Regional evaluations and strategies around Damascus.
Regional evaluations and strategies around Damascus.
By Mohammad Sabreen, from Cairo / Egypt
Exciting reports have revealed, in recent days, a new Middle Eastern deal based on Syria relinquishing the Golan Heights to Israel, in exchange for compensation from the Lebanese city of Tripoli. This comes amid persistent reports of the partition of Syria and other Arab countries. Some argue that the restructuring of Syria under Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa will mark the beginning of a process of redrawing the map of the Middle East, raising concerns among Arab countries, Iran, and even Türkiye and Pakistan.
On the other hand, some believe that Sharaa is embarking on a new experiment and maneuvering to consolidate his fragile rule in Syria. However, realpolitik always dictates that the world is governed by the balance of power, not interests, and that Sharaa is being used in a grand American game to reengineer the region to impose American hegemony. It is likely that the region is witnessing the beginning of another adventure in which Washington and Netanyahu believe the time is right to attempt to impose an Israeli peace—a flawed peace, one based not on the principle of land for peace, but rather a false peace based on the swallowing up of more Arab land.
Bin Jassim Sounds the Alarm
The most recent warnings came when former Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani commented on recent developments in the region, warning of serious repercussions that could affect Syria and the Gulf states in the absence of a unified vision.
Sheikh Hamad said in a post on his X page: “As I mentioned in a previous tweet, it is clear that there will be repercussions from everything that has happened in the region recently. These repercussions will take several directions, including plans to divide some countries, such as our sister country Syria, or to impose conditions that will make this region pay a heavy price for many years to come.”
He added, “As I have previously stated, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries will be the first to be affected by these repercussions, and therefore it is imperative that they agree on a single, clear vision regarding these developments.”
Sheikh Hamad continued, “Although I have always believed in the necessity of Gulf unity, I believe that this union cannot continue under the current circumstances unless the rule of law, rather than force, prevails in settling any dispute between member states or in interpreting any article of its founding charter.”
He emphasized that “when the rule of law prevails, there will be a true political union that guarantees the independence of Gulf decision-making and protects member states from any interference in their internal affairs.”
Sheikh Hamad affirmed that he is “fully convinced that the Gulf states possess the strength to achieve this goal, if there is a strong will and pure hearts.” He added, “If this is achieved, it will be the beginning of a strong and effective union. I may not see it, but our children and grandchildren will see it in the future. To achieve this, we must work with all our energies to preserve this region and hand it over to future generations in the best possible condition.” He concluded by saying, “As we all know, there is strength in unity, but this union requires a sound foundation, which unfortunately does not exist at the present time. I am not accusing any party; rather, I believe that the blame lies with everyone.”
Fire Threatens Qatar, the Gulf, and Türkiye
Commenting on Bin Jassim’s post, Egyptian political analyst Hind Al-Dawi, who specializes in Middle Eastern affairs, said on Facebook that Hamad bin Jassim and Erdogan “had a hand in destroying the Middle East,” noting that they “feel threatened when fire penetrated their country,” as she put it.
Egyptian Elite Warns
Meanwhile, Egyptian parliamentarian Mustafa Bakri warned of plans to divide Syria, which “will only benefit Israel,” amid sectarian clashes and conflicts. Commenting on calls to protect the Druze in Syria, Bakri said in a post on his X account: “What is happening in Syria and the call for foreign intervention to protect the Druze will inevitably lead to partition. If that happens, know that the conspiracy will spread to other regions.”
He added: “There are those who are deliberately implementing a plan that will only benefit Israel and other hostile parties, turning the Syrian homeland into sectarian and ethnic mini-states,” calling for “an end to this criminal plan.”
Between Dreams and Deals
The region is currently witnessing intense debate about the dimensions of the new Middle Eastern “deal,” which is based on Syria relinquishing the Golan Heights to Israel in exchange for compensation in the Lebanese city of Tripoli. In an article in Asharq Al-Awsat titled “The Arab Levant… Reeling Between Dreams and Deals,” writer Iyad Abu Shakra wrote that the “public” reactions from Lebanese parties were condemnatory and angry.
But those who know intentions and understand the meaning of Benjamin Netanyahu’s “hegemony” over Washington’s vision and approaches to the Middle East will take this development with the seriousness it deserves.
The release of the “concoction” news coincided not only with Israel tightening its control over Iran’s airspace and expanding its targeting of Iranian territory, but also with an acceleration in the convergence of “quiet” visions and understandings between Washington, Tel Aviv, and Ankara. This is happening in light of the region’s crises, starting with the Kurdish issue and extending to the remainder of the Palestinian issue.
