Recent events around Libya may cause wider effects, including regarding Israel.
Recent events around Libya may cause wider effects, including regarding Israel.
By Mohamed Sabreen, from Cairo / Egypt
There has been much change in Egyptian-Turkish relations. It is no secret to any observer that Arab countries are uncomfortable with talk of “neo-Ottomanism,” and American and Israeli circles do not hesitate to incite against Türkiye, claiming that it seeks to revive the Ottoman Empire. There is no doubt that everyone is monitoring Türkiye’s rise, its future role in the region, and the various visions of what this role might look like. Most importantly, there is agreement that Egyptian-Turkish cooperation is reshaping “new balances” in the Eastern Mediterranean. I believe that the Turkish government must be wary of the double trap set by the hidden American government. On the one hand, it makes it clear that it determines Türkiye’s foreign policy priorities, while on the other hand, it works to arouse Arab and neighboring countries’ fears of “neo-Ottomanism,” accusing it of being aggressive, expansionist, and threatening their interests.
Türkiye must be cautious and work toward closer ties with Arab capitals, because the Israeli threat and partition plans also threaten Ankara. There is no easier way than to embroil it in conflicts, exhaust it economically, and surround it with a wall of hostility. It is striking that the wave of incitement against Türkiye intensifies the closer it gets to Cairo and Riyadh in particular.
Egyptian and Turkish intelligence chiefs coordinate on Gaza, Libya, and Sudan
The heads of Egyptian and Turkish intelligence discussed regional and international developments, particularly regarding Sudan and Libya. Libya’s political scene has witnessed significant developments recently following the presentation of a roadmap for holding presidential and parliamentary elections, ending the division, and unifying power. This plan was supported by Egypt and Türkiye. In recent days, the heads of Egyptian and Turkish intelligence met with Libyan officials. Ankara and Cairo are coordinating on Gaza.
Egypt and Qatar, mediators in the Gaza ceasefire and prisoner exchange negotiations, presented a ceasefire proposal, supported by Türkiye, about two weeks ago. While Hamas expressed its approval, Israel has not yet responded to the proposal.
The proposal is based on a plan by US President Donald Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff.
An agreement heightens Israeli concerns
Egypt and Türkiye recently signed a new agreement to locally produce the “Torkha” (VTOL-UAV) in Egypt. This unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) was developed by the Turkish company Havelsan. The new agreement was signed between the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), an economic entity affiliated with the Egyptian Ministry of Military Production and the backbone of Egypt’s defense and civilian industries, and the Turkish company Havelsan, which produces the drone. This step aims to localize drone technology at the Qader Advanced Industries Factory.
The signing of the new agreement comes within the framework of the AOI’s plan to strengthen partnerships with major international companies, in accordance with a clear vision adopted by the organization to attract investment, meet local market needs, and open new export outlets, in line with Egypt’s Vision 2030 for Sustainable Development.
The AOI confirmed that the agreement falls within its strategy to deepen local manufacturing and attract foreign investment, in line with Egypt’s Vision 2030 for Sustainable Development. The head of the Arab Organization for Industrialization, Major General Mokhtar Abdel Latif, explained that the cooperation with Havelsan is a crucial step towards transferring the latest defense technologies, with a focus on meeting local market needs and opening export markets in Africa and the Arab region.
For its part, Havelsan expressed its appreciation for the partnership with the Egyptian organization, praised the capabilities of the Kader factory, and expressed its aspiration to expand cooperation into other industrial fields.
For his part, the Turkish Ambassador to Cairo, Salih Mutlu Şen, expressed his happiness at the signing of this agreement between the Turkish company and Egypt, announcing the start of drone production for the Havelsan factory in Egypt. He described the agreement as a “blessing” for strengthening industrial and defense cooperation between the two countries.
The “Torkha” drone is a vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) developed by the Turkish company Havelsan. It is an advanced reconnaissance and surveillance system, distinguished by its ability to operate in complex environments, with integrated artificial intelligence systems for real-time data analysis, making it ideal for military and security tasks such as border surveillance and intelligence gathering. Havelsan is one of Türkiye’s leading defense and information technology companies, specializing in the development of command and control systems, drones, and unmanned vehicles, including the Baha drone and the Burakan ground vehicle. Relations between Egypt and Türkiye have improved significantly since 2023. In February 2024, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Cairo, where he signed several economic and military cooperation agreements with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. The Toraja production agreement is an extension of this rapprochement, in addition to a previous agreement in March to produce unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) between Havelsan and the Kadir factory.
