Andrey Lankov, a Korea expert: Sooner or later, the DPRK soldiers will appear at the Ukrainian frontline

Andrei Lankov is one of the leading Russian oriental studies experts. In 1985, he attended Pyongyang’s Kim Il Sung University and currently works as a professor at Kookmin University, Seoul. Unlike lots of other pundits, Lankov does his best to analyse the DPRK issues impartially, ignoring propaganda of both sides.

Exclusively to UWI, Andrei Lankov commented on the rumors of North Korean soldiers being deployed at the Ukrainian battlefront — a sudden step that followed the signing of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. This treaty was signed by two leaders, Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un, on June 18, 2024 and came into official force on December 4, 2024.

Why did Russia decide to make such a deal with North Korea? Is Russia’s Asian strategy changing?

In my view, the decision to send DPRK troops to the Ukrainian frontline is not connected to a shift in Russia’s strategy in Asia. Rather, it is primarily driven by domestic policy considerations. Broadly speaking, Russian society does not strongly oppose the war in Ukraine, and the popularity of Vladimir Putin and his government has significantly increased during the conflict, thanks to the usual rally-round-the-flag effect and increased incomes fueled by wartime Keynesianism. [An economic theory assuming that stimulating people’s demand can avoid inflation and crisis; the source of stimulating this mass demand — increasing salaries — is described in the next paragraph — UWI]

Nevertheless, Russian decision-makers are clearly aware that while most people generally support or, ot least, accept the Kremlin’s current foreign policy, they are not eager to personally join the fighting units.

Conducting a new mobilization [the last, and so far the only one, took place in autumn 2022 — UWI.] could seriously undermine the government’s popularity and further strain the economy, especially given that labor shortages in Russia have reached unprecedented levels.  [According to the official sources, the country needs 2,5 million more workers, mostly because of demographic reasons; as an example, the Autumn 2022 mobilization has moved about 300,000 qualified men from the economy to the army — UWI.]

In this case, the Russian side heavily relies prefers on the ‘kontraktniki’, the well-paid volunteer troopers [the men voluntarily assigned to the military forces, for a $50,000-100,000 annual salary — UWI.]. In recent months, the sign-up bonuses paid as lump sums to volunteers in some Russian regions have reached $25,000. This indicates that the pool of potential volunteers is shrinking. Therefore, employing foreign military personnel becomes a logical— although, admittedly, somewhat unconventional — solution. While it may seem unusual in the 21st century, such an approach would have been quite normal and common a couple of hundred years ago.

But where can such foreign fighting forces be found? Due to a combination of political, military, and demographic factors, North Korea appears to be the only country capable of providing Russia with battle-ready manpower.

What does the Russia-DPRK’s Strategic Agreement cover?

If you mean some veiled meanings or secret protocols to this document — honestly, I don’t think they exist. The revial of the Moscow-Pyongyang military alliance [previously lasted during the communist regime, 1945-91 — UWI.] initially seemed strange for many observers — but now, in light of the North Korean forces being sent to Ukraine, the initial intent of both sides is clear. The existence of a formal military alliance makes such a deployment more or less legally explainable.

When it comes to the exact forms of military and military-technical partnership, these issues will be resolved on the ground, depending on the ever-changing situation. One thing is clear: North Korea is interested in obtaining not only economic aid and hard currency but also military technologies.

Will they get what they want? I know not. Moscow has traditionally been reluctant to share sensitive technologies with anyone, including its allies, and this stance is understandable. Perhaps the precise conditions of any potential technology transfer would become a subject of negotiations, which could prove to be highly complex.

Here, South Korea enters the game. Seoul has repeatedly stated that it would not react too dramatically if North Korean troops were to appear in Ukraine [the potential weakening of the Northern army in another conflict benefits the South — UWI]. However, if Russia really transfers dangerous technologies to the DPRK, a big ‘if’, Seoul has threatened to reciprocate by significantly increasing its military aid — primarily ammunition supplies — to Ukraine. These warnings have, of course, been noted and likely taken into consideration in Moscow.

Thereafter, are North Korean soldiers really serving in Russia, or will they?

By all indications, they are in Russia now. Neither the statements of South Korean intelligence services nor the official agencies of other countries can be fully trusted — but the Internet offers plenty of photographic evidence clearly proving the presence of DPRK servicemen in Russia. Additionally, there are images depicting the transportation of weapons via the Trans-Siberian Railway, including, notably, the Koksan self-propelled guns.

On the other hand, I am skeptical of the reports alleging the direct involvement of DPRK soldiers right now. The presence of North Korean units at the frontlines would be impossible to conceal and would become widely known almost immediately. For now, I believe that DPRK soldiers are undergoing training and acclimating to the new conditions. Nevertheless, it is clear that they have not come to Russia as tourists and are therefore likely to reach the frontlines sooner or later.