A Shift in Priorities
Here, some believe that the Washington-Tel Aviv axis’s handling of the “sectarian situation” across the Arab Levant has undergone a shift in priorities. This shift—at least temporarily—came about after the White House transitioned from Barack Obama and Joe Biden to Donald Trump. The irony, however, lies in the fact that the American Republican and Israeli Likud parties were the ones who had originally bet on “political Shiism” in the region prior to the invasion of Iraq.
At that time, the American “neoconservative movement”—closely linked to the Israeli right—was steering the ship during the presidency of George W. Bush through White House advisors and civilian personnel at the Department of Defense.
At the time, America was also trying to overcome the nightmares of the September 11, 2001, attacks. This was the event that the “neoconservatives” exploited to push for the occupation of Iraq and, later, its handover to Iran. Then, the interim “American governor”, Paul Bremer, boasted that his government had “ended a thousand years of Sunni rule” there!
Much Water Has Flowed in the River
Between 2003 and today, as the saying goes, “much water has flowed in the river.” First, despite the Democrats’ sympathy for the “Arab Spring” in several Arab countries, they—along with the Israeli leadership—abstained from supporting the “Syrian uprising” to overthrow Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Subsequently, they remained virtually silent regarding Iran’s military intervention in Syria to save the regime.
Second, the Democratic leadership relied on the “nuclear agreement” it concluded with Iran after the Muscat negotiations. Through this agreement, and through the positions of the Obama administration and then the Biden administration, Tehran felt it could act in the region as it pleased.
On the other hand, Netanyahu and the Likud Party had persistent and delicate sensitivities regarding the acceptable limits of Iran’s influence in the Arab arena. It is clear that Israel was the greatest beneficiary of Iran’s role in the region.
Israel was also very comfortable with Iran’s transformation into a “scarecrow” for the Arab states, pushing them toward “normalization” with it in the hope of protection. Moreover, Israel has never paid attention to the “boisterous” rhetoric of the “resistance” regimes and their parties, as long as the borders were secure and the possibility of “expansion” existed.
However, in one way or another, the “September 11, 2001” scenario was replayed through Operation “Noah’s Flood” on October 7, 2023, in the Gaza Strip envelope.
This event undoubtedly marked an important turning point in dealing with the “scenario” of regional alliances and prompted the adoption of alternative priorities. Without forgetting the tragedies of Gaza, the most dangerous part of the Israeli political reaction was Netanyahu’s explicit talk about “changing the Middle East.”
In the person of Donald Trump, Netanyahu found his desired goal and his “ideal partner” to draw that map, on the rubble of entities that mean nothing to either of them, and at the expense of peoples who have never been a factor in their political calculations. Indeed, the Palestinian future has never looked as miserable and bleak since 1948 as it does today. As for Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, whose borders were drawn by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, a practical complement to the Balfour Declaration, they may now have to anticipate developments in which Türkiye may become the second most influential regional player, after Israel.
Abu Shakra says that Lebanon’s non-Sunni sectarian extremists would not, in his estimation, oppose relinquishing more than half of its Sunni population by abandoning Tripoli, as well as Akkar and Denniyeh, if Washington and Tel Aviv guaranteed governmental and border “privileges” for Christians and Shiites. Many Lebanese Christians have already turned against the entity of “Greater Lebanon,” which was established in 1920 and included Tripoli and other regions. Many Shiite extremists would be happy to secure a sectarian numerical majority by weakening the Sunni presence.
As for Syria, the opportunities to strengthen the position of the Sunni majority, on the one hand, and address the sensitivities of the Alawite, Christian, Druze, and Kurdish minorities, on the other, now appear available through an American-Turkish deal.
Furthermore, there is no harm in observing and considering, across the Syrian-Iraqi border, the radical transformations and major deals in the Kurdish arena. Do the calculations of dreams align with the details of the deals? Or are we reverting to the labyrinths of trial and error?
Four Scenarios for Syria’s Future
In light of the accumulated complexities facing post-Assad Syria, particularly evident in a series of domestic and regional statements, the country’s future stands at a critical crossroads, where conflicting projects are vying for influence, from calls for national unity to attempts at partition and foreign interventions that deepen the state’s fragility.
While regional and international powers compete to redraw the contours of influence within Syria, a highly sensitive political and security landscape is emerging, potentially leading to one of several pivotal scenarios.