Türkiye’s Openness to Haftar
Turkish policy is moving from “crisis management” to “stability engineering.” A Turkish think tank has spoken of Ankara’s transition to a new phase of openness to various Libyan parties, highlighting the dimensions of its influence and its interest in resolving the Tripoli crises in coordination with European partners such as Italy.
The ORSAM Center for Middle East Studies stated that Türkiye has emerged as a major player in Libya since signing the 2019 “Security and Maritime Border Demarcation” agreement with the Tripoli government, which strengthened its military and political presence in the Libyan arena.
However, the most notable development was the visit of Turkish Intelligence Chief Ibrahim Kalin to Libya in late August 2025 and his meeting in Benghazi (behind closed doors) with retired Major General Khalifa Haftar, according to writer Kaan Devecioglu.
Kalin held closed-door meetings with Haftar and a number of Libyan National Army leaders, addressing regional security issues and bilateral cooperation. Kalin also met with Sadam, Khalifa Haftar’s son, who was recently promoted to deputy commander of the army. They discussed intelligence and security cooperation.
The visit comes at a time when the Libyan parliament in Tobruk is preparing to consider ratifying the maritime border demarcation agreement signed between Ankara and Tripoli in 2019.
The Political Division in Libya
The Turkish writer added that elections represent the primary way out of the Libyan crisis, but the biggest obstacle remains the division between Tripoli and Tobruk (west and east).
Therefore, Türkiye holds a unique position in this process; it enjoys close relations with the Government of National Unity in the west, while at the same time having opened channels of communication with the eastern camp, which qualifies it to play a facilitating role.
However, Ankara’s success in this role depends on its coordination with international actors such as the United Nations, the United States, Italy, and Egypt, as the Libyan crisis is no longer a local one but has also become an arena for international conflict. He added that Türkiye today is no longer merely a supporter of the Tripoli government, but rather is attempting to position itself as a mediator capable of communicating with all parties. It combines a tangible military and economic presence with diplomatic flexibility that allows it to influence the drafting of electoral laws and push for institutional reforms. From this perspective, Ankara emerges as a complementary element to the international community in ensuring the success of the UN roadmap and a key player in facilitating dialogue between East and West.
In recent years, Libya has become a key focus of the escalating debate over maritime jurisdiction and energy areas in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece is seeking to grant the small islands of Crete and Gavdos a wide expanse of their exclusive economic zone, a move that constitutes an infringement on the natural rights of Libya’s coasts.
However, established rules of international maritime law affirm that “small islands do not confer significant influence over larger land masses,” which strengthens Libya’s arguments against the Greek proposal. In this context, Tripoli’s signing of a maritime border demarcation agreement with Türkiye in 2019, followed by Tobruk’s entry into the ratification process, expanded Ankara’s strategic maneuvering margin in the Eastern Mediterranean while simultaneously affirming the protection of Libya’s sovereign rights.
From here, Türkiye has become a legitimate regional partner that cannot be excluded from energy and geopolitical equations, while Libya has emerged as a country of strategic weight in light of its vast resources.
The author noted that Libya is one of the largest African countries in oil reserves. The National Oil Corporation increased its production to 1.38 million barrels per day by the summer of 2025, with an ambitious goal of reaching 2 million barrels per day by 2028.
This was achieved through extensive modernization programs in partnership with international companies, confirming Libya’s return to its vital position in global energy markets.
The Turkish author pointed out that Türkiye has emerged in Libya on two complementary levels: first, “oil and energy”; It has positioned itself at the heart of the energy equation in the Eastern Mediterranean through the investments of the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) and thanks to the 2019 maritime agreement. Second, “reconstruction and development,” as Turkish companies have played a pivotal role in infrastructure, transportation, and digitalization projects, contributing to the diversification of the Libyan economy and strengthening its reconstruction efforts. This dual presence has positioned Türkiye as a “comprehensive strategic partner,” whose role is not limited to military security but also extends to economic development and technological transformation.
Future Scenarios
Based on these facts, two main scenarios can be discussed for Türkiye’s future in the Eastern Mediterranean. The first scenario is the establishment of a tripartite institutional mechanism between Türkiye, Italy, and Libya to cooperate on energy security, maritime jurisdiction, and reconstruction projects.
