From Comrades to Strategists
From Comrades to Strategists
By Mehmet Enes Beşer
China’s bilateral relations with Russia and North Korea in East Asian geopolitics have been instrumental in defining the region’s past and present. Founded on common ideologies and interests, their relation remains pertinent in foreign policy and in China’s regional stability strategy.
China’s bilateral ties with Russia and North Korea have been strategic alliances in recent years, with a dynamic of their own. The Sino-Russian relationship has been characterized by increasing economic cooperation and joint diplomatic action, more often than not, against Western hegemony. The “no-limits” China-Russia friendship is a testament to coordination between the two nations in maintaining a multipolar world order. In the meantime, a foundation of traditional relations with a moderating pinch of contemporary issues such as North Korea’s nuclear aspirations and economic sanctions form the foundation of China-North Korea relations. Stability and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula remain near China’s heart as it balances its role as a patron and regional burden.
This is the historical context under which the contemporary strategic realignment of China between the two nations makes sense. The Chinese diplomatic machinations from the earliest Cold War ideologically sympathetic times to the pragmatic alliances of the present day are akin to a balancing act in pitting the historic alignments against evolving national interest and regional security.
Historical Context: China’s Alliances with Russia and North Korea
China’s political connection with Russia and North Korea has been solidified by a century of relation that has actively shaped the geopolitics of East Asia. The past should be recalled so that today it can better comprehend China’s geopolitical position between the two countries.
Such political upheaval in the region following World War II was not experienced in East Asia. The establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1948 marked the beginning of the communist governments in East Asia. China and North Korea soon established diplomatic relations, and North Korea was recognized by China on October 6, 1949.
The Korean War (1950–1953) cemented the China-North Korea axis. The Chinese intervention in the form of the Chinese People’s Volunteers was a rescue to salvage North Korea from the UN and South Korean armies. The ideological and strategic partnership was with Western powers.
Meanwhile, China’s union with the Soviet Union was consummated in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in 1950. The treaty, with collective defense and loyalty to communist ideology at its center, was the centerpiece of the alliance. The alliance was, nevertheless, tumultuous, driven by men’s personality politics like Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin and by shifting power dynamics of early Cold War politics.
The subsequent two decades of the 1950s and 1960s witnessed Sino-Soviet relations worsening to the extent of the Sino-Soviet Split. National interest and ideological differences separated the two communist giants. The Sino-Soviet Split significantly impacted China’s foreign policy, and Beijing turned in the direction of an independent foreign policy and reshaping its relations with Moscow and Pyongyang.
Kim Il-Sung’s North Korea exploited the Sino-Soviet Rift by being semi-independent and in the situation to play the Soviet Union against China and the other way around. This worked to raise North Korea’s strategic worth to China as a buffer state, with Beijing then having adversaries on various sides at that time, including fighting along the border with the Soviet Union in 1969.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 ushered in revolutionary changes in the regional balance of power. North Korea’s most significant patron and economic supporter now was China, rather than the defunct Soviet Union. North Korea’s economy in the 1990s was also in crisis, where Chinese assistance was the balancing factor that staved off famine and economic isolation.
For China’s economic takeoff was not sidetracked by North Korean stagnation. Beijing’s more practical economic reform and opening to the world economy deviated from Pyongyang’s isolationism policy. The deviations, nevertheless, did not imply that China had no further use for stability in the Korean Peninsula or became an opponent of the kind of diplomatic initiative such as the Six-Party Talks and denuclearization of the peninsula.
China’s bilateral relations with Russia and North Korea over the last two years have been strategic alignments by themselves. The Sino-Russian axis has seen increased economic cooperation and coordinated diplomatic efforts, with a veneer of anti-Western domination. China-Russia’s “no-limits” partnership is a reflection of a convergence of the two countries towards the shaping of a multipolar global order.
In the meantime, Sino-North Korean relations are founded upon historical affinity yet characterized by contemporary issues like North Korean nuclearization and economic sanctions. China continues to seek stability promotion and peninsula denuclearization, balancing between the role of ally and that of regional leader.
China’s relationship with Russia and North Korea is the outcome of a history as complicated as that which shaped Europe’s geopolitics. China’s foreign policy practice, from ideological solidarity at the beginning of the Cold War to realpolitik diplomacy in the present, mirrors its ongoing search for balance between traditional alliances and emerging national interest and regional security imperatives.
Russia–North Korea Alliance: Strategic Implication to China
The recent Russia-North Korean axis is China’s grown-up issue, putting Beijing in the geopolitics juggling act among traditional alignment, regional stability, and international opinion. Its emerging Moscow-Pyongyang axis calls for careful consideration of what is in Chinese strategic interest.
China also has historical connections with Russia and North Korea ideologically as much as on the grounds of commonalities of aligned interests of a strategic partner nature. Intensified Russian-North Korean military collaborations more recently, however, introduce new variables to regional stability destabilizing the same further. Russia is alleged to be using North Korean military hardware and manpower support to intensify its war activities in Ukraine and thus make it further complicated for China to balance its diplomacy.
China’s preference is stability on the Korean Peninsula. A closer Russia–North Korea relationship would more likely prolong Pyongyang’s military stance to be more threatening, raising the cost for destabilizing actions. That instability is China’s strategic interest in the other direction, a stable periphery that encourages economic growth and regional influence. Other than that, a belligerent North Korea will set off an arms race in the region that will cause regional powers like South Korea and Japan to militarize, even against America. That will be in competition with Chinese influence and will confuse Northeast Asian security issues.