The Unitarian Scenario with Conditional Regional Guarantees
The new Syria, headed by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, adheres to the unity of the country and rejects separatist moves and calls, or those that demonstrate a desire to expand the scope of special powers for areas inhabited by ethnic or sectarian majorities.
In addition, a religious position is emerging from the Grand Mufti of the Republic, Sheikh Osama al-Rifai, who emphasizes the need to preserve Syria’s territorial integrity and reject partition plans, regardless of the pretext.
The Kurdish vision for the future of relations with Damascus has worried the new government, which rejected a recently issued document calling for special powers for Kurds in the region they control.
But Damascus is not alone in rejecting this Kurdish tendency. Statements by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan align with the position of the new Syrian administration, which rejects any infringement on the country’s unity, even if it takes the form of regional powers within a federal system.
Erdoğan stressed on Wednesday that Türkiye will not allow the establishment of any parallel entity in Syria, warning that Israeli practices inside Syria represent a dangerous provocation. He also affirmed that his country will respond to attempts to destabilize the country in “various ways.”
This intersects with Sheikh Al-Rifai’s call to reject strife and avoid cycles of revenge, emphasizing that all Syrian blood is sacred and that the path to salvation lies in allowing justice to take its course, not in revenge. These positions come at an extremely dangerous moment, as some internal and external forces are attempting to reproduce the civil conflict with sectarian or regional motives. The Grand Mufti of Syria, along with Türkiye, perceives significant risks from the ongoing events between extremist factions and residents of Druze towns in the Damascus countryside. This comes in the wake of a video insulting the Prophet Muhammad, attributed to a member of the Druze community, which was quickly exploited to launch campaigns against members of this minority in villages near the capital.
Recent Israeli statements have heightened the sense of apprehension surrounding these events, as the Hebrew state has threatened to intervene to protect the Druze in Syria. These statements are in line with the rhetoric of Druze leaders within Israel, most notably Sheikh Muwaffaq Tarif, who calls on members of his community to accept Israeli protection.
A unified Syria scenario requires the convergence of the wills of the main actors—from the central state to the Kurdish and Druze forces and the civil opposition—into a comprehensive formula that could include administrative decentralization without compromising the unity of the state and pave the way for an agreed-upon political process, with regional guarantees from Türkiye and the influential Arab states in the Gulf region.
The Restricted Federal Scenario
Despite Damascus’ insistence on the first scenario, and Erdoğan’s description of the idea of federalism in Syria as “merely a dream,” there are active parties, particularly in northern and eastern Syria, that continue to push for international recognition of the de facto status quo imposed by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) for years, through a federal-style autonomous administration. Some Kurdish statements have reiterated their demand for “recognizing the rights of Syrian communities within a decentralized framework.”
While this proposal does not explicitly call for secession, it raises the ire of both Damascus and Ankara, as it is feared that it could be a prelude to a soft partition that could pave the way for future secession.
Some Druze proposals in the south, which have called for “protecting sectarian particularity within a unified state,” constitute a parallel to this approach. This scenario may find indirect support from some Western capitals and Israel, which seek to reduce Turkish influence after Iran’s expulsion from Syria, without direct military engagement. However, it remains risky, as it could open the door to new internal conflicts over borders, jurisdiction, and natural resources.
The Externally Supported Actual Partition Scenario
Recent Israeli statements—which have ranged from security warnings to repeated airstrikes on sites inside Syria to the occupation of large swaths of southern Syria after the fall of the Assad regime—raise serious concerns that there are those seeking to effectively dismantle Syria, or at least to keep it in a “quasi-state” that neither rises from unity nor collapses completely.
In this context, the escalation of Israeli strikes on sites inside Syrian territory is noteworthy, at a time when some Israeli parties continue to promote the idea of “sectarian mini-states” as a long-term solution to the Syrian conflict.
This scenario, if realized, would mean consolidating the current status quo: multiple zones of influence, each administered by a local force and with varying regional or international support. This scenario threatens the collapse of the Syrian state as a unified entity, makes stability an unattainable dream, and perpetuates decades of open interventions and proxy conflicts.
The Scenario of Prolonged Chaos
If all political efforts fail, and the lack of national consensus or effective regional and international support for a balanced political solution persists, and given the country’s disastrous economic and financial situation, Syria could slide into a new phase of chaos, marked by regional wars and mutual revenge operations, with local actors increasingly relying on external allies to achieve temporary gains.
Erdogan clearly indicated that there are those “testing Türkiye’s patience in the Syrian file,” suggesting that any field action that upsets the balance, especially on the Turkish border, could push Ankara into a broader, direct intervention.