The author believes that such a structure would strengthen Turkish-Libyan ties and combine the historical presence of the Italian company Eni in the energy sector with the expansion of investments by Turkish petroleum companies on a complementary basis.
The second scenario is the reflection of the normalization process between Türkiye and Egypt on the Eastern Mediterranean. Although the 2020 agreement between Egypt and Greece regarding the exclusive economic zone was limited, the improvement in relations between Ankara and Cairo could open the door to more pragmatic partnerships.
While the Türkiye-Italy-Libya axis appears more feasible in the short term, deepening cooperation between Ankara and Cairo in the medium and long term holds the potential to reshape the regional balance in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, both scenarios expand Türkiye’s diplomatic room for maneuver, placing Libya at the center not only of its internal crises but also of ambitious regional cooperation projects. According to the author, Ibrahim Kalin’s meeting with Khalifa Haftar represents a significant turning point in Turkish policy toward Libya, opening the door to a new phase based on engagement with various Libyan actors, moving beyond supporting the Tripoli government alone.
A Multi-Dimensional Turkish Strategy
Hence, it can be said that this step outlines a multi-dimensional Turkish strategy that goes beyond crisis management to formulating regional stability equations.
Since 2023, Ankara has begun adopting a more flexible discourse toward eastern Libya. However, Kalın’s visit to Benghazi marked a turning point; it was no longer a mere tactical maneuver but rather an institutional and sustainable approach.
Thus, Türkiye has transitioned from a player biased toward one party to an actor capable of communicating with all parties, strengthening its position as a key mediator in the Libyan conflict.
The Turkish writer commented: Haftar’s softening of his rhetoric toward Türkiye can be explained by three main factors:
First, the “military horizon is closed”, as he realized that resolving the conflict through force was no longer possible, and that a political solution was the only viable option.
Second, “Türkiye’s positioning as a permanent player.”
It has not only established a military presence, but has also established a solid position through economic projects, energy agreements, and diplomatic channels, making it a difficult player in the Libyan equation.
Third, “The pragmatism of reconstruction.”
The urgent need for stability in the country and the launch of development projects has prompted eastern Libya to seek realistic partnerships, making dialogue with Ankara a political necessity.
These shifts have enabled Türkiye to play a dual role; it maintains its close relations with the Tripoli government while simultaneously gaining the legitimacy to engage directly with Haftar’s camp. This duality gives it a rare advantage: the ability to build bridges between eastern and western Libya and present itself as an acceptable mediator regionally and internationally.
The author points out that this dynamic is also reflected in the positions of external powers. Turkish-Italian cooperation opens a wide scope for reconstruction and energy projects in Libya, and the UN-sponsored process provides an international framework that could pave the way for elections. Thus, Türkiye finds itself in a position that allows it to influence the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean, not only through its military might, but also through diplomatic and development tools.
Therefore, Ibrahim Kalin’s meeting with Haftar was not merely a passing event, but rather an indication of the transition of Turkish policy from a phase of “crisis management” to one of “stability engineering.”
He emphasized that Türkiye today is not content with a supportive role for Tripoli, but rather seeks to be an active partner in rebuilding Libya and linking it to broader regional projects. Thus, the Turkish role in Libya becomes an influential factor in shaping the country’s future and in shaping the political geography of the entire Mediterranean.
“Neo-Ottomanism” and the Incitement of Washington and Israel
Israeli circles do not hesitate to incite against Türkiye, claiming that it seeks to revive the Ottoman Empire. This is in light of Türkiye’s rise, its future role in the region, and the success of the Erdogan government in strengthening cooperation with Egypt and other Arab countries. This matter is being closely monitored by several parties, most notably Europe and the United States, as well as its political and security experts. Among these is George Friedman, founder of Stratfor, known as the “shadow CIA,” who published an article examining the impact of global and regional developments on Turkish foreign policy.
Friedman conducted an in-depth analysis of the current situation and presented a roadmap for Ankara’s foreign policy. Unsurprisingly, this roadmap aligns with the interests of the United States, Israel, and NATO. Friedman urges Türkiye to pursue effective policies against Iran and Russia in the Black Sea, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Mediterranean. He places this proposal within the framework of Türkiye’s efforts to become a regional and global power.
