Moldova: The next victim of the Western war machine

By Gökalp Erbaş

Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service recently announced that it had received intelligence about NATO’s intention to make Moldova a center of war against Russia. Transnistrian officials also believe that NATO plans for a direct attack on the Transnistrian Republic are being developed.

Anyone who has been following developments in the region over the past year, and who has observed Sandu’s shaky grip on power, knows that these plans are not surprising. But with the parliamentary elections scheduled for September 28, and polls showing that it will be impossible for the ruling party to secure an outright majority, the government could pave the way for the West to turn Moldova into a war zone in order to create an emergency to prevent the elections. This scenario, which could be the final step in the “Ukrainization” of Moldova, is now closer than ever for many.

At a time when the whole of Europe is embarking on a large-scale rearmament and the creation of a war equipment industry and market to make it possible, the possibility of a second front opening up for Russia increases. Knowing Moldova and understanding its current political situation, which has the potential to bring the forces of NATO and the Russian Federation into direct confrontation and open the door to a full-scale war, is becoming increasingly important in interpreting the war between Russia and the West.

Moldova is melting down

Moldova is literally a country in meltdown. It has one of the highest rates of population loss in the world. More than 400,000 Moldovan citizens have left the country in the last 10 years alone. The country has lost 40% of its total population since it gained independence with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Changing governments have not brought a solution to this problem. In fact, as integration with the West increases and travel becomes easier, migration to Western Europe is accelerating. Especially the loss of skilled and active population is not only a loss of quantitative labor force for Moldova, but also a loss of innovation and quality.

While part of the country finds the solution in insisting on the European path at all costs, thanks to the active work of the Sandu government’s richly funded civil society networks, this propaganda also increases migration to the west of Europe through the images it creates. In other words, Moldova is becoming quantitatively and qualitatively weaker.

As Russian commentators have noted, this puts Moldova in a position where the West does not want to burden its already heavy shoulders. It would therefore not be surprising if the only way for Moldova to gain Western support is to sacrifice itself at some point, to become the bait on the hook.

Economic consequences of Westernization

Sandu, who came to power in 2020, had two main problems on its agenda: the economic situation and government corruption. But the new government’s failure in this regard is reflected both in public opinion and in the data. The government has even gone so far as to say that the data from the State Statistical Institute is not in line with reality.

In the first six months of 2025, instead of growing, the economy shrank even more. In 2024, growth was only 0.1 percent. These rates are perhaps comparable to the chaos and misery of Moldova’s first years of independence. Prices are constantly rising, especially for services and food. Home ownership is becoming impossible for the young population.

But despite all this, the number of luxury and electric cars is on the rise. The widening income gap, a direct consequence of unjust enrichment, is not going unnoticed. According to a recent public opinion poll, 88% of respondents are concerned about the increase in utility tariffs, 86% are concerned about their health and that of their relatives, and 79% are concerned about the rising prices of foodstuffs.

Moldovans are also struggling with high energy bills, despite large subsidies, due to Ukraine’s blocking of power lines and the disconnection of power lines due to unpaid debts to the Russian distributor. It seems that Europe is making Moldova dependent on itself in terms of energy as well.

Agriculture in particular is in deep decline. Moldova’s most important agricultural product is wine. Winemaking alone accounts for 3 percent of the country’s GDP. It also employs 15 percent of the active population. However, the anti-Russian policy has also created a major disadvantage for Moldova’s winemaking. In the 2000s, around 80% of the wines produced were sold to Russia, while in 2023 this figure is not even 3%. Moldova has long been looking for alternative routes for its wines. The closure of state enterprises that benefit farmers on agriculture is another practice that infuriates farmers. The more Moldova follows the Western recipe in the economy, the more it undermines the structural and real areas of improvement and the more dependent it becomes on euros from dozens of funds with different names.

Political situation and Sandu fascism

Although the political situation in Moldova is generally portrayed as being divided between traditional pro-Russian sentiment and fierce pro-European sentiment, there are actually other factors at play. As Western sources have noted, there is no unity among parties and political figures who are openly anti-EU or Eurosceptic.

The newly formed Alternative Bloc, while positive about EU membership, takes a position that differs significantly from the social policies of the ruling PAS party. They embrace pragmatic solutions that prioritize Moldova, which Westerners liken to MAGA and seek to resolve the energy dispute with Russia. However, they lack the civil society power of the ruling party.

Another political bloc, “Together”, is another pro-European force, albeit with low voter potential. The Victory Bloc and the Socialist & Communist Bloc are the forces that best represent anti-European voters in the country. They advocate against turning Moldova into a European colony, for cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union, and for improving relations with Russia. However, the Victory Bloc has been barred from the elections by the Moldovan Central Election Commission’s latest decision. Although the legal path remains open, it is unclear whether the bloc will be able to participate in the elections.