Conversely, signs of tension are growing in the south, where fears of a recurrence of civil wars are rife, especially with the emergence of vengeful rhetoric in some quarters. The Grand Mufti of the Republic has warned against this, calling for the quelling of strife and the predominance of the logic of justice over the logic of revenge.
Between the scenarios of cautious unity, soft division, and systematic chaos, Syria faces an extremely sensitive historical imperative. The country’s future is determined not only by what Damascus, the opposition, or local forces want, but also by what the intertwined interests of regional and international powers on Syrian soil permit.
Egypt’s Reservations
Since the overthrow of the Assad regime, Egypt’s stance on events in Syria has been cautious in its approach to the new government in Damascus. This has been evident in diplomatic stances and official statements. Perhaps the most recent of these was what Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Ati said during his speech at the Arab Ministerial Meeting on Syria.
During his speech at the expanded ministerial meeting held in Riyadh, the Egyptian minister stressed the need to “prevent harboring terrorist elements” on Syrian territory, calling for concerted international efforts to prevent Damascus from becoming “a source of threat to the stability of the region or a hub for terrorist groups.”
Two days earlier, during a television interview, the Egyptian Foreign Minister described the new Syrian government as a “de facto authority.”
However, this cautious stance did not prevent Egypt, represented by its Foreign Minister, from being a partner in the Arab consensus—released from the Riyadh meeting—to support Syria and lift the sanctions imposed on it.
Egypt’s reservations about the radical changes in Syria were evident, as Cairo was relatively late in communicating with the new Damascus. The Egyptian Foreign Minister made a phone call to his Syrian counterpart about a full month after the new government assumed leadership of the country.
Official statements regarding the Syrian situation varied, describing it as “worrying” and paving the way for dangerous repercussions for the entire region.
Politicians and media figures loyal to the Egyptian government expressed their fears and warned against what they described as the rise of what they called armed organizations to power in Syria and the danger of exporting their ideology to other countries.
Egyptian authorities issued a decision requiring Syrians arriving from all over the world to Cairo to obtain permission from “relevant authorities,” without specifying who those authorities were.
Four Elements Determine Egypt’s Position on Syria
At the same time, Egyptian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ambassador Tamim Khallaf said that four main elements represent the determinants of Egypt’s position on developments in Syria, emphasizing the existence of a “sincere Egyptian desire” to assist Syria. In televised statements, Khalaf explained that these elements include: the necessity of respecting Syrian sovereignty, the unity and integrity of its territories, preserving Syrian national institutions and state capabilities, and initiating a comprehensive political process with pure Syrian national ownership that establishes a new phase of societal consensus without foreign dictates or interference. He also emphasized working with regional and international partners to support Syria in its reconstruction and the safe return of Syrian refugees to their country.
He emphasized that Cairo’s position aims solely to achieve the pure Syrian national interest, restore security and stability to Syria, and preserve the state’s capabilities. He noted that the transitional phase must be managed without exclusion, reflecting Syria’s sectarian and religious diversity, and ensuring that all Syrian political forces have a role in managing the transitional process.
The Syrian Experience Is Different
In a recent article, the Egyptian writer Amr Al-Shoubaki discusses how the Syrian experience has changed. He asserts that most experiences of change in the Middle East have tended to repeat the rhetoric of resistance in confronting the West and Israel, refusing to recognize the “Zionist entity,” and demanding the annulment or freezing of the Camp David Accords. The rhetoric of the Iranian revolution represented the cornerstone of adopting a discourse of resistance and armed resistance, confronting the policies of the “Great Satan,” and condemning peace settlement projects, from the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, through the Wadi Araba agreements between Jordan and Israel, to the Abraham Accords. The criterion of “political Islam,” in refusing to recognize Israel and raising the slogan of liberating Jerusalem, appears to be the standard by which many measure the “nationalism” of any regime and the extent of its defense of the “issues of the nation.”
Beyond the sectarian interpretation of the Iranian Revolution, which doesn’t truly reveal most of its dimensions, its timing in 1979 was a time when the prevailing Arab sentiment was to reject any relationship with Israel, and President Sadat’s move was an exception in this regard. It is true that the Iranian Revolution added its ideological dimensions to the Middle Eastern environment, which held a “degree of resistance” and many hopes for realizing the dream of liberating Palestine and restoring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people “through the barrel of a gun.” The conviction in resistance, armed resistance, and the rejection of any peaceful settlement was prevalent among broad segments of the Arab population, especially since the promises of the Iranian Revolution were significant. It promised to liberate Jerusalem and support the oppressed. Political Islam movements were also on the rise, before they were tested in governance and administration. Some continued to believe in the slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood and their allies in Egypt: “Islam is the solution.”