Friedman’s article is worth considering alongside the recent repeated references to the “Ottoman Empire” by the US ambassador to Ankara, Tom Barrack, as part of the United States’ effort to impose a new foreign policy doctrine on Türkiye.
Friedman’s article is important because it outlines the main lines of this doctrine. George Friedman and Kamran Bokhari’s article, “Türkiye’s Time to Rise,” is published on geopoliticalfutures.com.
Friedman had previously predicted in his article “The Next 100 Years,” published nearly 15 years ago, the emergence of three great powers over the next few decades: Japan, Poland, and Türkiye.
Japan’s stable and growing economy and its focus on military development demonstrate a steady, if quiet, growth in its power. Poland is now Europe’s fifth-largest economy and a continental leader in military development. However, both countries are constrained by other great powers. Japan must confront China, and Poland must confront Russia, which is on Ukraine’s back foot.
Friedman and Kamran Bokhari believe that Türkiye’s time has come to shine. It possesses a massive military and economy, which, despite their modest growth, demonstrate potential unmatched by few countries in the region. More importantly, it possesses tremendous geopolitical opportunities.
On the other hand, Friedman advocates exploiting the difficult situations of its neighbors. He argues that with Russia bogged down in Ukraine, the United States seeking to diminish its global influence, Iran suffering losses across the region, compounded by its internal leadership transition, and Israel reeling from internal and external crises, Türkiye can exploit these opportunities in any direction that serves its core interests.
In some cases, it has already succeeded. Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Türkiye played a crucial role in helping Azerbaijan defeat Armenia in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, which resulted in a historic shift in the balance of power on Türkiye’s eastern flank. Baku’s seizure of the region has allowed Armenia and Azerbaijan to distance themselves from Russia and ally with Türkiye. Equally important, the peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, expected to be signed soon, will facilitate Ankara’s development of the Zangezur Corridor, an economic artery running through the South Caucasus. It will also allow Türkiye to connect with the Caspian Sea region and border regions in Central Asia.
The authors outline the strategic direction of the Caucasus, the Black Sea, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean, emphasizing that, in the context of regional developments, Türkiye has been the biggest winner in the Israeli-Iranian conflict. The marginalization of Hezbollah’s leadership and its warning and offensive capabilities led to the collapse of the Assad regime. Israel’s subsequent attacks on Iran have severely weakened the Islamic Republic. Türkiye was quick to exploit the opportunity to bring Syria into its sphere of influence, supporting one of its proxy groups to seize control of the capital, Damascus.
Improving Relations with Arab Countries
At the same time, Ankara has improved its relations with key Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It formally approved Egypt’s participation in the KAAN TFX stealth fighter program, marking a pivotal step in bilateral defense cooperation, and has begun to strengthen its influence in Libya to project power westward in the Mediterranean.
Creating Antagonism Between Türkiye and Russia
Friedman believes that European powers are struggling to formulate a new security architecture, given the United States’ withdrawal from transatlantic security guarantees. Here, too, he urges Türkiye to seize the opportunity. First, it is seeking to build a closer relationship with Poland, as evidenced by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s visit to Ankara in March, to coordinate joint efforts to stabilize Ukraine and explore Türkiye’s options within post-war security frameworks. Second, with the increasing changes within the European Union and NATO, Ankara is accelerating its efforts to expand its influence in the Balkans. Recently, the Balkan Peace Platform hosted a meeting in Istanbul with the foreign ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Kosovo, as well as a deputy minister from Albania.
Friedman proposes a strategy of provoking Türkiye against Russia, and argues that much of this can be achieved thanks to Russia. Russia’s decline, especially after its invasion of Ukraine, has repercussions on its southern flank, and Türkiye is uniquely positioned to reap the benefits. In the coming years, Moscow’s ability to project power in the Black Sea basin will diminish. Ankara has already strengthened its naval role in the Black Sea—both unilaterally and in coordination with NATO. Türkiye has also established itself as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine. Similarly, it is in the process of strengthening trade, connectivity, and security ties with Georgia, Romania, and Bulgaria.
In geopolitics, the emergence of a great power depends not only on the possession of power and ambition, but also on the opportunity to pursue both. Türkiye appears to fit this profile. It occupies a strategic geopolitical position straddling Europe, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean. This situation has pressured Türkiye for more than a century. However, given its current military and economic capabilities, this situation promises to free it from these constraints. Given Türkiye’s internal problems, it remains to be seen how far it can take advantage of this situation.