Alongside many other independent parties with low voter support, Gutsul, the President of Gagauzia and a member of the closed Shor Party, who is currently acting independently, Irina Vlah, also of Gagauz origin, continuing under the Heart of Moldova banner, and Renato Usati, the leader of Our Party, are other influential Eurosceptic/anti-EU figures. As shown by three different polls conducted in April and May, it is impossible for the ruling party to secure a parliamentary majority on its own.

This situation also explains the government’s increasing pressure on the opposition. The Sandu government has, so far as one can say, established a fascism over the influential figures of the opposition, led by Evgeniya Gutsul. News channels, messaging groups and platforms that do not follow the government line are accused of being “Russian agents” and are shut down and banned through a “rapid judicial process.”

Under the guise of judicial reform, some of the legal officials handling the cases of opposition figures are being replaced with individuals who are said to be former members of the ruling party. Lawyers complain that the counter-evidence they present in court is not even considered and that the trials are completely biased. They also state that there is no clear evidence of illegal financial networks established with Russia for the purpose of interfering in the elections. Of course, unsurprisingly, all these suspicious circumstances are not even considered worthy of mention by EU and Western-funded civil society organizations.

The heart of the conflict: Transnistria

Under all these circumstances, according to statements by Transnistrian officials and Russian intelligence, Transnistria will be the centre of the conflict in the project to turn Moldova into a second centre of armed struggle against Russia.

There are more than 200,000 Russian citizens in this region. In addition, Russian peacekeeping forces are also present in the region, alongside local armed forces.

Most importantly, there are weapons depots containing thousands of tons of ammunition, described by some as among the largest in Europe. These depots are also considered to be targets.

One of the most difficult situations for Transnistria in the region is that it has been held hostage by Moldova and Ukraine in terms of energy. With Ukraine closing the pipeline from Russia to the region, the people of Transnistria are now at the mercy of these two countries for energy. When the next heating season arrives, if Moldova completely ends its dependence on electricity produced from natural gas in Transnistria, it may once again demand concessions in exchange for providing energy.

This issue, which has been frozen for a long time with the government taking no real action, has gradually heated up with the start of the Ukraine-Russia war and is now waiting to boil over with Europe’s rearmament and urgent need for a war market. Any “reunification” or other military intervention in Transnistria would set the stage for a conflict in which Russia would be directly involved. However, since the conflict zone is outside the territory of the Russian Federation, the Russian Army would be the “aggressor”. Moldova is a country that is incomparably weaker than Ukraine in terms of military power, industry, army, and reserves. Therefore, the West will have to use its own forces and resources directly in its project in Moldova.

Although the extent to which laws determine the actions of the government in Moldova today is debatable, there are laws that bind the government in the eyes of the public. The most important of these is the “principle of neutrality” enshrined in the Moldovan Constitution. In a scenario where Russia directly intervenes in Transnistria and comes into conflict with Western-backed forces, the government may seek to use this “Russian aggression” as a pretext to amend the constitution. Additionally, given that social discontent over the social and economic problems mentioned above has reached a level that can no longer be ignored, a war situation could also serve to overshadow all other concerns of the government and stifle criticism of it. Most importantly, the war machine that is beginning to be assembled in Europe will have a great opportunity to support the thesis that Russia’s goal is not just Ukraine but to invade all of Europe.

This would also create a reason for NATO to expand further in the view of those in the West. Moldova would thus enter NATO’s control mechanism. While writing about this issue, those in the West complain about the lack of NATO platforms in Moldova and note this as a significant disadvantage. Moldova also receives considerable funding to purchase American weapons through foreign military financing (FMF). The amount Moldova received through FMF in 2024 alone is close to the total amount it received between 2010 and 2020.

Moldova may become one of the new battlefields in the Russian-Western conflict in the near future, if not in a few months as predicted by intelligence. There are several conditions that must be met for this not to happen.

One of these is that the parliamentary majority in Moldova must be dominated by at least anti-war and pro-neutrality blocs. Secondly, opposition forces, which are generally influential in rural areas and in the east, must also become influential in the cities.

In Moldova, where NGOs are almost entirely pro-European, opposition forces need to increase their social visibility. The final hearing in the case against Gagauzia President Gutsul has been postponed to 5 August, and if the requested 9-year prison sentence is confirmed, opposition street protests are not out of the question. In particular, if the issue of preventing the Victory bloc from participating in the elections cannot be resolved through the courts, this could lead to practical consequences in the streets also, as it would mean the deprivation of the rights of a voter group with a significant potential vote. However, if the opposition is suppressed and intimidated through police methods, and PAS and its allies secure high vote shares in the elections, an inevitable outcome will be approaching. In this scenario, Russia will eventually be provoked from this front, and we will witness the outcomes of Russia’s actions together.