The End of the Arab Regional Order
Although events have shaken these deeply held beliefs that the only war Arabs and Muslims should fight is against Israel, there was the years-long Iran-Iraq War, which resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths. Then came Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, with all the repercussions it created for the Arab world, leading many experts to consider it the end of the “Arab regional order.”
Despite this, the Palestinian issue remained present, but receded into the background. This was particularly true after the failure of the Oslo process (1993), the aborted 2000 Intifada, the deterioration of the performance of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority, the entrenched Palestinian division, and the failure of Hamas as a political alternative to governance before and after October 7, 2023. All of this deepened the conviction of many that the primary cause of the Arab defeats was due to poor internal performance, not external conspiracies. This context represented the political backdrop for the moment of the Syrian revolution’s success in December 2024. It tested the discourse of resistance and Iranian promises in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq, and exposed the experiences of political Islamist movements in governing according to the old model and cognitive paradigm. The Islamist organization Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham came to power in Syria after the overthrow of the Assad regime, which had exploited resistance to kill Syrians. Arab states also decided to prioritize their national projects and interests. President Sadat’s unilateral move was accepted by many because it reclaimed occupied land. The Gaza War revealed that Arabs and Turks support the Palestinian cause politically, humanitarianly, media-wise, and legally (which remains far less than hoped for), not through war. If they fight, their war will be solely in defense of their security and national territory. Even the Iranians, who fought Israel, were primarily defending their national project and their regional and nuclear ambitions. The Syrian revolution discovered, the moment it came to power (and not long before that), that what its leader had been saying when he was in Jabhat al-Nusra, or leading Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and controlling Idlib—that Tahrir al-Sham was a step toward liberating Jerusalem—had no connection to the new Arab, regional, and international reality. The national calculations of each country had become entrenched, and no one fought except to liberate their own land.
Reading the Historical Moment
Al-Shoubaki believes that reading the historical moment is a prerequisite for the success of any political movement, without compromising national and humanitarian principles, international norms, and laws. Accepting a security agreement with Israel that guarantees its non-aggression against Syrian territory is acceptable but signing a peace treaty and normalizing relations while its occupation and aggression against Syrian territory continue is unacceptable. The Syrian administration continues to adhere to this position.
The Syrian revolution came to power in a “reformist” Arab climate, some of which had experimented with revolutions and revolutionary rhetoric but failed. This context also reflects the “post-October 7” context, which is supposed to restore respect for civil, political, and legal resistance against the Israeli occupation everywhere. A strong, civil Syria, with its authentic people, will be able, with Arab and regional support, to establish its national project and build strong institutions and a state of law capable of deterrence and liberation, a “successful model,” not a “resistance model.”
Israeli peace
The Arab states are still trying to prevent the process of “manipulating borders,” preserving the territorial integrity of Arab states, and preventing the imposition of “Israeli peace.” Official Arab sources believe a ceasefire agreement will be reached in Gaza, and they also believe a partial implementation of the Lebanon agreement will open the door to a prolonged truce. This is based on their conviction that what happened during the war with Iran revealed to Washington and Arab capitals the extent of the interconnectedness of the region’s wars, on the one hand, and the centrality of the Gaza war among them, on the other. They believe that if future rounds of war occur, the Arabs and America will be among the losers. Furthermore, any attempt to implicate Syria in a new adventure will severely detonate the region.
Arab circles believe that the loss will occur due to the massive destruction caused by a war that depends on oil and gas supplies and during which Arab economies will stagnate. These economies have become central to the US president’s calculations, following the massive Arab investments in America. However, these investments are linked to stability to ensure their flow. Arab sources confirm that Arab-American diplomatic cooperation strongly supports these two essential points, especially since circles within the US president’s team are linking shifts in the American public that are beginning to spiral out of control if the Gaza war continues. This is especially true with the upcoming midterm congressional elections, and Trump does not want to lose his majority, become a “lame duck,” and allow his Democratic opponents the opportunity to attempt to impeach him again. I believe that the coming days will reveal the strength of Türkiye’s relations with the Arab states, Trump’s new approach to peacemaking and stopping wars, and whether Netanyahu has learned his lessons or is still suffering from the hallucinations of victories and scenes of destruction, and does not see that everyone in the region sees him as nothing more than a chronic problem with no hope of stability except his departure.