We do not seek to revive the empire
Libya is of paramount importance to Türkiye’s “Blue Homeland” strategy and the Eastern Mediterranean. For some time now, the country has been witnessing fundamental changes and shifts in the balance of power. Parties are shifting, alliances are being rearranged, and the balance of power is constantly being altered. Recently, Ankara began reconnecting with Khalifa Haftar, with the head of Turkish intelligence meeting face-to-face. Uluç Özülker, a former ambassador to Tripoli, believes that the priority now is peace, and Türkiye has a serious role to play.
He denied the common accusation that Türkiye is seeking to “revive the Ottoman Empire,” saying, “This is not true, but we are present and influential, drawing on our historical legacy.” The clearest example of this is Somalia. It is under Türkiye’s full supervision in governance, education, military training, and security. There is no other foreign power in the country, and gradually, our presence is expanding to Somalia, Libya, and Sudan. What we are talking about is an interconnected whole. We are the heirs of the Ottoman Empire, and I cannot deny this legacy. We exist in the world as successors to a great empire.
At the same time, he said he does not trust America and pointed out that Condoleezza Rice presented a map showing seven countries as candidates for intervention within the framework of the Greater Middle East Project, and Libya was among them. Türkiye should also be included on that list, although this has not been officially announced. He said that Türkiye has imposed its presence in the region, but through its policies, and has acted as a force of stability and reassurance amid the turmoil in Libya.
On the other hand, he explained what Türkiye should do to normalize the situation in Libya and with whom it is prepared to work. He said, “First, internal peace must be ensured. Historically, Benghazi and Tripoli have not fully trusted each other. But now Haftar has taken a positive step.” Preventing the permanent division of Libya would be a major achievement. Türkiye already has a strong presence in Tripoli and appears to be holding quiet talks with Haftar. The UAE and Egypt have also softened their hostile stances. These are promising developments.
Türkiye is more dangerous than Iran
For his part, Amr Moussa, the former Secretary-General of the Arab League and former Egyptian Foreign Minister, believes that the danger of the Turkish role in the Arab region is far greater than that of Iran, which warrants closer monitoring. In a television interview with MBC, Moussa said that Türkiye has specific plans and strategies, compared to Iran’s reliance on religious doctrine and the Sunni-Shiite divide, which he described as “irrational.”
Moussa emphasized that the use of “Shiite-Sunni antagonism is highly abhorrent and unacceptable and makes politics questionable.” On the other hand, Türkiye “wants strategic control,” pointing to the presence of Turkish military bases in the Gulf and others in the Red Sea, in addition to its presence in the Mediterranean and Black Seas.
Dangerous strategic positions
Moussa continued, “These are very dangerous strategic positions and movements. This movement is not limited to the Arab world, but also to Turkish-speaking countries. Ankara also desires to join the European Union and deal with Washington and Moscow at the same time. These are significant matters, and it is a more important policy that must be pursued with greater attention than the policy of Sunnis, Shiites, and turban-wearing.”
Moussa referred to his initiative, which he proposed to Arab leaders while leading the League, to link the League with countries neighboring the Arab world. He emphasized that the initiative was not a proposal for an “alliance with Türkiye and Iran,” as Arab media outlets portrayed it, but rather aimed to “establish an Arab Neighborhood League” to include African, Mediterranean, and Asian countries, including Türkiye, Iran, and Israel.
He stated that he faced an obstacle to the inclusion of Iran and Israel due to their problems with the Arab world. Ultimately, a number of Arab leaders rejected this initiative, which, he said, would have transformed the Arab League from 22 countries to 44, with the inclusion of neighboring Arab countries.
Türkiye and the Desired Role
For his part, Lebanese writer and researcher Wissam Ismail, in an article titled “Türkiye and the Reality of the Desired Role in the Region,” recently published on the Al-Mayadeen website, argues that “Turkish influence in the region in the future will only be the result of liberation from the complex of liberation from the unbalanced relationship with Washington, and also the result of liberation from the complex of not declaring absolute hostility to the Israeli entity.” He argues that the Turkish project is facing a serious test today, and that it is no longer possible to approach the Turkish role in the region according to the principles that governed international relations and the balance of power in the Middle East until the implementation of Operation Protective Edge.