Politically, the North Korea-Russian axis will be contrary to Chinese interests. Both countries are plagued by international sanctions, and their reunification can lead to tighter enforcement or the imposition of additional sanctions that have the potential to impact regional trade networks. China becoming a part of such networks means there are more sanctions to overflow into its economy, particularly border regions that conduct trade with North Korea. Further, China’s external economic agenda, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, will also face increasing scrutiny and criticism from Western nations sensing that China is engaged in financing sanctioned regimes.
Politically, the axis tarnishes China’s reputation as a responsible global power. China has lectured for decades on non-interference and peaceful resolution of disputes. Russia’s and North Korea’s overt military alignment, especially following the Ukrainian crisis, is putting China on shaky ground. The implication of even tacit approval, or even failure to condemn them, would be acquiescence in aggression and undermining China’s reputation with Western countries and complicating China’s accession to world organizations worldwide. Or, refusing the marriage at first can drive two neighboring countries into one another’s arms to China’s loss and exclusion by them.
Second, alignment would inevitably impact Chinese security interests at the domestic level. A North Korea that is more belligerent and has more combat capability would translate into more unstable foreign policy, and therefore border clashes or refugee flow into China are more probable under increased tensions or war. These would be expensive to Chinese resources and could result in domestic destabilization, particularly among border provinces.
To avert such risks, China will adopt a multi-track strategy. It would toughen diplomatic language to convey its aspiration for stability in the region and deter such a step that would invite additional tensions. China can toughen its border defense mechanisms in a bid to ready itself for any eventuality resulting from North Korean instability. China is economically poised to try to diversify its unions in an effort to minimize any impact of destabilizing sanctions from the Russia-North Korea axis.
At equilibrium, Russia’s warming ties with North Korea present China with a challenge to be responded to multilaterally at the intersection of regional stability, economic interests, and diplomatic balance. China must balance its walk on a tightrope, seeking to push its own strategic interests without threatening strategic neighbors and international prestige. The drama confirms the extent of geopolitical machinations and China’s need to conduct them in an environment of attention to detail and anticipation.
China’s Strategic Response: Balancing Act
China’s strategic reaction to evolving Russia–North Korea relations must be a high-wire balancing act, suitable to its tense role in the regional and worldwide geopolitics calculation. Beijing’s policy is that of a mix of diplomatic restraint, financial pragmatism, and strategic ambiguity, each designed to advance national interests without mirroring regional instability.
Diplomatically, China has circumvented the new Moscow-Pyongyang axis. That diplomatic step is an indication that Beijing does not wish to be directly associated with the turmoil created by North Korea’s purported military assistance to Russia in its war with Ukraine. By neither condemning it, but also not endorsing it wholeheartedly, China is also attempting to uphold its policy of non-interference and thereby preserve its relationship with the two nations without further exacerbating the current tensions.
Economically, China is a friend to Russia and North Korea but at a higher defense mode to ensure there is no undercutting of international sanctions. Beijing cuts its economics trade down to the bare minimum to ensure there is no accidental enabling of activities that would justify sanctions by the international community. This operational notice is nothing but China taking heed of what happens when a nation makes China the victim of the repercussions of what they have set in motion.
Strategically, China views the impact of the Russia–North Korea alliance on the trajectory of regional security. The threat posed by Moscow and Pyongyang’s combined military cooperation threatens an arms race in Northeast Asia and destabilizes the region and undermines Beijing’s bid for a secure environment. The resolution is China’s emphasis on diplomacy and peaceful resolution of conflict, necessitating mechanisms functioning in submission to security interests without the escalation of military tensions.
To this degree, China’s strategic calculation also involves anchoring in regional multilateral forums. As an active participant in the Six-Party Talks and drawing in neighboring countries, such as South Korea and Japan, China desires to be a stabilizer. In achieving this, China is not only responding to the Russia–North Korea axis but also devising China’s desire for maintaining the region stable and secure.
Actually, China’s Russia–North Korea alignment diplomacy is a virtuoso balancing act, carefully calibrated to further its national interest and regional stability. In its combination of diplomatic restraint, economic pragmatism, and strategic alliance, Beijing aims to orchestrate the dynamics of this new alignment as skillfully as it has orchestrated the geopolitics of the day.
Conclusion: Managing Complex Alliances
China’s handling of changing Russia–North Korea relations is a reflection of its excellence in dealing with changing geopolitical facts. Once at times an ally to both nations, China must now balance its strategic interests with changing realities.
The reinforcement of the Moscow-Pyongyang defense tie, as seen via the news of North Korean fighters fighting to serve Russian interests in Ukraine, is a delicate subject to Beijing. The dominant Beijing approach has been classically prudent, comprised of a sage choice to avoid and observe.
Economically too, China’s involvement is multilateral. China is the North’s largest trading partner, providing Pyongyang with its economic lifeline, the Chinese share of which accounts for almost 90% of the total. Further, China’s help is limited by fear of North Korea’s nuclear dream, which Beijing sees as destabilizing.
Diplomatically, China is following the policy of regional stability but not openly at conflict with its former allies. The balancing act is reflected in China’s attempts to allow North Korea to bypass multilateral sanctions while trying to keep Pyongyang ‘at arm’s length’ without severing relations.
Briefly, China’s foreign policy action within the domain of Russia–North Korea is one of its demonstrations of skill at handling complicated alliances. Emulating a low-profile and prudent approach, China tests regional stability, protects national interests, and deals with the complexity of modern geopolitics.