what loans small and medium-sized businesses need. The same goes for medications for retirees. We need to take very concrete action.”

Peronist congresswoman Vanesa Siley, representing the province of Buenos Aires, reflected: “There is a democratic dissatisfaction. Since 2015, wealth distribution has been on a downward spiral, and the one sin a Peronist government cannot be allowed to commit is having registered workers living below the poverty line.” She argued that, to address the fact that “people aren’t going to vote because they feel democracy isn’t solving their main problems, if they’re going to talk about labor reform, we have to put our own labor reform proposal on the table.”

From Chaco, a province in northern Argentina, former governor and elected national senator Jorge Capitanich considered that, both in the 2023 elections, when Milei won the Presidency, and in the 2025 legislative elections, “there is a displacement effect in the archetypal Peronist vote, for very simple reasons: the increase in job insecurity and the systematic destruction of wages, both in the public and private sectors and among informal workers.”

What must Peronism face?

In Chaco, the opposition lost by 3,447 votes. Former governor Capitanich stated: “We made every effort to unite all (Peronism) to have a competitive force, but those who focus on short-term issues often fail to grasp the impact this has.”

In national terms, he analyzed: “Our political space is stagnating, and the non-Peronist space, with its various factions, can grasp a broader framework. What happened in the 2023 presidential elections is that part of our electoral territory has been decimated. But 2027 (the next presidential elections) is not yet decided. It’s a toss-up; it depends on how the government performs in terms of its effectiveness in solving problems, and on our ability to articulate, structure, and expand our support base.”

Siley, from Buenos Aires province, emphasized, “We need to have a program,” and offered a proposal regarding labor: “The first labor reform proposal from Peronism should be a fixed sum, because today salaries aren’t enough, since people have to hold two or three jobs and work weekends too. There’s a reality of multiple jobholding due to extremely low wages, in addition to the 50% rate of informal employment.” She also added “a reduction in the workday,” an update to “parental leave,” and regulation of platform work.

Finally, Capitanich, who also served as Chief of Staff under Cristina Kirchner, stated: “By 2027, we won’t be a viable alternative if we don’t develop a comprehensive government plan, build teams to support that plan, and convince those who are still undecided. And we need a method for resolving disagreements. How do we do that? With a large primary election. We can’t afford to be at odds with the central regions of the country. Without Córdoba, Mendoza, Santa Fe, the City of Buenos Aires, and the interior of Buenos Aires Province—the backbone of Argentina’s productive sector—we can’t create a federal, inclusive, equitable, and socially just Argentina.”

“A productive, federal Argentina with social justice should be the three defining characteristics of a national, popular, and democratic project for our movement. This means we need a government plan, immediately and quickly. We can’t just react to the government’s initiatives; we need the capacity to establish a framework for discussion. In other words, we need to build meaning and foster cohesion among our members,” he concluded.

Just as 2023 shaped a political landscape of weariness, anger, and dissatisfaction, electoral fragmentation and abstention reveal wounds in political representation. Furthermore, the vote counts necessitate taking into account that, in Argentina, more than half the population does not earn a living wage and lacks clear prospects for a better future.