Given that the consequences of Operation Protective Edge have altered the regional balance of power, leading to the fall of the regime of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Israel’s vision of its national security has changed. It now believes that the opportunity has become ripe to expand its sphere of security and political influence, allowing, in his view, the establishment of a “Greater Israel” project, not only according to the security concept but also according to the geographical concept.
Israeli Rejection
Accordingly, the Turkish vision of expanding its sphere of influence in the region, which is based on the possibility of acting as a proxy for the United States and NATO, meaning the possibility of achieving specific outcomes for Türkiye’s vital sphere—namely, Turkish hegemony over Syria and parts of Iraq, leading to a key role in Lebanon and the Gulf—has collided with explicit Israeli rejection, initially expressed by Israeli political decision-making circles through repeated statements rejecting Turkish expansionism toward its borders, particularly in Syria. This rejection has also been met with military action, which in recent days has reached the point of threatening Turkish military aircraft over Syria and carrying out intensive bombing operations against Turkish-backed Syrian factions. This is not to mention the implications of the bombing of the entrance to the Syrian People’s Palace, which could be interpreted as a direct message of rejection of any uncalculated Turkish action near the Israeli border.
In contrast to this Israeli action, which can be described as aggressive toward the Turkish role in Syria, and the public and explicit support for the Kurds and Druze in Syria, it is necessary to discuss the Turkish project and the extent to which President Erdoğan is able to achieve the ambitions and narratives he has preached. Today, the Turkish project faces a serious test of its seriousness and potential success in transforming Türkiye into a state of central influence in the region and the world. Failure at this stage will transform the Turkish regime’s narrative into a mere media campaign whose sole function is to promote the regime internally in the face of an opposition that has become a source of concern for the ruling party and threatens its continued rule in any future elections.
The Relationship with Israel
Writer Wissam Abu Ismail addresses the future of the Turkish role, explaining that “if it is possible to approach the relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran or the Arab Gulf states according to the logic of ‘no enemies’ and intersection of interests, and not to characterize the dispute as a sign of hostility that could translate into a military confrontation, leading to their acceptance of Türkiye’s advanced role at a pivotal regional moment, then it is impossible to approach the details of the relationship with the Israeli entity according to the same mechanism.”
The Conflict with Israel
Thus, the question becomes necessary about the extent to which the Turkish state can realistically secure a position that Israel disapproves of without a real confrontation. It is well known that what thwarted Türkiye’s historical endeavor to play the role of the United States’ agent in the region was the Israeli entity. This stems from the deeply rooted conviction in Israeli historical consciousness, which can be summarized as follows: Greater Israel, as an idea, is incompatible with the concept of balance in relations with its neighbors. Rather, it assumes absolute hegemony from the ocean to the Gulf, reaching the borders of the Turkish state’s political geography, and the possibility of penetrating them whenever the opportunity arises.
Despite the lack of It is realistic to classify the relationship between Israel and Türkiye as hostile, given that the relationship has been formally established since 1949 and has witnessed reciprocal official visits, despite tensions at various points, the most recent of which was the visit of Israeli President Isaac Herzog to Türkiye in May 2022. It should also be noted that the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the aggression on Gaza did not lead to a final severance of relations between the two countries. Türkiye has linked the restoration of its relations with Israel to allowing aid into Gaza, which can be interpreted as not a final, principled decision, but rather a means of pressure used by Türkiye against Israel. This means that it represents a strategic choice through which Türkiye aims to formulate a new framework for its relationship with Israel.
Partnership is inevitable. The fate of Egypt and Türkiye, and indeed the vital interests and national security of both countries, are intertwined. While several dangers threaten Egypt, the Gulf states, and the Levant, from Iraq and Syria to Jordan and Lebanon, Türkiye is also threatened. And, of course, Greater Israel threatens everyone. Recently, Turkish deep state institutions sounded an “alarm bell” that Türkiye’s turn is coming after the aggression against Iran. I believe there are internal parties on both sides that do not want a rapprochement between Egypt and Türkiye, and these are stirring up fears of the distant past. However, the fears of the present should bring the two powers closer together. Furthermore, the strategic partnership and deep cooperation between Egypt and Türkiye, especially on the Libyan issue, could create tremendous opportunities, unlimited gains, and reshape “new balances” in the Eastern Mediterranean