“No oracle needed to see Türkiye–US relations aren’t going to improve”

On 24 September 2025, Türkiye and the US concluded a contract for the supply of LNG for a period of 20 years, with a volume of approximately 70 billion cubic meters.

The next day, on September 25, a meeting between Erdoğan and Trump took place at the White House. Trump urged Türkiye to abandon purchases of Russian oil, pointing out that this could contribute both to success in negotiations on Türkiye’s return to the F-35 program and lifting CAATSA sanctions imposed in effect since 2019 following Türkiye’s purchase of Russian S-400 systems.

Circles and media close to the Turkish government portrayed the talks and agreements in a very positive, almost cheerful light. But the picture doesn’t seem that one-sided.

On September 26, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan speaking in New York, said licenses for the US-made F110 turbofan engines needed for KAAN are stalled in the US Congress, and “Kaan’s engines are being held up in the US Congress, with their export licenses frozen. Those licenses must be activated and the engines delivered so that Kaan’s production can move forward.”

However, on 29 September 2025, the US Congress blocked the supply of these engines to Türkiye. Fidan described the move as “a deliberate obstacle to Türkiye’s plans for achieving national defense autonomy.”

We asked İsmet Özçelik about the main dynamics of Türkiye-US relations.

Pro-American elements within the AKP government

What is the attitude in Turkish government circles towards the idea of abandoning purchases of Russian oil?

Türkiye has particular problems with hot money. The Turkish government is trying to make progress on this issue by improving relations with the US. Pro-American elements within the AKP government argue that Erdoğan and Trump have “good relations” and that leveraging this could alleviate problems in the Turkish economy, and by doing so they could secure another favorable outcome in the upcoming elections.

The US, however, is well aware of Türkiye​​’s situation and the cards it holds, and is trying to turn Türkiye’s predicament into an opportunity. The US is pressuring Türkiye to sever its ties with Russia.

Importing gas from across the ocean instead of neighbors

Türkiye imports approximately 41 percent of its natural gas and 66 percent of its oil and petroleum products from Russia. In such a situation, it is unthinkable for Türkiye to sever its relations with Russia and stop buying gas from it. Such a move would be shooting itself in the foot.

Trump is, how shall we say, an expert at turning such situations into money. The Turkish government made a mistake and signed a 20-year LNG agreement for 4 billion cubic meters per year. Some in Türkiye say that this gas is cheap and that it is a profitable deal. Everyone who knows this market knows that it is not cheap at all, but rather the most expensive gas Türkiye imports. Türkiye is surrounded by gas reserves. Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Algeria, Russia, etc., there is gas everywhere. The gas Türkiye gets from these neighbors is expensive, but the gas it gets from across the ocean is cheap! Funny.

The government will sit down with Russia in December to negotiate a new gas deal. If Ankara does this LNG move to get more leverage at the negotiation, that’s laughable because everyone in the market already knows the real prices and conditions.

So no, I don’t see Türkiye cutting off its gas or oil imports from Russia anytime. I don’t think US pressure will work either. Some European countries made that mistake after the war in Ukraine, and we’ve all seen the price they paid for it.

“Turkish and American interests are diametrically opposed”

On 30 September 2025, the American news portal Foreign Policy published an article stating that relations between Türkiye and the US are not improving, but are becoming less significant.

It writes, moreover, disagreements on issues related to Syria, energy, and other matters persist. To what extent does the Foreign Policy article reflect the reality of US-Türkiye relations?

Türkiye’s interests and those of the US contradict everywhere in our region, in Syria, Iraq, Cyprus, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean. It’s something that goes beyond the will or choices of individual governments.

Take the most recent example, the attack on Aleppo. Türkiye, by coordinating with the Damascus administration, supports Syria’s territorial integrity. The US and Israel, on the other hand, favor a divided Syria.

The recent attack on Aleppo

On Monday, October 6, US Ambassador to Türkiye and Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack and CENTCOM Commander Admiral Cooper met with the leader of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Mazloum Abdi in Hasakah during the day. Barrack shared the meeting on his social media account. That very night, SDF launched an attack on Syrian army positions in Aleppo. Reports said there were casualties and injuries in the Syrian army. Could that assault have taken place without the US knowing it beforehand? Who would believe that? The SDF is entirely under US control. And following the attack, Mazloum Abdi was flown to Damascus by helicopter under American protection.

So, what message was being sent through these events? First, to the al-Sharaa government: “The SDF is under our protection. You’ll have to deal with them on our terms.” The second message was to Türkiye: “You’ll have to accept the SDF’s demands, too.” Can Türkiye ever accept that? Absolutely not. It’s a red line, something Ankara has reiterated time and again at the official level. In other words, Turkish and American interests are diametrically opposed.

Can the talks between Ankara and Washington bridge this divide? Notice that Erdoğan barely said a word after the meeting with Trump. If anything positive had come out of it, we would’ve seen it trumpeted in the media. And when Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan later spoke in New York, his remarks made it clear that things aren’t going well.

“Meeting Washington’s demands is impossible for Türkiye”

At this point, it’s less about the government’s particular stance and more about Türkiye’s fundamental interests and necessities. Governments can take certain steps, for example in order to attract hot money as I mentioned, but those are short-term moves. They don’t change the underlying realities.

To lift the CAATSA sanctions, the US has put certain conditions on the table, including halting the purchase of Russian oil and gas. But Türkiye simply cannot do that. I told you the numbers, they speak for themselves. If Türkiye stopped buying Russian energy, its industry would grind to a halt. If it tried to replace that supply with more expensive alternatives, production costs and inflation would skyrocket. So, meeting Washington’s demands is simply not possible for Türkiye.

Then there’s the F-35 issue. Those jets have lost much of their appeal. They’ve been plagued by malfunctions and crashes. Many retired Turkish Air Force generals now say that being out of the F-35 program might actually have been a blessing in disguise.

In short, you don’t need to be an oracle to see that Türkiye–US relations aren’t going to improve anytime soon.